The Politics of Globalization by Kreuter, Helena
 IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca  
Lucca, Italy  
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven  
Leuven, Belgium  
The Politics of Globalization  
Joint Degree in “Institutions, Markets and Technologies – 
Curriculum in Economics, Management and Data Science”, 
XXXI Cycle, and in “Business Economics”  
By  
Helena Kreuter  
2019  
 
  
 The dissertation of Helena Kreuter is approved.  
 
Program Coordinator:  
Prof. Dr. Pietro Pietrini, IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca 
 
 
Supervisors:  
Prof. Dr. Massimo Riccaboni, IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca 
Prof. Dr. Dirk Czarnitzki, KU Leuven 
Dr. Guglielmo Barone, Banca d’Italia 
 
 
Assessment Committee Faculty Members: 
Dr. Armando Rungi, IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca 
Dr. Mattia Nardotto, KU Leuven 
 
 
The dissertation of Helena Kreuter has been reviewed by:  
Prof. Dr. Andrea Fracasso, University of Trento 
Prof. Dr. Bettina Peters, University of Luxembourg  
 
 
 
 
IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca  
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
2019  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my family 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII 
Contents 
 
List of Figures .............................................................................................. IX 
List of Tables .................................................................................................. X 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................... XII 
Vita and Presentations ............................................................................ XIII 
Abstract ...................................................................................................... XVI 
1   Introduction ...............................................................................................1 
2   Low-wage import competition and populist backlash:  
     The case of Italy ....................................................................................... 10 
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 10 
2.2 Data and measurement issues ........................................................ 17 
2.3 Empirical strategy ............................................................................ 23 
2.4 Results on populism......................................................................... 24 
2.5 Labor market as the transmission channel ................................... 34 
2.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................... 38 
2.7 Appendix ........................................................................................... 40 
3   Employment, turnover and profitability effects of the 
     German national minimum wage: A sectoral analysis .................... 44 
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 44 
3.2 Data and institutional context ........................................................ 47 
3.2.1 Institutional context ................................................................ 47 
VIII 
3.2.2 Firm-level data ........................................................................ 49 
3.2.3 Sector-level treatment indicator ............................................ 49 
3.3 Estimation .......................................................................................... 50 
3.4 Discussion.......................................................................................... 58 
3.5 Robustness checks ............................................................................ 63 
3.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................... 67 
3.7 Supporting details ............................................................................ 69 
3.8 Appendix ........................................................................................... 74 
4   Is protection really good for the imposing country? 
     A production network approach .......................................................... 78 
4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 78 
4.2 Tariffs on imported intermediates ................................................. 83 
4.2.1 Model setup ............................................................................. 84 
4.2.2 Competitive equilibrium ....................................................... 86 
4.2.3 Shock propagation .................................................................. 88 
4.3 Border-adjustments in corporate profit taxation ......................... 91 
4.4 Conclusion ......................................................................................... 93 
4.5 Proofs ................................................................................................. 96 
4.5.1 Proofs of results in Section 4.2.2 ........................................... 96 
4.5.2 Proofs of results in Section 4.2.3 ........................................... 99 
4.5.3 Proof of result in Section 4.3 ................................................ 103 
4.5.4 Cobb-Douglas-CES utility function....................................105  
References ................................................................................................... 107 
IX 
List of Figures  
 
 
1.1        Trend in world exports and gross domestic product ....................1 
2.1        Populism in some Western countries ............................................ 14 
2.2        R&D expenditure and worldwide market share dynamics ....... 15 
2.3        Export dynamics .............................................................................. 19 
2.4        Populism trend ................................................................................. 22 
3.1        Ratio of minimum wage to median wage, 2015 ........................... 48 
3.2        Employment effect in East Germany ............................................. 56 
3.A.1    Correlation share, gap and wage bill indicators .......................... 76 
X 
List of Tables  
 
 
2.1       Baseline estimation ........................................................................... 25 
2.2       Robustness checks ............................................................................. 27 
2.3       Confounding factors ......................................................................... 32 
2.4       Additional findings - invalid ballots and voter turnout .............. 33 
2.5       Trade shock and total employment ................................................ 35 
2.6       Trade shock and income .................................................................. 36 
2.7       Trade shock and income inequality ................................................ 38 
2.A1    Descriptive statistics ......................................................................... 40 
2.A2    List of two-digit sectors .................................................................... 41 
2.A3    List of populist parties by election .................................................. 43 
3.1       Treated, untreated and greyzone sectors ....................................... 51 
3.2       Matching summary ........................................................................... 53 
3.3       Employment effects .......................................................................... 55 
3.4       Employment effects - micro and small enterprises ...................... 58 
3.5       Matching design – credit rating and turnover regressions ......... 60 
3.6       Credit rating effects - all, micro and small enterprises ................ 61 
XI 
3.7       Turnover effects - all, micro and small enterprises ...................... 62 
3.8       Employment, turnover and credit rating effects - smaller  
            grey zone ............................................................................................ 64 
3.9       Bite measure indicator overview .................................................... 65 
3.10     Employment, turnover and credit rating effects - Gap ................ 66 
3.11     Employment, turnover and credit rating effects - WBI ................ 67 
3.12     Exit rate effects................................................................................... 71 
3.13     Employment and turnover effects - Italian control firms ............ 72 
3.A1    Overview of bite, gap and wage bill indicators by sector 
            (East-West) ......................................................................................... 74 
3.A2    Summary statistics ............................................................................ 75 
3.A3    Difference in difference, by region ................................................. 77 
 
 
XII 
Acknowledgements 
 
Chapter 2 is the reproduction of the paper “Low-wage import 
competition and populist backlash: The case of Italy”, co-authored with 
Guglielmo Barone. 
Chapter 3 is the reproduction of the paper “Employment, turnover and 
profitability effects of the German national minimum wage: A sectoral 
analysis”, co-authored with Dirk Czarnitzki and Jesse Wursten.  
Chapter 4 is the reproduction of the paper “Is protection really good for 
the imposing country? A production network approach”, co-authored 
with Massimo Riccaboni. 
 
 
XIII 
Vita 
 
October 19, 1988 
 
Born, Frankfurt am Main, Germany 
  
 Education 
 
2017-present PhD Candidate in “Business Economics” 
KU Leuven, Belgium 
 
2015-present PhD Candidate in “Economics, Management 
and Data Sciences” (XXXI Cycle), 
IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, Italy 
 
2015 M.Sc. in “Economics”, 
Final mark: 110/110 cum laude 
University of Pisa and Sant’Anna School of 
Advanced Studies, Italy 
 
2011 B. Sc. in “Scienze Economiche” 
Final Mark: 110/110 cum laude 
University of Pisa, Italy 
 
  
 Education Abroad 
 
10/2017-02/2018 Visiting Research Student at the Faculty of 
Business and Economics, KU Leuven Belgium 
 
10/2009-06/2010 Erasmus Stay at the University of Durham, 
United Kingdom 
 
08/2008 Summer School, London School of Economics, 
United Kingdom 
 
XIV 
 Working Experience 
 
03/2015-09/2015 Internship at the Autorità di Bacino Pilota del 
Fiume Serchio, Lucca, Italy 
 
11/2018-present Research Assistant at the Institute for Public 
Economics, Köln, Germany 
 
  
 Additional Qualifications 
 
10/2012 GRE Certificate; Milan, Italy 
 
06/2015 IELTS Certificate, Florence Italy 
 
  
 Grants 
 
2018 FWO PhD Fellowship from the Research 
Foundation Flanders 
 
2015 Full PhD Scholarship from IMT School for 
Advanced Studies Lucca, Italy 
 
XV 
Presentations 
 
1. Barone, Guglielmo, and Helena Kreuter, “Low-wage import 
competition and populist backlash: The case of Italy”. Paper 
presented at the Florence branch of the Banca d’Italia, September 13, 
2017. 
2. Barone, Guglielmo, and Helena Kreuter, “Low-wage import 
competition and populist backlash: The case of Italy”. Paper 
presented at the Workshop on Recent Advances in Public Economics 
and Quantitative Methods, IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, 
March 9, 2018. 
3. Barone, Guglielmo, and Helena Kreuter, “Low-wage import 
competition and populist backlash: The case of Italy”. Paper 
presented at the Faculty of Business and Economics - KU Leuven, 
July 9, 2018. 
XVI 
Abstract 
 
Over the past three decades, trade with low-wage countries - in first 
place China - has grown dramatically. Economic theory has long 
recognized that trade liberalization, though enlarging the overall 
economic pie, also produces strong redistributive effects: while it 
increases aggregate productivity and benefits consumers through lower 
prices and a wider range of available goods, at the same time it is also 
associated with substantial adjustment costs in the labour market. As the 
gains are diffuse but the costs concentrated, the lack of appropriate 
compensatory mechanisms is likely to drive a backlash against the 
ongoing economic transformations. 
The present dissertation aims at providing further understanding on the 
consequences of trade globalization for developed countries. 
Specifically, our focus is on the political dimension of the phenomenon. 
Indeed, ballot boxes represent a litmus test of economic changes with 
profound social effects and policymakers are called upon to offer 
adequate responses to the citizens’ requests. 
In chapter 2, we study empirically the role of low-wage import 
competition from China in shaping electoral outcomes in Italy over the 
period from 1992 to 2013. Given the unequal growth of Chinese exports 
across sectors, we compare the voting pattern at the national 
parliamentary elections in about 8,000 municipalities differently 
exposed to the trade shock according to their ex-ante industry 
specialization. The model is estimated in first differences and Italian 
imports from China are instrumented by Chinese exports to other high-
income countries. 
We find that China’s trade liberalization has favoured the spread of 
populism in Italy. This result is robust to a large number of sensitivity 
checks as well as to concurrent shocks that may have contributed to spur 
a populist reaction in the Italian electorate - immigration, the 
introduction of the Euro and fiscal austerity. Moreover, we show that 
import competition from China has triggered also other forms of protest 
vote, namely invalid ballot papers and abstentionism. In line with the 
XVII 
predictions of economic theory, the channels at work turn out to be 
labour market adjustments. 
If trade globalization is a key determinant behind the recent wave of 
protest vote across the Western World, how can policymakers meet the 
challenges associated with it? This dissertation assesses the desirability 
of three distinct economic policies, one intervening directly on the labour 
market and the other two acting, respectively, at the trade and fiscal 
level.  
In chapter 3, we present a novel approach to analyse the employment 
growth effects of the introduction of a national minimum wage (€8.50 
per hour of work) in Germany on January 1st 2015. Thanks to our access 
to household survey data and proprietary firm-level data, we compare 
firms in heavily affected sectors to similar firms in de facto unaffected 
sectors. Industry vulnerability is determined according to the share of 
eligible workers with pre-treatment hourly wage below €8.50 - 
computed separately for East and West Germany. Treated units are 
linked to control units matching on past employment and forward 
looking credit ratings.  
We detect only very small negative employment effects in East Germany 
(0.05 percent of overall employment, 22000 jobs lost), mainly 
concentrated among small firms. The lack of a significant occupational 
impact still holds when we use different thresholds for treatment 
assignment or alternative minimum wage bite measures. To explain our 
finding, we provide evidence that, in West Germany, the minimum 
wage introduction has also induced positive effects on turnover and a 
deterioration of credit ratings, while, among treated firms in East 
Germany, turnover remains stable and credit ratings actually improve. 
Thus, ex-ante fears for dramatic job losses seem not justified and 
minimum wage policy may actually help to mitigate inequality in major 
industrial economies. 
In chapter 4, we develop a simple theoretical framework that allows us 
to investigate the macroeconomic consequences of sector-specific tariffs 
on imported intermediates in the presence of input-output linkages 
among industries. Our model features a large open economy with 
XVIII 
multiple perfectly competitive sectors and exogenous market power. 
Each industry specializes in the production of a distinct good according 
to a nested Cobb-Douglas-CES technology; its output sales (net of 
national imports of the same good) meet final demand by a 
representative household with Cobb-Douglas preferences and 
intermediate input demand by other sectors. Under wasteful 
government spending, we establish that a positive sectoral input tariff 
shock entails a loss in aggregate value added, by lowering output not 
only of the protected industry’s immediate customers but also of its 
customers’ customers and so on. 
Assuming next that a given share of each industry’s total output is sold 
on foreign markets, our model can also be used to evaluate the 
macroeconomic implications of the introduction of border-adjustments 
into sector-homogeneous corporate profit taxation. We show that a shift 
to a destination-based regime induces a change in aggregate value added 
that results from the net effect of border-adjustments’ two key 
components, the impossibility to deduct the costs of imported inputs 
from the corporate income tax base but the ability to exclude export sales 
from it. For low sectoral export shares, the network propagation 
triggered by the implicit import tax is more powerful than that triggered 
by the implicit export subsidy, leading to a contraction of overall 
economic activity. 
Thus, in today’s highly vertically integrated advanced economies, the 
unilateral adoption of both import tariffs on intermediates and border-
adjusted corporate taxes may turn out to be counterproductive for the 
imposing country even before retaliation is considered. 
1 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Since mid-1980s international trade has expanded steadily, marking the 
onset of the third wave of globalization. In particular, merchandise 
export volumes have been growing at a much faster pace than 
production, with even more impressive rates after 2000 (see Figure 1). 
The trade slowdown caused by the recent global financial crisis seems 
not to have reversed this trend. 
 
Figure 1.1: Trend in world exports (blu) and gross domestic product 
(orange) 
 
Source: Worldbank 
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2 
The extraordinary development of trade, to which Rodrik (2011) refers 
as “hyper-globalization”, was made possible by a subsequent reduction 
in the costs of moving goods, ideas and people (Baldwin, 2016) as well 
as by the liberalization of cross-border capital movements, the 
multilateral dismantling of customs duties in different areas of the world 
market, the creation of the European Single Market and the increasing 
fragmentation of production processes in global value chains (Südekum, 
2018). A key role was played by the low-wage Asian economies, first and 
foremost China, which enacted deep economic reforms in the 1980s and 
1990s and gained access into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2001. 
Economic theory has long recognized that trade globalization produces 
both winners and losers. Specifically, this imbalance may arise on two 
levels: between countries and within a country.  
The central finding of Ricardo (1817) was that free trade produces 
aggregate welfare gains for all trading partners as it allows countries to 
specialize in the goods in which they have a comparative advantage. 
Subsequent literature has put forward a number of arguments for why 
free trade does not necessarily lead to a win-win situation, including 
among others, adverse terms of trade (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950; 
Myrdal, 1957; Nurkse, 1959), unequal exchange (Baran and Sweezy, 
1966; Emmanuel, 1972), domestic distortions (Haberler, 1950; Bhagwati, 
1963; Johnson, 1965; Bhagwati, 1971) and imbalances between the 
expansion of imports and exports (Autor et al., 2013). 
Anyway, even if a country in aggregate benefits from the process of trade 
integration, internal inequalities may still exacerbate as trade mandates 
reallocation of workers and jobs and permanently alters skills demands 
(IFS Annual Lecture, 2017). This claim is rooted in the well-known 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem (1941), which has been derived within the 
traditional Heckscher-Ohlin framework and can be stated in general 
terms as follows: under competitive conditions, as long as complete 
specialization is ruled out, there is always at least one factor of 
production that experiences a decline in its real returns as a result of 
opening up to trade (Rodrik, 2018). More recently, a number of new 
mechanisms through which trade can influence within-country income 
3 
inequality have been brought to light: hetereogenous firms and 
bargaining, trade in tasks, labour market frictions, and incomplete 
contracts (see Harrison, 2011). 
Until the late 1990s, the consensus among economists was that the 
distributive effects of international trade had limited practical relevance. 
This consensus arose as a result of a number of studies focusing on the 
increase in the skill-premium - the wage gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers - observed both in developed and developing 
countries. With few exceptions (e.g. Wood, 1995; Feenstra and Hanson, 
1996), such a trend was mainly explained by skill-biased technological 
change; other factors considered along with trade were weaker trade 
unions and immigration. 
Yet, the impressive surge in exports from developing countries over the 
past two decades has prompted empirical analysis, in tune with 
theoretical developments, to reassess the redistributive effects of trade, 
with a special focus on developed countries most exposed to low-wage 
import competition. While several recent contributions have focused on 
local labour market adjustments (e.g. Autor et al., 2013; Dauth et al., 2014; 
Malgouyres, 2017a), another approach goes one step further by asking 
how social groups threatened by trade globalization respond in terms of 
voting behaviour (Kayser, 2007). Indeed, voting behaviour represents a 
litmus test of economic changes with profound social effects. 
In principle, because free trade brings about an improvement in 
aggregate economic efficiency, income could be redistributed from the 
winners to the losers. The so-called compensation hypothesis suggests 
that globalization leads to welfare state expansion (Cameron, 1978; 
Ruggie, 1982; Katzenstein, 1985; Rodrik, 1998) as higher integration into 
the world economy increases individuals’ feeling of economic insecurity 
(Scheve and Slaughter, 2004) and shapes preferences of more vulnerable 
citizens in favour of social protection (Walter, 2010). Yet, today 
compensation is economically and politically difficult (Rodrik, 2018): (i) 
the imposition of the taxes needed to dispense assistance creates 
deadweight losses and their collection is constrained by the increasing 
mobility of capital headed towards low-taxation countries; (ii) 
policymakers are often time-inconsistent;  and (iii) the bargaining power 
4 
of workers’ organizations has weakened in advanced economies over 
the last few decades. As a result, governments may fail to provide 
sufficient compensation (Frieden, 2017)  
At the end of the last century, new political forces, labelled as populist, 
have emerged in many Western countries. Since 2000, support for these 
forces has more than doubled (see Rodrik, 2018), disrupting so long 
established patterns of party competition (Ingelhart and Norris, 2016). 
The victory of Donald Trump in the US and the significant electoral 
results of the Front National in France, the Dutch Freedom Party in the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom Independence Party in Great Britain 
and the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in Austria are all examples of a 
far-reaching tendency. Despite their differences, Mudde (2007) suggests 
that populist parties share three core features: anti-establishment, 
nativism and authoritarianism.  
What are the causes behind such a political development? Theoretical 
research on the political economy of populism has pointed to economic 
insecurity stemming from exposure to globalization as a key 
determinant (e.g. Guiso et al. 2017; Rodrik, 2018).1 At the same time, a 
number of empirical papers has started documenting how various forces 
associated with globalization, such as low-wage import competition and 
immigration, give rise to a demand for protectionism (e.g. Scheve and 
Slaughter 2001a,b; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Scheve and Slaughter 2007; 
Di Tella et al., 2019) and increase support for non-mainstream parties 
(e.g. Autor et al., 2016; Dippel at al., 2017; Malgouyres, 2017b; Caselli et 
al., 2018; and Colantone and Stanig, 2018b; Becker and Fetzer, 2016; 
Fetzer, 2018). 
In chapter 2, we empirically study the role of trade globalization in 
shifting the Italian electoral base toward populism. Following the 
literature pioneered by Autor et al. (2013), the trade shock is proxied 
with swiftly rising import competition from China. Indeed, thanks to a 
rapid process of structural transformation and international integration, 
                                                          
1 Other explanations of the populist success are based either on a backlash against 
progressive cultural change (Ingelhart and Norris, 2016) or on the 2008-2013 financial crisis 
(e.g. Guiso et al., 2019; Algan et al., 2017; Dustman et al., 2017).  
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China’s share in world exports rocketed from 2 percent in 1990 to 14 
percent in 2015 (WTO Trade Profiles). Italy has not been immune to this 
impetuous trend; rather, as its initial product specialization model was 
more heavily centered on the less technologically advanced sectors, Italy 
was more vulnerable to the China shock than its Western competitors.  
Our focus is on the parliamentary national elections that took place in 
Italy - under proportional rule - between 1992 (globalization take-off) 
and 2013. Populist parties in each of these elections are identified by 
relying on the classification provided in Inglehart and Norris (2016). The 
authors label a party as populist if it scores high on an index of 13 
selected policy dimensions contained in the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey, ranging from political, social and religious values, to material 
interests, to stance towards market deregulation and state management 
of the economy. 
In order to exploit geographic heterogeneity in the Italian production 
structure, we borrow the specification of local trade exposure derived by 
Autor et al. (2013) and compare the voting pattern in about 8,000 
municipalities differently affected by Chinese import competition 
according to their ex-ante sectoral composition of employment. The 
model is estimated in first differences and potential endogeneity issues 
are addressed by instrumenting Italian sectoral imports from China with 
Chinese sectoral exports to other high-income countries only weakly 
integrated in terms of trade with Italy. 
We find that China’s surge in international trade has favoured the spread 
of populism in Italy. This result is robust to a large number of sensitivity 
checks - pertaining, among others, to the classification of populist parties 
and to the measurement of import exposure - as well as to three 
concurrent shocks that may also have contributed to the spread of 
populism in Italy - namely immigration, the introduction of the Euro and 
fiscal austerity. Moreover, we show that voters’ protest reaction also 
takes the form of an increase in invalid ballot papers and a drop in 
turnout. To rationalize our findings, we assess the role of labour market 
adjustments as possible transmission channel and we detect that Chinese 
import competition leads to higher unemployment and lower income 
and is associated with a rise in inequality.  
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Thus, the empirical evidence in chapter 2 is consistent with the 
prediction of economic theory according to which trade globalization 
creates distributional consequences. The question then is: how can 
policymakers meet these challenges?   
The obvious answer would be to strengthen the welfare state through 
reforms aimed at supporting the most vulnerable workers and jobs. In 
this respect, an interesting policy is the minimum wage, which is 
currently under discussion in Italy. Indeed, according to the ILO 
Minimum Wage Policy Guide, “the purpose of minimum wages is to 
protect workers against unduly low pay” and so to help “overcome 
poverty and reduce inequality”. Yet, as pointed out by Neumark (2014), 
the effectiveness of minimum wages at achieving this goal actually 
depends on whether they destroy jobs for low-paid workers in poor or 
low-income families.  
Economists have long explored the existence of disemployment effects 
associated with minimum wage policy (see for a review: Brown et al., 
1982; Card and Krueger, 1995; Neumark and Wascher, 2007/8; Schmitt, 
2013; Belman and Wolfson, 2014/6). Despite the abundance of studies - 
mainly focused on the US -, there is still no consensus on the issue: some 
papers report no, or even, positive employment effects, others provide 
evidence of job losses.  
In chapter 3, we contribute to this debate by analysing systematically the 
employment effects of the introduction of a national statutory minimum 
wage (€8.50 per hour) in Germany on January 1st 2015. Germany offers 
an interesting opportunity to reassess the desirability of minimum wage 
policy from the perspective of a major industrial economy. Indeed, from 
the mid-1990s onwards, Germany had witnessed the progressive erosion 
of its collective bargaining system as a result of the introduction of 
opening clauses after the reunification with Eastern Germany (Schnabel, 
1999), the increase in outsourcing of economic activities, the opening up 
of public services to private providers and the Hartz-Acts of the Schröder 
government in 2003 (Weinkopf, 2015). By 2013, coverage had fallen from 
its peak of 85 percent before reunification to just 60 percent in the West 
and 48 percent in the East (WSI‐Tarifarchiv, 2016). This process led to the 
development of one of the largest low-wage sectors in Europe (Bosch, 
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2018) so that the bite of the new German minimum wage was strong 
despite its not particularly high level: about four million eligible 
employees were paid less than €8,50 in 2014, most of them concentrated 
in the East and within service sectors (Minimum Wage Commission, 
2016). 
Moreover, we have access to individual-level data from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel as well as to proprietary firm-level data from the 
Mannheim Enterprise Panel. The depth and richness of these datasets 
allows us to adopt a novel approach in the estimation of how 
employment growth responds to the introduction of a national 
minimum wage: we compare firms in heavily affected sectors with 
similar firms in de facto unaffected sectors. Industry vulnerability is 
determined according to the share of eligible workers with pre-treatment 
hourly wage below €8.50 - computed separately for East and West 
Germany. Treated units are linked to control units, matching on past 
employment and forward looking credit ratings.  
Our results point out only very small negative employment effects in 
East Germany (0.05 percent of overall employment, 22000 jobs lost), 
mainly driven by small firms. The lack of a significant occupational 
impact, which is in line with other ex-post evaluations (for a review, see 
Caliendo et al, 2018), is confirmed also when we use different thresholds 
for treatment assignment and alternative measures of the minimum 
wage bite. To explain this outcome more optimistic than ex-ante 
predictions, we discuss three potential adjustment channels - 
complementary to those already identified by existing studies (non-
compliance: Burauel et al., 2017; increased unpaid overtime: Burauel et 
al., 2017; and lower working hours: Burauel et al., 2018). In West 
Germany, we find that the minimum wage introduction led to a strong 
growth of turnover and a deterioration of credit ratings (an indicator of 
profitability), suggesting the presence of positive product demand and 
price effects and of monopsonistic labour markets. Demand and price 
effects may be at work also in East Germany, where, in response to the 
minimum wage policy, turnover remains stable, credit ratings actually 
improve and firm exit rates are unaffected. 
Another possible answer to the distributional challenges brought about  
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by trade globalization are trade or fiscal policies intended to shield 
domestic production and raise government revenues. This course of 
action has been embarked upon by the Trump administration whose 
motto is “America First”. Indeed, in 2018 the US government 
implemented several rounds of import tariffs - washing machines (20-50 
percent), solar panels (30 percent), steel (25 percent), aluminium (10 
percent) - and put forward a proposal to introduce border-adjustments 
into corporate profit taxation, whereby export revenues would be 
deductible from the corporate tax base, while costs for imported inputs 
would not. 
Optimum tariff theory asserts that a country with monopoly power 
benefits from imposing unilaterally modest import duties (see 
Humphrey, 1987). The underlying rationale is that, by restricting 
imports from abroad, a big country with substantial market power can 
improve its terms of trade. However, such a conclusion is based on 
models featuring only final goods. Today, though, much of world trade 
is in intermediate inputs whose production has been increasingly 
offshored over time and import tariffs targeted at those goods may not 
necessarily work out to the advantage of the imposing country 
(Krugman, 2018). 
As for the inclusion of border-adjustments into corporate profit taxation, 
the proponents of such a policy argue it to be neutral, that is to have no 
effect on real allocations (see, for example, Auerbach and Holtz-Eakin, 
2016). Yet, this neutrality prediction is based on assumptions - first and 
foremost the trade balance condition - that are unlikely to hold up in 
reality (Barbiero et al., 2018) and ignores an important feature of today’s 
economies, namely strong interconnections among sectors. These 
interconnections may play an important role as a channel for the 
propagation and amplification of the fiscal shock. 
In chapter 4, we re-assess the macroeconomic consequences of both 
sectoral input tariffs and a shift to border-adjusted corporate profit 
taxation, in the light of the above. To this end, we build on the model 
developed by Acemoglu et al. (2012, 2016) (for a literature review on 
production networks in macroeconomics, see Carvalho et al. 2018), 
which allows us to account for inter-industry input-output linkages. 
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Specifically, we consider a large open economy populated by a 
representative household and by multiple perfectly competitive 
industries, each specialized in the production of a distinct good. The 
representative household has Cobb-Douglas preferences over the 
different goods and provides labour services (with disutility) to firms at 
a sector-homogenous wage rate. Output at each node is produced 
according to a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas technology that 
combines labour with a composite intermediate good, whose 
components are in turn a CES aggregate of a domestic and a foreign 
variety, the latter being subject to sector-specific import duties. For 
simplicity, we assume domestic and foreign pre-tax prices to be in a 
proportional relation, the pass-through of the tariff rate into import price 
to be exogenous, and tariff revenues to be wasted. 
Our model predicts that positive sector-specific input tariff shocks lead 
to a loss in aggregate value added: indeed, being forced to use less 
intensively the foreign intermediate input variety, the immediate 
customers of the protected industry suffer a drop in productivity, which 
induces them to cut back their production and raise prices (relative to 
the wage); a powerful cascade of downstream adjustments then ensues, 
as every indirect customer of the protected industry (i.e. its customers’ 
customers and so on) will also find it optimal to reduce output by some 
amount. This result questions the optimality of protective import duties 
even before retaliation is considered.  
Moreover, treating exports from any industry as a given share of its 
output, we show also that the change in aggregate value added induced 
by a shift to a destination-based corporate tax system results from the 
net effect of border-adjustments’ two key components, the impossibility 
to deduct the costs of imported inputs but the ability to deduct export 
sales. While the former causes GDP to shrink by lowering input demand 
of importing industries and its (direct and indirect) downstream 
customers, the latter drives GDP upwards by increasing input demand 
of the exporting industries and its (direct and indirect) downstream 
customers. For low sectoral export shares, the negative impact of the 
implicit import tax dominates over the positive impact of the implicit 
export subsidy. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Low-wage import competition and 
populist backlash: The case of Italy 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In many developed Western societies, populism is on the rise at an 
alarming pace. The outcome of the Brexit referendum and the election of 
Donald Trump in the US are the most eye-catching examples of this 
phenomenon, but several other countries are witnessing similar 
tendencies: in Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and the 
Czech Republic, populist parties recently achieved large electoral 
support at general polls. Such a political backlash has given rise to a 
widespread debate on its causes. 
Trade globalization is one of the key candidate economic determinants, 
the channels at work being labor market adjustments. Autor et al. (2013) 
outline a simple theoretical trade model based on monopolistic 
competition and heterogeneity in industry labor productivity across 
countries, according to which positive shocks to low-wage countries’ 
export supply can cause employment in the traded-good sectors of 
developed countries to contract on net as long as trade is not balanced. 
This mechanism captures the widely held perception of the 
redistributive effect of trade globalization between countries, with 
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developed economies being the losers and low-wage developing 
exporters the winners. On the other hand, trade theory also posits 
redistributive effects within (developed) countries. As recently pointed 
out by Rodrik (2018)2, the theorem in Stolper and Samuelson (1941) 
entails very neat distributional implications from opening up to trade: 
assuming a two-good and two-factor model of production, with no 
frictions in the inter-sectoral mobility of inputs, trade liberalization 
makes the factor that is used intensively in the importable good worse 
off, by inducing a decline in its payment. If the two factors are skilled 
and unskilled labor, the prediction for rich countries would be that trade 
increases the return to skilled labor and lowers the return to unskilled 
labor, so raising income inequality.3 
In this chapter, we empirically study the role of trade globalization in 
moving the equilibrium of the political game toward populism. We 
compare the voting patterns at the Italian parliamentary national 
elections over the 1992-2013 period (starting from the trade globalization 
take-off) in about 8,000 municipalities differently exposed to the trade 
shock. The model is estimated in first differences so as to control for 
municipality-level time-invariant idiosyncratic shocks, while a full set of 
time fixed effects accounts for country-level time-varying perturbations. 
Following the literature, Chinese import competition proxies for trade 
globalization (Autor et al., 2013; Autor at al., 2016; Dippel et al., 2017; 
Malgouyres, 2017b; Caselli et al., 2018; Colantone and Stanig, 
forthcoming). The populist vote is computed by relying on the 
classification of populist parties provided in Inglehart and Norris (2016).  
The identification of a causal effect requires dealing with the potential 
endogeneity of import exposure, which may arise from various sources. 
For example there may be omitted municipality-time level unobserved 
                                                          
2 Beyond theoretical arguments, Rodrik (2018) suggests also that the populist backlash is 
not a surprise in light of economic history: the first era of globalization started in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, led to the emergence of history’s first self-conscious populist 
movement in the US rallying against the Gold Standard and ended in the first half of the 
twentieth century with the spread of communism, fascism and Nazism.  
3 See Harrison et al. (2011) for a survey of recent works exploring new channels through 
which trade can affect income inequality (e.g. firm-heterogeneity and bargaining, trade in 
tasks, labour market frictions and incomplete contracts). 
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shocks like a sectoral, asymmetric, negative shock to local manufacturing 
industries that may attract imports from China and, at the same time, 
induce a populist reaction among voters; this would bias the OLS 
parameter upward. Moreover, the populist vote may result in 
protectionist policies that reduce import flows: in such a case reverse 
causality would lead to a downward bias. Finally, we can not exclude 
that we are measuring trade shock with some errors. To address the 
possible endogeneity issue, we instrument imports from China with 
Chinese exports to a set of other non-euro high-income countries that 
represent a small share in Italy’s total trade. The instrument is intended 
to capture only the push factor underlying the Chinese export 
performance; at the same time, it involves economies only weakly 
connected to Italy in terms of trade, so minimizing the risk of 
invalidating the exclusion restriction assumption.  
Our results show that exposure to Chinese import competition enlarges 
support for populist parties: the IV preferred specification indicates that 
a one-standard deviation increase in the annual change of imports from 
China (about 145 dollars per worker at 2000 prices) entails a rise in the 
annual change of the populist vote share equal to 0.4 percentage points, 
about one third of the average value of the dependent variable and one 
tenth of its standard deviation. The magnitude of the impact is non-
negligible, especially if one takes into account that the vote response 
regards all voters and not just those working in the tradable sectors. This 
result is robust to a number of robustness checks, including 
measurement of the trade shock and the classification of populist parties. 
Moreover, it holds when we augment our regression with potential 
confounding factors that may have spurred populism in recent years: 
immigration, the introduction of the euro and fiscal austerity. Additional 
findings show that voters’ protest reaction also takes the form of an 
increase in invalid (blank and null) ballot papers and a drop in voter 
turnout. To rationalize our results, we show that Chinese import 
competition has negatively affected employment and income, so 
signaling that globalization has had a redistributive role between 
countries. Moreover, combining data on income distribution at the 
municipality-year level with exposure to Chinese import competition, it 
turns out that the latter is also positively correlated with inequality: 
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winners and losers from globalization also emerge within the country 
under scrutiny.  
The present chapter is related to the empirical literature on the political 
consequences of trade globalization. Earlier works investigate how trade 
openness shapes individual preferences, either in favour of more 
redistribution (e.g. Walter, 2010) or in favour of protectionist policies 
(e.g. Scheve and Slaughter 2001b; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Blonigen and 
McGrew, 2014). More recently, focus has shifted to the impact of foreign 
competition on actual electoral outcomes at the local level. Within this 
strand of the literature - pioneered by Margalit (2011)4 - Autor et al. 
(2016) is the seminal paper looking at the role of rising exports from 
China on political polarization: the Chinese import shock affects the 
ideological composition of the US Congress, with politicians moving 
toward the very left or the very right of the political spectrum. Other 
studies for the US test the existence of a realignment effect (Che et al., 2016) 
or an anti-incumbent effect (Jensen et al., 2017). More closely related to our 
analysis are four contributions, those by Dippel at al. (2017), Malgouyres 
(2017b), Caselli et al. (2018), and Colantone and Stanig (2018b). While 
adopting the same methodology to measure import exposure (borrowed 
from Autor et al., 2013; Autor et al., 2016), they basically differ in the 
countries examined and share the result that import competition from 
low-wage countries increases voting for far-right parties.5  
An important but less related reference is the research agenda shedding 
light on the determinants of populism. While some scholars propose a 
cultural backlash hypothesis to explain today’s success of populist 
parties in the Western World (e.g. Ingelhart and Norris, 2016), others 
trace it back to economic insecurity, resulting especially from 
globalization (e.g. Guiso et al. 2017; Rodrik, 2018) and the financial crisis 
of 2008-2013 (e.g. Guiso et al., 2019; Algan et al., 2017; Dustman et al., 
2017). Finally, as far as the transmission channel is concerned, we also 
                                                          
4 The author uses an innovative but narrow measure of trade exposure focusing on layoffs. 
5 Dippel et al. (2017) study German NUTS 3 regions (slightly more than 400 Landkreise) from 
1987 to 2009; Malgouyres (2017b) focuses on French communities (about 3,500 cantons) 
from 1995 to 2012; Caselli et al. (2018) use labour market areas (over 600 systems) as main 
unit of analysis from 1994 to 2008; finally, Colantone and Stanig (2018b) combine district-
level voting data and European NUTS 2 region-level trade data between 1988 and 2007.  
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draw on the empirical literature that, in the wake of Autor et al. (2013), 
assesses the impact of low-wage import competition on local labour 
markets in developed countries (e.g. Dauth et al., 2014; Malgouyres, 
2017a), indicating significant adjustment costs in terms of job 
displacement and reduced earnings.6 
We contribute to the existing literature in many respects. First, as Caselli 
et al. (2018), we consider the Italian case, which is particularly interesting 
for three reasons. (i) Italy displays by far one of the highest vote shares 
for populist parties among large rich countries, according to the data 
recorded in the most recent elections (see Figure 2.1). (ii) Since the 
nineties, Italy’s imports from China have increased at an impressive 
average rate, comparable to that of other similar countries; however, at  
 
Figure 2.1: Populism in some Western countries 
 
Note: Vote share won by all populist parties in the last available parliamentary election in 
France (2017), Germany (2017), Italy (2018), and Western Europe. The latter aggregate 
includes all countries (except Switzerland) considered in Colantone and Stanig 
(forthcoming) and is weighted using the 2016 population. Parties are labelled as populist 
based on the classification by Inglehart and Norris (2016). 
Source: Own calculations based on the elections datasets: http://www.parlgov.org/ and 
http://elezioni.interno.gov.it/camera/scrutini/20180304/scrutiniCI. 
                                                          
6 Analyses carried out at the level of national industries lead to similar conclusions as for 
the negative implications of import competition on labour market outcomes (e.g. Federico 
et al., 2014; Pierce and Schott, 2016; Acemoglu et al., 2016). 
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the same time, the beginning-of-period Italian product specialization 
model was more heavily centered on the less technologically advanced 
sectors (e.g., textile, apparel, leather, footwear, furniture) with respect to 
Western competitors, so making the country more vulnerable to the 
China shock. In Figure 2.2, we show that in 1992 the Italian economy 
spent a largely smaller share of its GDP on research and development 
than other highly industrialized countries and that the Italian loss in 
worldwide export market shares over the 1992-2013 period was larger 
than the average. (iii) Populism makes sound economic policies more 
difficult to implement, even if populist parties are not in power, because 
non-populist parties tend to react to populism by reducing the distance 
of their platform from that of their populist competitors (Guiso at al., 
2017).7 On the other hand, we think that lessons from the Italian case may 
well be informative about other developed countries.  
 
Figure 2.2: R&D expenditure and worldwide market share dynamics 
 
Note: The Group of Seven (G7) includes: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. 
Source: Own calculations based on WTO and OECD data. 
                                                          
7 In this respect, Italy is one of the Western developed countries that has more urgently 
needed structural, but often unpopular, reforms to spur growth during  the last 15-20 years: 
see IMF (2017), OECD (2017). 
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Second, we focus on populism as a voting outcome, rather than on 
extreme right parties. It is increasingly recognized that certain core 
features of populist parties are not necessarily prototypical of a radical 
right party. From an empirical point of view, the two variables do not 
necessarily coincide and the Italian case is very suitable to distinguish 
between them. The Five Star Movement, in fact, is a large political party 
that is labelled as populist by all the prevailing classifications, but, at the 
same time, cannot be placed along the usual right-left dimension of the 
political spectrum (Bordignon and Ceccherini, 2015). Not surprisingly, 
the correlation in our data between the vote share for extreme-right 
parties and the vote share for populist parties is far from perfect (-0.26)8.  
Third, our study addresses the very important issue of the robustness of 
the results to concurrent factors that are likely to have contributed to the 
rise of populism: immigration, the introduction of the euro in the late 
nineties and the recent measures of fiscal austerity implemented in the 
Euro area.  
Fourth, we enrich our knowledge on the labor market adjustments, 
showing that the increase in within-country income inequality goes hand 
in hand with the distributional frictions between-countries.  
Fifth, our very fine spatial breakdown is beneficial to the empirical 
strategy, as the exposure to low-wage import competition, which 
strongly depends on the sectoral composition of local economies, varies 
greatly even among neighboring municipalities. Hence, less fine 
territorial units used in other papers may mask useful heterogeneity.9 
                                                          
8 We identify as extreme right parties: Italian Social Movement – National Right (Movimento 
Sociale Italiano – Destra Nazionale); Social Movement – Tricolour Flame (Movimento Sociale – 
Fiamma Tricolore); Tricolour Flame (Fiamma Tricolore); New Force (Forza Nuova); National 
Front (Fronte Nazionale); Social Alternative (Alternativa Sociale); National Right (Destra 
Nazionale); The Right – Tricolour Flame (La Destra – Fiamma Tricolore); Casapound Italy 
(Casapound Italia); National Project (Progetto Nazionale); Italian Missinian Refoundation 
(Rifondazione Missina Italiana).  
9 The average size of an Italian municipality is 7,000 inhabitants, to be contrasted with 
19,000 in French “cantons” (Malgouyres, 2017b), 198,000 in German Landkreise (Dippel el 
al., 2017), 97,000 in Italian “local labour systems” (Caselli et al., 2018), and 1,800,000 in 
European regions (Colantone and Stanig, 2018b). Additional findings in Caselli et al. (2018) 
suggest that the use of more disaggregated data is desirable in the study of the electoral 
consequences of trade globalization. 
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next Section 
discusses data and measurement issues, while Section 2.3 describes our 
empirical strategy. In Section 2.4, we present our core findings on the 
effect of trade shock on populism (and other forms of protest vote), while 
Section 2.5 is devoted to showing our results on the labor market 
transmission channel. Section 2.6 concludes. 
 
 
2.2 Data and measurement issues 
 
Measuring exposure to import competition. To measure the exposure 
of Italian municipalities to import competition from China, we use the 
index developed by Autor et al. (2013), which maps sector-specific 
national import shocks to local units on the basis of their initial industry 
specialization: 
∆𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 = ∑
𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑡0
𝐿𝑖𝑡0
∆𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝐼𝑇𝐴
𝐿𝑘𝑡0
𝑘                                        (2.1) 
where i indicates municipalities, t denotes years, k represents tradeable 
sectors and 𝑡0 refers to Census years, which fall in Italy at the beginning 
of every decade. ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝐼𝑇𝐴 is the yearly average change in (real) imports 
from China to Italy observed in sector k between t and t - n. 𝐿𝑘𝑡0 is the 
start-of-decade Italian employment in sector k. 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑡0 is the start-of-decade 
employment in municipality i and sector k. 𝐿𝑖𝑡0 is the start-of-decade 
total employment in municipality i. According to equation 2.1, import 
competition from China will affect more strongly municipalities where 
the start-of-decade employment structure is dominated by industries 
witnessing larger subsequent increases in Chinese imports per worker. 
Data on imports are taken from the Observatory of Economic 
Complexity at the MIT Media Lab, which combines historical Feenstra’s 
data (1962-2000) from the Center for International Trade Data with more 
recent data (2001-2014) of UN COMTRADE. We have access to annual 
bilateral trade flows for 262 countries and 989 different products for the 
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four-digit SITC revision 2 classification over the timespan 1962-2014. 
Employment at the municipality-sector level is drawn from the Italian 
Statistical Agency (Istat) for the Census years 1991, 2001 and 2011. Up to 
2001 the number of workers in local units of enterprises is based on the 
two-digit NACE revision 1 breakdown, while for 2011 it is available 
according to the two-digit NACE revision 2 classification. NACE 
revision 2 codes have been converted to NACE revision 1 codes using 
the conversion matrix reported in Perani and Cirillo (2015). The 
administrative boundaries of Italian municipalities are those used in the 
Istat 2011 general Census. In order to match trade data with employment 
data, SITC revision 2 commodities must be matched with NACE revision 
1 industrial categories. We use the correspondence table between SITC 
revision 2 and ISIC revision 3 (equivalent to NACE revision 1 up to two 
digits) provided by Affendy et al. (2010). Trade values of not-uniquely-
mapped goods are assigned to two-digit NACE revision 1 sectors using, 
firstly, the UN conversion table between SITC revision 2 and SITC 
revision 3 in combination with the WITS concordance table between 
SITC revision 3 and NACE revision 1, and then, eventually, national 
employment shares at the start of the decade (reflecting the initial 
importance of each sector in the economy). At the end, we are left with 
international trade data for 34 two-digit NACE revision 1 industries, 
almost all of them concerning non-service activities (see Table 2.A2). 
Trade flows for Italy have been deflated by applying the Italian implicit 
gross value added deflator, taken from the OECD STAN database.  
Figure 2.3a shows that Chinese exports took off at the beginning of the 
nineties. Since then, they have been growing at a much faster pace with 
respect to worldwide exports, and Italy has not been immune to such an 
impetuous trend. In Figure 2.3b, we display the sectoral contribution to 
the total growth rate of real imports from China over the period under 
examination. Between 1992 and 2013, Italian imports from China grew 
eight-fold, so that by 2013 China became Italy’s third largest import 
origin after Germany and France; the compounded average growth rate 
exceeded 10 percent. The main contributions came from machineries 
(NACE revision 1 codes 29 and 30), textiles and wearing apparel (17, 18), 
electrical machinery and communication equipment (31, 32), chemical 
products (24) and leather and footwear (19). 
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Figure 2.3: Export dynamics 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Note: The sectoral contribution to the growth rate of real Italian imports from China over 
1992-2013 is computed as: 
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑘,1992
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠1992
∗ (
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑘,2013
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑘,1992
− 1), where k indexes tradeable sectors 
(see Table 2.A2 for a description of the two-digit NACE revision 1 codes). 
Source: Own calculations based on international trade data from the Observatory of 
Economic Complexity at the IMT Media Lab. 
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Identifying populist parties. Data on election outcomes at national polls 
come from the Ministry of Interior and are available at the municipality 
level (around 8,000 municipalities).10 We sourced information on the 
votes for each party, the invalid ballot papers, and the turnout at the 
polling booths for the general parliamentary elections that took place in 
1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, and 2013. In light of the broader 
political involvement envisaged by the regulation of the Chamber of 
Deputies, our focus is specifically on the national elections for the lower 
house of the legislature.11 Finally, over the years under scrutiny, the 
electoral rules changed, with a different mix of parliamentary seats 
assigned by a majoritarian rule or by a proportional rule. In all elections, 
we focus on votes under the proportional rule, which is more apt to 
mirror political preferences.  
With voting data in hand, we identify populist parties by relying on the 
classification developed by Inglehart and Norris (2016), who take 
Mudde’s (2007) very influential contribution as a basis. Mudde (2007) 
suggests that populism presents the following recurring features: (i) anti-
establishment ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated 
into two homogenous and antagonistic groups – the ’pure people‘ and 
the ’corrupt elite‘ – and argues that politics should be an expression of 
the will of the people; (ii) authoritarianism belief in a strictly ordered 
society in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely; 
and (iii) nativism, holding that states should be inhabited exclusively by 
members of the native group (“the nation”), and non-native elements – 
whether persons or ideas – are fundamentally threats to the homogenous 
nation-state. Inglehart and Norris (2016) bring these ideas to the data by 
exploiting the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) in which 337 
                                                          
10 http://elezionistorico.interno.it/. Data at our disposal do not include the small 
autonomous Aosta Valley region (0.2 per cent of the Italian population). 
11 The Italian parliament is composed of two houses: the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate of the Republic. According to the principle of perfect bicameralism, the two houses 
perform identical functions. The only differences between them lie in the membership and 
the rules for the election of their members. The Chamber of Deputies has 630 members, 
who must be at least 25 years old and are elected by all Italian citizens over the age of 18. 
The Senate has 315 members, who must be at least 40 years old and are elected by all Italian 
citizens over the age of 25. In addition to elected members, the Senate also includes life 
senators, who are appointed by the President of the Republic. 
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political scientists rate the positioning of 268 parties (those with seats in 
parliaments) on 13 policy areas.12 Experts’ answers are mapped into a 
score and a party is evaluated as populist if its scores on those items 
related to anti-establishment sentiment, popular will, nationalism, and 
traditional values are above a given threshold. Italian parties coded as 
populist, available only for the 2013 elections, are the Northern League 
(Lega Nord), the Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle) and the 
Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia). In relation to our aim, this list has two 
limitations: it does not cover the full spectrum of Italian political forces 
(those that did not win any seat at the parliament) and, more 
importantly, it does not take into account political forces involved in the 
elections before 2013. Hence, we properly integrate the list by tracing 
back the parties so that it ultimately includes the Northern League 
(Lombard League in 1992), the National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale), the 
Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano), the Tricolor Flame 
(Fiamma Tricolore), the Right-Tricolor Flame (La Destra-Fiamma Tricolore), 
Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia), and the Five Star Movement 
(Movimento Cinque Stelle). Table 2.A3 reports the year-by-year list of 
populist parties considered here. 
Inglehart and Norris (2016)’s categorization is not the only one. Van 
Kessel (2015) proposes a competing classification, adopted in Guiso et al. 
(2017), whose main advantage is that the populist party classification 
covers many years. However, differently from Inglehart and Norris’ 
(2016) classification, van Kessel’s (2015) approach captures only one of 
the three dimensions (the anti-elite rhetoric) that Mudde (2007) 
highlights. On the other hand, the drawback with Inglehart and Norris’s 
(2016) classification – i.e., the fact that it is time-invariant – is not very 
relevant in our case as we focus only on a single country and, therefore, 
recovering the time dimension of the data is straightforward.13 The main 
difference between the two classifications is that van Kessel (2015) labels 
                                                          
12 They include support for traditional values, liberal social lifestyles, nationalism, tough 
law and order, multiculturalism, immigration, rights for ethnic minorities, religious 
principles in politics, rural interests, wealth redistribution, as well as stance towards 
market deregulation, state management of the economy, and preferences for either tax cuts 
or public services.  
13 As far as Italy is concerned, the categorization in Rodrik (2018) coincides with that of van 
Kessel (2015).  
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as populist the parties headed by Berlusconi (Forza Italia and the People 
of Freedom – Popolo delle libertà), but not all post-fascist parties (the 
National Alliance, the Italian Social Movement, the Tricolor Flame, the 
Right-Tricolor Flame, Brothers of Italy). Anyway, we show that our 
results are robust either when we adopt the definition by van Kessel 
(2015) or when we enlarge our notion to include the parties in the 
coalitions led by Berlusconi.14 
Figure 2.4 shows the increasing overall populist vote trend in Italian 
general elections. In 1992 the populist share was about 15 per cent; in the 
next two elections it rose, exceeding 25 percent four years later; after that, 
the populist share went monotonically down (except for the 2006 
election), dipping to slightly below 15 percent in 2008. Finally, in the 2013 
election, the populist parties nearly tripled their share. The figure also 
shows large variability in populism across municipalities.  
 
Figure 2.4: Populism trend 
 
Source: Own calculations based on election data from http://elezionistorico.interno.it/.    
                                                          
14 The classifications of populist parties considered here are in line with previous works 
studying the phenomenon of populism within the Italian context (e.g. Passarelli and 
Tuorto, 2012; Passarelli, 2013; Agnew and Shin, 2017). 
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2.3 Empirical strategy 
 
To assess the causal effect of import competition on the populist vote, we 
adopt the following specification: 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽∆𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡0
′ 𝛾 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾𝑟(𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                       (2.2) 
As above, i indicates municipalities. t now specifically denotes the 
election years (1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013) and 𝑡0 refers to the 
Census years 1991 (for the periods 1992-1994, 1994-1996, 1996-2001) and 
2001 (for the periods 2001-2006, 2006-2008, 2008-2013). ∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the average 
annual change of the populist vote share between two subsequent 
elections. ∆𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the trade shock defined in equation 2.1, with n equal to 
the length of a parliamentary term. 𝛿𝑡 are period fixed effects and 𝛾𝑟(𝑖) 
are region-level fixed effects (r = North, Centre, South). 𝑋𝑖𝑡0 includes a 
set of (time- variant and invariant) variables - all measured at the start of 
the decade -, which aim at controlling for economic, demographic, social 
and geographic differences across municipalities: the share of workers 
employed in manufacturing sectors, the population density, the share of 
female working-age population, the share of the population that holds 
at least a high-school diploma, the aging index, a dummy capturing 
whether the territory is coastal or not, and a measure of terrain 
roughness. Data for all these covariates are taken from Istat. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an 
idiosyncratic shock. Table 2.A1 shows the main descriptive statistics.15  
Estimating a first difference model allow us to control for municipality-
level time-invariant heterogeneity. However, endogeneity might arise 
primarily from omitted municipality-period idiosyncratic shocks. For 
example, suppose that a negative sectoral shock hits the domestic 
economy: if the spatial distribution of the affected industry is not 
uniform (as is often the case), the shock may disproportionally worsen 
the municipality labor markets specialized in that industry, so 
generating a populist reaction at the polls; at the same time, the negative 
                                                          
15 Like the literature in the field, we cannot distinguish demand and supply effect (Guiso 
et al. 2017): our results are about the effect of the import competition shock on the political 
market equilibrium. 
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sectoral shock may attract imports from China. In such a case, the OLS 
estimate for 𝛽 would be upward biased. On the other hand, reverse 
causality may generate downward bias if populism gives rise to 
protectionist measures, and measurement error might be at work too.  
To address the potential endogeneity bias we follow the approach in 
Autor et al. (2013) and instrument ∆𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 with: 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 = ∑
𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑡0
𝐿𝑖𝑡0
∆𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅
𝐿𝑘𝑡0
𝑘 .                                       (2.3) 
Equation 2.3 is analogous to equation 2.1 except for ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅, which is 
the yearly average change (over a parliamentary term) in real import 
flows of industry-𝑘 goods from China to a set of non-euro OECD 
countries that exhibit high growth rates of trade with China over the last 
decades, but whose average share in total Italian trade was below 1 per 
cent between 1992 and 2013: Norway, Denmark, Australia, Canada, 
Iceland and New Zealand.16 The idea underlying 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is that it captures 
only supply-side improvements in Chinese export competitiveness (due, 
for example, to productivity growth); at the same time, we assume that 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 affects the populist vote only through its effect on ∆𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡. This 
assumption might be invalidated were we to take advanced economies 
with strong trade connections to Italy as alternative destination areas. To 
minimize this risk, we selected high-income countries that are weakly 
integrated (in trade terms) with Italy. 
 
 
2.4 Results on populism 
 
Baseline findings. Table 2.1 shows the baseline estimates. In column 1, 
we start by displaying the OLS results of a very parsimonious 
specification including only import competition and period fixed effects. 
                                                          
16 Trade flows of each of these countries have been deflated by applying the respective 
implicit gross value added deflator, taken either from the OECD STAN database (if 
available) or from the EU KLEMS database. 
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Estimates suggest a positive (and highly statistically significant) 
correlation between the change in the trade shock and the change in the 
populist vote share. In the next two columns, we enrich the specification 
by including area fixed effects 𝛾𝑟(𝑖) and other controls 𝑋𝑖𝑡0: the point 
estimate of the coefficient of interest and its precision are very stable.  
 
Table 2.1: Baseline estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Δ(import exp.) 0.0317 0.0303 0.0352 0.0213 0.0190 0.0249 
 (0.0050)*** (0.0049)*** (0.0059)*** (0.0057)*** (0.0054)*** (0.0078)*** 
First Stage:       
IVΔ(import exp.)    0.1369 0.1340 0.1165 
    (0.0235)*** (0.0228)*** (0.0177)*** 
F-stat excl. instr.    33.99 34.62 43.07 
Period FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Area FE N Y Y N Y Y 
Controls N N Y N N Y 
Election years 1992-2013 1992-2013 1992-2013 1992-2013 1992-2013 1992-2013 
Est. method OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV 
Observations 48,081 48,081 48,072 48,081 48,081 48,072 
The dependent variable is the average annual change in the populist vote share between two elections. 
Votes are categorized as populist following Inglehart and Norris (2016). Standard errors are clustered 
at the level of 611 local labor markets. Stars: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
Columns 4-6 document the results derived using the IV estimator. The 
instrument is always highly significant in predicting the potentially 
endogenous variable. The impact of the trade shock on the share of 
preferences for populist parties is highly significant, though slightly 
smaller in size than its OLS counterpart. The downward revision of the 
point estimates suggests that the potential omitted variable bias 
stemming from a negative sectoral supply shock dominates the potential 
downward bias related to reverse causality and/or measurement error. 
In our preferred specification in column 6, which includes area fixed 
effects and controls, the estimate for the coefficient of interest is 0.0249 
and is very precisely measured. To put this into perspective, a one-
standard deviation increase in the China imports yearly change (about 
145 dollars per worker at 2000 prices) entails a rise in the annual change 
of the populist vote share equal to one third of the average value of the 
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dependent variable and one tenth of its standard deviation. The impact 
is non-negligible, especially if one considers that the vote response 
regards all voters, and not just those working in the tradeable sectors 
(about 45 per cent of total workers) who are directly affected by rising 
trade exposure.  
 
Robustness checks. In Table 2.2, we carry out a number of robustness 
checks for our preferred specification (Table 2.1, column 6). A first set of 
robustness checks deals with the challenge of properly identifying 
populist parties. As outlined in Section 2, van Kessel (2015) proposes an 
alternative list of Italian populist parties which excludes Brothers of Italy 
(and, implicitly, its forerunner parties such as the Italian Social 
Movement, etc.), but includes Berlusconi’s political forces Forza Italia and 
Popolo delle Libertà (that is, Forza Italia fused with National Alliance). 
When we rely on this classification – which we enrich by including all 
minor parties in the coalition led by Berlusconi – results are confirmed 
(column 1). We also check for the robustness of our classification to the 
inclusion of Berlusconi’s and his allies’ parties and, again, our findings 
are undisputed (column 2). We computed the populist vote share by 
including in the denominator valid votes for all parties, while the 
currently available classification of populist political forces does not 
scrutinize minor parties (those with no seats in the Parliament; see 
Section 2). In column 3, we re-compute the populist vote share with 
respect only to votes for parties with parliamentary representation and 
the coefficient of interest is again stable.  
The next four columns address measurement issues that pertain to the 
key independent variable. We chose import competition from China as 
our preferred measure of trade shock for the sake of comparability with 
the field literature. However, one might reasonably argue that China is 
not the only big player in trade globalization. Among Italy’s top import 
origin areas in 2013 – defined as those whose share of total Italian 
imports exceeds 4 per cent – the group of countries belonging to Central 
and Southeastern Europe plays a relevant role, too, mainly because of  
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Table 2.2: Robustness checks 
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geographical proximity.17 In our sample period, imports from these 
countries rose by an average of 9.9 percent per year, only slightly below 
the Chinese figure (10.3). Hence, we redefine ∆𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡  in equation 2.1 so as 
to include in ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝐼𝑇𝐴 also imports to Italy from Central and Southeastern 
Europe, while keeping the instrument group unchanged. Column 4 
indicates that broadening the set of sending countries does not alter our 
results. Another potential drawback of our key regressor is related to the 
set of importing countries. Proxying the trade shock with Chinese import 
penetration within a single country might makes more sense in case of 
an economy that exhibits a very large internal market. The US, for 
example, seems to meet this requirement fully. When it comes to smaller 
developed countries, like Italy (or Germany or France), this implicit 
assumption is no longer obvious, and it would be reasonable to assume 
that competition with low-wage exporters actually takes place within a 
wider market. Therefore, we re-compute ∆𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡  in equation 2.1 by 
including in ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝐼𝑇𝐴 also imports from China to Italy’s top five export 
destinations in 1992.18 The estimated effect of the trade shock continues 
to hold (column 5). Still, a further issue with the trade exposure indicator 
regards the normalization of the change in imports from China. In the 
baseline equation 2.1 we follow Autor et al. (2013) and divide import 
change by employment in Italy in sector k measured at the beginning of 
the decade. In column 6, instead, imports are divided by absorption 
(internal production + imports – exports at the sector level) at the start of 
the decade, along the lines of Autor et al. (2016). The coefficient of 
interest is again positive and statistically very significant. The last 
concern about the import exposure measure is that we are not capturing 
the potential benefits of trade integration that may come from Italian 
exports to China. In Column 7, we substitute net Italian imports from 
China (imports – exports) for ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡
𝐼𝑇𝐴 and the main result is unaffected.  
                                                          
17 The list of countries includes Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, FYR 
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. At the end of the 1980s, they represented a relatively 
small (but not irrelevant) share of Italian imports (3 per cent); in 2013, at the end of our 
sample period, this share had grown considerably reaching 9 per cent. 
18 Germany, France, the US, Great Britain and Spain. In 1992, the share of total Italian 
exports to each country was above 5 percent and the cumulative share was 54 percent.  
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Finally, the remaining three columns in Table 2.2 deal with some 
additional issues. Between 1992 and 1994, Italy witnessed the outbreak 
of the so-called Mani Pulite scandal, a judicial investigation into political 
corruption. As a result of this scandal, the political system underwent a 
deep transformation, with the disappearance of many traditional parties 
including the Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana), the main 
party since the end of WWII, and the Socialist Party (Partito Socialista), 
which played a very important role in supporting the former during the 
eighties. The 1992 election (the first one in our sample) was the last 
election of the long-established First Republic; from the 1994 election 
onwards, new forces joined the political arena, among which was 
Berlusconi’s party. In column 8, we document that our findings are 
robust to the exclusion of the 1992 election from the sample. Column 9 is 
concerned with the spatial units of analysis. As stated in the 
introduction, we argue that our very detailed breakdown allows us to 
exploit a very large portion of variability. However, this might come 
with a cost: spillover effects among municipalities might be at work. For 
example, a certain trade shock may hit a municipality, but its effects may 
spread outside that municipality because of local production ties and 
worker mobility. In the end, spillover may bias parameter estimates. To 
ensure that this is not the case, we aggregate all relevant variables at the 
level of 611 local labor markets (with an average size equal to around 
97,000 inhabitants), which are much more self-contained units than 
municipalities as their boundaries are defined on the basis of daily 
commuting patterns, so minimizing the risk of spillover effects. Again, 
our key estimate is undoubtedly confirmed. Lastly, in column 10, we 
augment the baseline specification with area × trend fixed effects and 
results are once more largely reassuring.  
 
Confounding factors. So far, we have shown that China’s surge in 
international trade has favored the spread of populism. However, 
import competition from low-wage countries may be only part of the 
story: during the period under examination, three concurrent shocks 
may also have induced a populist reaction in the Italian electorate. The 
first is the other major facet of the ongoing globalization process, namely 
the increasing international migration toward rich countries. Hostility to 
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immigration is justified by populist parties on the basis of the perception 
that foreigners pose a threat to jobs and livelihoods and a challenge to 
national cultures and identities. The second is the introduction of the 
euro in 1999. According to the anti-euro rhetoric - which, not 
surprisingly, has been largely embraced by the Five Star Movement and 
by the Northern League – the end of competitive currency devaluation 
harmed Italian exporters, generating unemployment in exporting 
sectors. The third shock is the fiscal consolidation that took place in Italy 
during the sovereign debt crisis and culminated in the fiscal compact 
package passed by the Italian Parliament in 2012. Here, the populist 
argument is that the Italian recession, or its unsatisfying recovery rate 
during or after the sovereign debt crisis, depends in a nondemocratic 
way on the will of unknown, not-elected bureaucrats working for the 
European Union who apply rigid fiscal rules that ultimately harm 
people’s well-being. In all three cases, there exist competing factors that 
might be captured by trade globalization.  
In Table 2.3, we address this issue by including in the right-hand side of 
equation 2.2 proxies for the confounding factors to see whether our 
results on import competition will survive.  
The role of immigration is taken into account with: 
∆ (
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
)
𝑖𝑡
 
that is, the annual average change of the share of immigrants over native 
population at the municipality-year level. Data come from Istat and refer 
to regular immigrants. Unfortunately, this variable is available only from 
2001 onwards. The expected sign is positive.  
Exposure to the euro is measured as follows: 
∑
𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑡0
𝐿𝑖𝑡0
(1 − 𝜗𝑘)
𝑘
∆𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑡 
∆𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑡 is the average annual growth rate of Italy’s real effective 
exchange rate over a parliamentary term (a positive value indicates 
appreciation and, so, loss of competitiveness). Data on 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑡 are taken 
 31 
from the Bank of International Settlements.19 To map the country-level 
exchange rate shock to sectors, we assume that activities with low 
human capital content are more sensitive to price competition, in 
accordance with Bugamelli et al. (2010). Specifically, 𝜗𝑘 is the skill 
intensity in manufacturing sector k as reported by the same authors.20 
Local exposure is then retrieved, in parallel with equation 2.1, by taking 
a weighted summation of the industry-level changes, where the weights 
reflect the start-of-decade relative importance of each sector in a given 
municipality.21 The expected sign is positive. 
Exposure to fiscal austerity is given by:  
∑
𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑡0
𝐿𝑖𝑡0
𝜌𝑘𝐼[𝑡≥2013]
𝑘
 
𝐼[𝑡≥2013] is a dummy variable equal to one since 2013, the year in which 
the Fiscal Compact came into force in Italy. This country-level fiscal 
shock is apportioned to industries according to their dependence on 
public spending. Specifically, 𝜌𝑘 is the share of the final demand for 
products from tradeable sector k incurred by the public administration, 
as it results from the 2005 Input-Output accounts released by Istat. 
Municipality-level vulnerability is derived again, in parallel with 
equation 2.1, by exploiting the local heterogeneity in the industry mix. 
The expected sign is positive. 
A general overview of Table 2.3 is largely reassuring: the effect of import  
competition is always positive and statistically significant so signaling 
that our key regressor is not picking up the impact of some confounding 
factor. In more detail, the first three columns show that the confounders 
enter the regression with the expected (positive) sign, even if the 
                                                          
19 The BIS real effective exchange rate of a country is a geometric trade-weighted average 
of its bilateral exchange rates, adjusted by relative consumer prices (for details, see Klau 
and Fung, 2006).   
20 To avoid potential endogeneity issues, Bugamelli et al. (2010) compute the sectoral skill 
content measure for the US, based on the assumption that skill content is largely a 
technological characteristic and the level of development of euro area member states is 
comparable to that of the United States. 
21 The summation is over manufacturing sectors, the only ones for which the skill intensity 
is available.  
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estimation of the immigration parameter lacks precision22. In the last two 
columns, we enter all confounding factors simultaneously and our 
estimates are largely confirmed. In any case, the effect of import 
competition remains unchanged.23  
 
Table 2.3: Confounding factors – immigration, euro and fiscal austerity 
 
 
(1) 
Immigration 
(2) 
Euro 
(3) 
Austerity 
(4) 
All 
(5) 
All 
Δ(import exp.) 0.0132 0.0160 0.0253 0.0122 0.0163 
 (0.0061)** (0.0079)*** (0.0079)*** (0.0058)** (0.0061)*** 
Δ(immigrant share) 0.1383   0.1073  
 (0.0954)   (0.0931)  
Δ(exp. to euro)  0.3787   0.3888 
  (0.0606)***   (0.0606)*** 
Δ(exp. to fiscal compact)   0.1549 0.2135 0.1714 
   (0.0219)*** (0.0275)*** (0.0227)*** 
First Stage:      
IVΔ(import exp.) 0.1007 0.1066 0.1168 0.1001 0.1068 
 (0.0125)*** (0.0140)*** (0.0179)*** (0.0122)*** (0.0141)*** 
F-stat excl. instr. 64.95 57.73 42.76 66.99 57.49 
Period FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Area FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Election years 2001-2013 1992-2013 1992-2013 2001-2013 1992-2013 
Estimation method IV IV IV IV IV 
Observations 24,044 48,072 48,072 24,044 48,072 
The dependent variable is the average annual change in the populist vote share between two elections. 
Votes are categorized as populist following Inglehart and Norris (2016). Standard errors are clustered 
at the level of 611 local labor markets. Stars: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
Additional findings on protest vote. In order to provide a more 
complete picture, it is worth investigating the possibility that import 
competition from China might, not only have shifted votes toward 
                                                          
22 This result is actually consistent with Caselli et al. (2018), who show that the lack of a 
significant relationship between the change in the local presence of immigrants and the 
change in the vote share of far-right parties is due to potential endogeneity issues.  
23 Because of the data limitation stated above, regressions including immigrants are run 
using only elections from 2001 onwards. Even in this subsample, the trade shock in the 
benchmark specification has a positive and statistically significant parameter (0.0132, 
standard error 0.0062).  
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populist parties, but also have triggered some other forms of protest 
vote.  
Table 2.4 parallels Table 2.1. Panel A shows the results for regression 2.2 
with the average annual change of the share of invalid (blank and null) 
ballot papers as the dependent variable. It turns out that Chinese import 
competition exerts a positive and highly significant effect on invalid 
ballot papers, which is known to be an alternative manner of protesting 
against politics and politicians. In Panel B, we replicate the same exercise 
using voter turnout – a well-celebrated determinant of the quality of the 
democratic process – as the outcome variable and find a negative and 
significant effect. In both cases, the economic size of the impact is non-
negligible: the estimates reported in the last column imply that a one-
standard deviation increase in the change of the trade shock implies a 
variation in the dependent variables that is 7 percent (for invalid ballots) 
or 5 percent (for turnout) of the respective standard deviations. 
 
Table 2.4: Additional findings - invalid ballots and voter turnout 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: invalid ballots 
Δ(import exp.) 0.0002 0.0016 0.0037 0.0004 0.0025 0.0065 
 (0.0005) (0.0005)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0004) (0.0006)*** (0.0015)*** 
Panel B: voter turnout 
Δ(import exp.) -0.0047 -0.0050 -0.0075 -0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0055 
 (0.0012)*** (0.0012)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0011) (0.0010)* (0.0016)*** 
First Stage:       
IVΔ(import exp.)    0.1368 0.1339 0.1164 
    (0.0235)*** (0.0228)*** (0.0177)*** 
F-stat excl. inst.    33.99 34.63 43.11 
Period FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Area FE N Y Y N Y Y 
Controls N N Y N N Y 
Election years 1992-2013 1992-2013 1992-2013 1992-2013 1992-2013 1992-2013 
Est. method OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV 
Observations 47,992 47,992 47,983 47,992 47,992 47,983 
In Panel A, the dependent variable is the average annual change in the share of invalid ballots between 
two elections. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the average annual change in voter turnout between 
two elections. Standard errors are clustered at the level of 611 local labor markets. Stars: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; 
*** p<0.01. 
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2.5 Labor market as the transmission channel 
 
We have established that the rise in Chinese trade generates an increase 
in the share of votes for populist parties, along with an increase in the 
share of invalid ballots and a drop in voter turnout. Instrumental 
variable estimations ensure that these relationships have a causal 
interpretation. According to the economic theory outlined in the 
Introduction, the transmission channels should be concerned with the 
redistributive effects of trade between and within countries: developed 
countries suffer from the upsurge of low-wage emerging exporters such 
as China and the negative impact is likely to affect more strongly 
domestic workers whose degree of substitutability for workers in low-
wage countries is larger. In this Section, we test whether these channels 
are at work in our case study. We proceed in two steps. First, we assess 
the between-country channel by checking whether import competition 
from China has a negative impact on employment and income in Italian 
municipalities. Second, we use various municipality-year level measures 
of income inequality as dependent variables to shed some light on the 
within-country mechanism.24 
 
Effects on employment and income. In order to study the employment 
effects of the exposure to Chinese imports, we borrow from Autor et al. 
(2013) and run a slightly modified version of equation 2.2: 25 
∆𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽∆𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−10
′ 𝛾 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾𝑟(𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                   (2.4) 
where i indicates municipalities and t denotes Census years (2001, 2011). 
∆𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the ten-year change of total employment as a share of the 
                                                          
24 Dippel et al. (2017) present a simple framework that allows to assess the extent to which 
the effect of import exposure on voting behaviour is causally mediated by the effect of 
import exposure on labour markets. 
25 We first checked whether replicating the benchmark regression only for elections held in 
1992, 2001 and 2013 (those nearest to the Census years) yields estimates that are similar to 
the full-sample case. It turns out that this is the case: in the IV specification with all controls, 
the coefficient is 0.0045 (standard deviation 0.0015).  
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working age population. ∆𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the trade shock as defined in equation 
2.1, with n now equal to 10; the instrumental variable is adjusted 
accordingly. 𝛿𝑡, 𝛾𝑟(𝑖) and 𝑋𝑖𝑡−10 are defined as above. 
Results are reported in Table 2.5. Both OLS and IV coefficients suggest a 
negative and significant impact of Chinese import penetration on total 
employment. According to the IV estimate in column 6, the magnitude 
of the impact is not negligible: a one-standard deviation rise in the 
import exposure shock induces a drop in the dependent variable larger 
than one-fifth of its standard deviation. These results suggest that, even 
if China’s competition affects the tradeable sectors only, negative effects 
are detectable at the total economy level as well, probably because of 
spillover effects.26 
 
Table 2.5: Trade shock and total employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Δ(import exp.) -0.0157 -0.0163 -0.0170 -0.0153 -0.0157 -0.0162 
 (0.0021)*** (0.0021)*** (0.0024)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0035)*** (0.0038)*** 
First Stage:       
IVΔ(import exp.)    0.1908 0.1888 0.1748 
    (0.0219)*** (0.0213)*** (0.0170)*** 
F-stat excl. inst.    76.24 78.55 105.42 
Period FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Area FE N Y Y N Y Y 
Controls N N Y N N Y 
Census years 1991-2011 1991-2011 1991-2011 1991-2011 1991-2011 1991-2011 
Est. method OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV 
Observations 16,028 16,028 16,028 16,028 16,028 16,028 
In Panel A the dependent variable is the 10-year change in manufacturing employment as a share of 
working age population. In Panel B the dependent variable is the 10-year change in total employment 
as a share of working age population. Standard errors are clustered at the level of 611 local labor 
markets. Stars: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
In Table 2.6, we analyze the effects of the import exposure shock on 
income levels. Confidential data on average income levels at the 
                                                          
26 In unreported evidence (available upon request) we replicate the estimation of equation 
2.4 with manufacturing employment as the dependent variable. As expected, we find 
stronger effects of import competition than those reported in Table 2.5. 
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municipality level come from the Ministry of Economy and Finance and 
are based on tax records. Available years are from 2003 to 2014.27 After 
adjusting income data for tax evasion, the estimating equation is 
analogous to previous ones and reads as:28  
ln (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑖𝑡 − ln (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑖𝑡−1 =  𝛽∆𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡0
′ 𝛾 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾𝑟(𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (2.5) 
We find that the China import shock has a negative effect also on income, 
though the size of the impact is smaller than in the case of employment: 
the standardized beta in the last column is 0.01.  
 
Table 2.6: Trade shock and income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Δ(import exp.) -0.0119 -0.0119 -0.0118 -0.0044 -0.0043 -0.0032 
 (0.0014)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0005)*** 
First Stage:       
IVΔ(import exp.)    0.1574 0.1568 0.1514 
    (0.0208)*** (0.0207)*** (0.0199)*** 
F-stat excl. instr.    57.39 57.28 57.91 
Period FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Area FE N Y Y N Y Y 
Controls N N Y N N Y 
Census years 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 
Est. method OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV 
Observations 88,998 88,998 88,979 88,998 88,998 88,979 
The dependent variable is the yearly change in log income. Standard errors are clustered at the level of 
611 local labor markets. Stars: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
                                                          
27 Unfortunately, available data refer to average income and not to wages. Then, assuming 
that the impacts of import competition on sources of income different from wage (e.g. rents, 
capital gains, etc.) are lower, our findings are to be considered as a lower bound for the 
effect on wage.  
28 Tax evasion is imputed using Marino and Zizza (2008) who compare Italian data from 
survey data with those from official tax records to propose tax evasion rate by gender, age, 
geographical area, job type (employee, self-employed, etc.). We map these rates into 
municipalities by means of their composition in terms of the same variable using data from 
the 2001 census. Then we correct original data by dividing them by 1 – (imputed tax 
evasion rate). As before, we first checked the benchmark result on populism by restricting 
the sample to the years for which income data are available. When we focus on elections 
held in 2006, 2008, and 2013, the IV trade shock coefficient is 0.0199 (standard error 0.0087). 
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All in all, results in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 are consistent with the theoretical 
prediction according to which Italy, as a rich and developed country, is 
a loser in trade globalization. 
 
Effects on income inequality. Our last bunch of results is about the 
distributive effect of trade within country. Theory suggests that in 
developed countries trade can be detrimental/beneficial to low-/high- 
skilled workers. Our empirical framework can accommodate the test for 
this prediction: if it is true, one should observe an increase in wage 
inequality at the municipality-year level. The same confidential data on 
income include consistent data on the Gini index and on the shares of 
taxpayers whose income is above 75,000/120,000 euros (near the top 5/1 
percent, respectively); all these measures allow us to study the effect 
either on the whole distribution (Gini) or on top incomes. The estimation 
approach follows model 2.5 except that our dependent variable is the 
change in one of the inequality measures.29   
Table 2.7 reports our findings. The first three columns indicate that 
import competition is positively correlated with income inequality, and 
this evidence is robust to various definitions of the dependent variable 
as well as the functional form. However, these correlations can be given 
a causal interpretation only in the case of the full IV specification with 
the Gini index as the dependent variable (column 6 in Panel A), while 
the IV estimates obtained by measuring inequality with the share of 
high-income taxpayers are never significantly different from zero 
(columns 4-6 in Panels B and C).30 In respect of our aim, failing to identify 
a robust causal link between import competition and inequality does not 
make the evidence in Table 2.7 useless. Voters are likely not to be so 
sophisticated and rational as to distinguish correlation from causality: 
they may well observe concomitant rising import competition and rising 
inequality and postulate a nexus between the two; such a nexus is then 
sufficient to translate into voting behavior.  
                                                          
29 As far as inequality measures are concerned we cannot correct directly for tax evasion. 
Therefore, we give more weight to more reliable data by weighting regression with weights 
equal to 1 – (imputed tax evasion rate).  
30 This result is consistent with Malgouyres (2017b).  
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Table 2.7: Trade shock and income inequality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: dependent variable = change in the Gini index 
Δ(import exp.) 0.0003 0.0005 0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0000 0.0004 
 (0.0001)** (0.0001)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001) (0.0002)** 
Panel B: dependent variable = change in the share of taxpayers whose income is > 75,000 euros 
Δ(import exp.) 0.0012 0.0011 0.0013 0.0003 0.0002 0.0005 
 (0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Panel C: dependent variable = change in the share of taxpayers whose income is > 120,000 euros 
Δ(import exp.) 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 
 (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
First Stage:       
IVΔ(import exp.)    0.1574 0.1569 0.1514 
    (0.0208)*** (0.0207)*** (0.0199)*** 
F-stat excl. instr.    57.56 57.45 58.06 
Period FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Area FE N Y Y N Y Y 
Controls N N Y N N Y 
Years 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 
Est. method OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV 
Observations 88,998 88,998 88,979 88,998 88,998 88,979 
In Panel A the dependent variable is the annual change in the Gini index. In Panel B the dependent 
variable is the annual change in change in the share of taxpayers whose income is > 75,000 euros. In 
Panel C the dependent variable is the annual change in the share of taxpayers whose income is > 120,000 
euros. Standard errors are clustered at the level of 611 local labor markets. Stars: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01. 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In recent years, populist parties have seen a surge in support in Western 
developed countries. We focus on the Italian case – one the most affected 
countries – and show that trade competition from low-wage countries 
and, in particular, from China contributes to causally explain the 
populist backlash. This result is confirmed after a number of robustness 
checks, including taking into account the competing role of immigration, 
the end of competitive devaluation, and the introduction of the fiscal 
compact. We further show that that protest vote also takes the form of 
an increase in invalid votes and a drop in voter turnout. To rationalize 
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these findings, we analyze the labor market effect of the China shock and 
find that it lowers employment and income and is positively correlated 
with income inequality, consistent with predictions from trade theory. 
More generally, and from a policy perspective, our results point to the 
deep root of the success of populist parties in Italy and suggest that 
fighting economic insecurity would be an effective tool to limit populist 
backlash. 
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2.7 Appendix 
 
Table 2.A1: Descriptive statistics 
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Table 2.A2: List of two-digit sectors 
Sector 
(NACE 
revision 1) 
Sector (description) Import  
from China 
 (Y/N) 
Skill 
intensity 
Dependence 
on public 
spending 
01 Agriculture, hunting and related service 
activities 
Y  0.00526 
02 Forestry, logging and related service activities Y  0.01494 
05 Fishing, operation of fish hatcheries and fish 
farms; service activities incidental to fishing 
Y  0.00000 
10 Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat Y  0.00000 
11 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; 
service activities incidental to oil and gas 
extraction, excluding surveying 
Y  0.00024 
12 Mining of uranium and thor um ores Y   
13 Mining of metal ores Y  0.00000 
14 Other mining and quarrying Y  0.00014 
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages Y 0.16 0.00066 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products Y 0.27 0.00056 
17 Manufacture of textiles Y 0.10 0.00127 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and 
dyeing of fur 
Y 0.14 0.00022 
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture 
of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and 
footwear 
Y 0.09 0.00126 
20 Manuf cture of wood and of products of wood 
and cork, except furniture; manufacture of 
articles of straw and plaiting materials 
Y 0.08 0.00213 
21 Manufacture of pu p, paper and paper 
products 
Y 0.17 0.00127 
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of 
recorded media 
Y 0.34 0.00056 
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 
products and nuclear fuel 
Y 0.31 0.00007 
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products 
Y 0.41 0.06580 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products Y 0.15 0.00173 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products 
Y 0.14 0.00127 
27 Manufacture of basic metals Y 0.14 0.00027 
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, 
except machinery and equipment 
Y 0.12 0.00072 
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment 
n.e.c. 
Y 0.16 0.00280 
30 Manufacture of office machinery and 
computers 
Y 0.49 0.00262 
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Table 2.A2: List of two-digit sectors (continued) 
Sector 
(NACE 
revision 1) 
Sector (description) Import  
from China 
(Y/N) 
Skill 
intensity 
Dependence 
on public 
spending 
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and 
apparatus n.e.c. 
Y 0.21 0.00161 
32 Manufacture of radio, television and 
communication equipment and apparatus 
Y 0.36 0.01382 
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks 
Y 0.38 0.00700 
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers 
Y 0.20 0.00505 
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment Y 0.33 0.01605 
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. Y 0.16 0.00118 
37 Recycling N  0.00171 
40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply Y  0.00030 
41 Collection, purification and distribution of 
water 
N  0.02431 
45 Construction N  0.00300 
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel 
N  0.00008 
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except 
of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
N  0.00817 
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; repair of personal and household 
goods 
N  0.02907 
55 Hotels and restaurants N  0.00539 
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines N  0.00390 
61 Water transport N  0.00195 
62 Air transport N  0.00383 
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; 
activities of travel agencies 
N  0.03725 
64 Post and telecommunications N  0.00199 
65 Financial intermediation, except insurance and 
pension funding 
N  0.00098 
66 Insurance and pension funding, except 
compulsory social security 
N  0.00013 
67 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation N  0.00001 
70 Real estate activities N  0.00006 
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without 
operator and of personal and household goods 
N  0.00117 
72 Computer and related activities N  0.00951 
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Table 2.A2: List of two-digit sectors (continued) 
Sector 
(NACE 
revision 1) 
Sector (description) Import 
from China 
(Y/N) 
Skill 
intensity 
Dependence 
on public 
spending 
73 Research and development N  0.42225 
74 Other business activities Y  0.00050 
75 Public administration and defence; compulsory 
social security 
N  0.98660 
80 Education N  0.77876 
85 Health and social work N  0.75661 
90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and 
similar activities 
N  0.01252 
91 Activities of membership organizations n.e.c. N  0.01794 
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities Y  0.12070 
93 Other service activities Y  0.09299 
95 Private households with employed persons N  0.00000 
99 Extra-territorial organizations and bodies N   
 
 
Table 2.A3: List of populist parties by election 
Election 
year 
Parties labelled as populist 
1992 Italian Social Movement – National Right (Movimento Sociale Italiano – Destra 
Nazionale); Lombard League (Lega Lombarda)  
1994 Northern League (Lega Nord); National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale) 
1996 Northern League (Lega Nord); National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale); Social 
Movement – Tricolor Flame (Movimento Sociale – Fiamma Tricolore) 
2001 Northern League (Lega Nord); National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale); Tricolor 
Flame (Fiamma Tricolore) 
2006 Northern League (Lega Nord); National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale); Tricolor 
Flame (Fiamma Tricolore) 
2008 Northern League (Lega Nord); The Right – Tricolor Flame (La Destra – Fiamma 
Tricolore) 
2013 Northern League (Lega Nord); Tricolor Flame (Fiamma Tricolore); The Right (La 
Destra); Brothers of Italy – National Alliance (Fratelli d’Italia – Alleanza 
Nazionale); Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle) 
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Chapter 3 
 
Employment, turnover and 
profitability effects of the German 
national minimum wage: A sectoral 
analysis 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The desirability of minimum wage policy has been a heavily debated 
subject for over a century. On the one hand, setting a wage floor can 
ensure that those who work earn enough to live decently, if not 
comfortably (Macrosty, 1898). On the other, fixing the price of labour 
might unbalance supply and demand, leading to increased 
unemployment and the poverty risks that entails. There is still no 
consensus on the existence or size of this disemployment effect despite 
hundreds of papers already published on the subject, mainly based on 
state-level variation in the US. 
The introduction of a national minimum wage in Germany on January 
1st 2015 (€8.50/hr) is a welcome opportunity to obtain a fresh angle on 
the issue. As a major industrial economy, Germany is more comparable 
to other Western economies than say, Indonesia (Pratomo, 2016). The 
new wage floor is set at a level similar to that of long-established 
minimum wages in neighbouring countries, amounting to 48 percent of 
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the median wage31. Yet, given the extension of the German low-wage 
sector (Bosch, 2018) and the limited number of legal exemptions, its bite 
is considerable, with more than 50 percent of employees affected in 
certain sectors32. Unlike US studies, we are not limited to geography-
level data, but can instead analyze firms directly thanks to our access to 
the nationally representative, firm-level database of Germany’s largest 
credit rating agency. 
The national character of the new minimum wage law means the panel 
techniques standard in the literature cannot be applied (e.g. Neumark 
and Wascher, 1992; Allegretto et al., 2013; Dube, Lester and Reich, 2010). 
Existing evaluation studies for Germany typically use difference-in-
difference strategies relying on regional, individual-level or firm-level 
variation in the bite of the minimum wage (Caliendo et al, 2018). Instead, 
we propose here a different approach. First, we exploit differences in 
pre-treatment hourly wage levels across sectors to identify the effect 
minimum wages have on employment growth. Next, we link firms in 
heavily affected sectors to those in de facto unaffected sectors, matching 
on past employment paths and forward looking credit ratings. We 
surround the matching period by two testing periods (2011 and 2013-14) 
to evaluate our matching process. 
Our results indicate that employment barely responded to the minimum 
wage introduction in Germany. Overall, employment growth of treated 
firms in the East was 0.8 percentage points lower than in the control 
group; in the West, the point estimate is indistinguishable from zero. In 
headcounts, this equates to just 21,482 jobs lost, or 0.05 percent of total 
employment. Even among micro firms in East Germany, we only found 
a reduction in employment growth of 1.8 percentage points. 
Our results are largely in line with those of other evaluation studies. For 
example, Caliendo et al. (2018), exploiting regional differences in the 
intensity of minimum wage exposure, find a reduction in overall 
employment of 0.5 percent, concentrated amongst mini-jobbers33. Garloff 
                                                          
31 Source: OECD (2018). 
32 Own calculations based on the German Socio-Economic Panel. 
33 The mini-job statute in Germany significantly reduces social security contributions for 
(very) low earning employees. 
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(2016) takes this approach one step further by creating region-age-
gender cells, each with specific minimum wage bites and employment 
evolutions. He also finds no meaningful overall employment effect, only 
a shift from mini jobs to regular employment. Turning to survey data, 
Bossler and Gerner (2016) find that employment grew by 1.9 percent less 
in firms which reported having employees paid less than €8.50/hr in the 
2014 IAB Establishment Panel. Relative to total employment that 
represents a reduction of about 0.15 percent. 
The present chapter ties in to the wider international debate on the 
welfare effects of minimum wages and the discussion on which 
mechanisms could explain the lack of employment effects found in some 
studies (e.g. Cengiz et al., 2018; Allegretto et al., 2013; Dube et al., 2016) 
but not in others (e.g. Neumark and Wascher, 1992; Liu et al., 2016; 
Neumark et al., 2014). In addition to non-compliance (Burauel et al., 
2017), increased unpaid overtime (Burauel et al., 2017) and lower 
working hours (Burauel et al., 2018), other adaptation strategies may also 
have been at work in Germany. Our estimates suggest that a part of the 
cost shock is absorbed by higher turnover, either through firms raising 
prices or wealthier consumers leading to more product demand. This 
corroborates existing studies in the US (Aaronson, 2001; Allegretto and 
Reich, 2018), Hungary (Cengiz et al., 2018) and Germany (Link, 2018). 
Moreover, we also show that credit ratings deteriorate in the West, 
suggesting the presence of monopsonistic labour markets in the 
restaurant and accommodation sectors, with minimum wages eating 
into firm profits (Bachmann and Frings, 2017). In the more diverse group 
of treated sectors in the East, instead, we find that credit ratings actually 
improve, contrasting with Draca et al. (2011), who find that the national 
minimum wage introduced in the UK in 1999 lowered profitability of 
affected firms by 2.7 percent.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines 
the institutional background of the minimum wage reform, describes the 
data used for the empirical analysis and sets out the identification 
strategy we rely on. Section 3.3 presents our estimation strategy and the 
results so obtained for the employment effects. Section 3.4 discusses 
potential complementary adjustment mechanisms to the labour cost 
shock. Section 3.5 concludes and Section 3.6 provides supporting details. 
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3.2 Data and institutional context 
 
3.2.1 Institutional context  
Western Germany has a long tradition of collective bargaining systems, 
which kept wages relatively high until the 90’s. However, the 
reunification with deindustrialized Eastern Germany and increased 
international competition led to the introduction of opening clauses 
enabling deviations from binding industry-level collective agreements 
in the field of working time and wages (Schnabel, 1999). Together with 
the opening up of many public services to private providers and the 
Hartz labour market reforms of 2003, these developments substantially 
eroded the collective bargaining system, dropping coverage rates from a 
near universal 85 percent in 1990 to barely 60 percent in 2013 (and not 
even 50 percent in the East) (Weinkopf, 2015). Trade unions, which 
initially favoured sector-level agreements, started pushing for a national 
minimum wage, but met heavy political resistance. At the time, 
Germany was still considered the sick man of Europe, with 
unemployment rates above 10 percent, only turning into an economic 
superstar from 2008 onwards (Dustmann et al., 2014). The surge in 
economic prowess also led to increased support for a national minimum 
wage, as rising GDP failed to lift wages for the bottom deciles. 
The Social Democratic Party (SPD) forced the issue in 2013 by making 
their entry in the governing coalition conditional on the introduction of 
a national minimum wage (Weinkopf, 2015). The Minimum Wage Act 
went into force on January 1st 2015, setting a national wage floor of €8.50 
(then $11.05) and strengthening collective agreements (exceeding the 
national minimum). There are only very few exceptions: mainly 
interns34, minors, trainees, volunteers and previously long-term 
unemployed during their first six months in a new job. Additionally, 
sectors with existing minimum wages below €8.50 (e.g. meat processing, 
hair dressing) were granted a two-year transition period. We exclude 
those from our analysis. 
                                                          
34 Excluded are those with a compulsory internship, a voluntary orientation or a voluntary 
accompanying internship lasting less than three months or an entry-level qualification.. 
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Figure 3.1 shows that Germany’s National Minimum Wage (NMW) is 
set at a similar (relative) level as those present in other countries. About 
2.8 million eligible employees earned less than €8.50 per hour in 2014 (11 
percent, Burauel et al., 2017), albeit with sizeable differences across 
sectors and regions (see Table 3.A1). Own back of the envelope 
calculations based on the SOEP suggest that full compliance with the 
NMW would raise the average wage of affected employees by €2.41/hr. 
This would increase the total wage bill across Germany by 2 percent. 
 
Figure 3.1: Ratio of minimum wage to median wage, 2015 
Source: OECD (2018) 
 
The future evolution of the policy is decided upon by the minimum wage 
commission, which consists of voting representatives from industry (3), 
unions (3) and two advisory members from the academic community. 
This led to a first increase in 2017, when the minimum wage was raised 
from €8.50 to €8.84, suggesting the minimum wage will be raised 
gradually (the 2017 hike amounts to a 4 percent increase) rather than in 
larger discrete jumps as more customary in the US35. 
                                                          
35 The average size of minimum wage changes in the US between 1990 and 2013 was 9.5 
percent (Wursten, 2017). 
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3.2.2 Firm-level data 
The core of this study is the Mannheim Enterprise Panel (MUP) hosted 
by ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research. It is based 
on data obtained from Creditreform, the largest credit rating agency in 
Germany and covers all German corporations (Vanhaverbeke, 2017). The 
dataset is representative for the German economy and can thus be used 
to formulate population-level conclusions (Bersch et al., 2014). The main 
variables of interest are employment and turnover, but also the assigned 
credit ratings. These are based on a combination of public and private 
sources, e.g. public trade registers and court filings as well as private 
data on payment reliability and even manager interviews. As a result, 
these ratings contain more information on a firm’s health than traditional 
balance sheet items: financial and liquidity risks and structural risks such 
as industry classification, firm age, firm size and productivity, along 
with “soft factors” such as payment history, volume of orders, firm 
development or management quality (Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2007). We 
drop outliers based on changes in the credit rating and employment or 
turnover (depending on the dependent variable) to retain the largest and 
smallest firms but still filter out input errors as well as major swings due 
to mergers and acquisitions. 
 
3.2.3 Sector-level treatment indicator  
Our identification strategy is based on comparing firms in heavily 
affected sectors to similar counterparts in largely unaffected sectors. In 
order to construct this ‘vulnerability’ indicator, we turn to the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP version 32), a yearly survey of private 
households, which has been conducted since 1984 in West Germany and 
since 1990 in East Germany (comparable to the Current Population 
Survey in the US). Crucially, it contains monthly wages as well as hours 
worked information, which we combine to obtain an estimate of each 
individual’s hourly wage. Restricting our sample to eligible employees 
in 2013-2014, we can then calculate for each two-digit sector36  how many 
                                                          
36 We use the NACE revision 2 classification, which is based on the international ISIC 
standard and can fairly easily be compared to the US NAICS system. 
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employees were earning less than the €8.50 right before the minimum 
wage introduction. Given the substantial wage differences between East 
and West Germany, we further split this across the two regions. 
Table 3.A1 provides an overview of the most and least affected sectors. 
As in the US, we can see that the food and beverage services sector is 
most heavily affected. Unaffected sectors are, for example, waste 
collection, financial services and the higher value manufacturing sectors. 
The table also shows the average gap between the sub-NMW earners’ 
wage in 2014 and the NMW, and how much that sector’s total wage bill 
would rise under full compliance (and no other wage movement).  
We use the share of sub-NMW workers to split the industries into three 
groups: treated, grey zone and controls, for East and West Germany 
separately. Any sector where this share exceeds 30 percent is defined as 
treated, below 10 percent is considered control. Those in between we 
consider to be in the grey zone and exclude from the analysis. Table 3.1 
shows the treatment allocation per sector-region (region: East or West 
Germany), as well as the corresponding distribution of firms in our 
regression sample. The differences between East and West Germany are 
remarkably stark. Only the ‘restaurant’ and accommodation sectors 
(NACE revision 2 codes 56 and 55) are treated in the West, whereas only 
seven sectors qualify as controls in the East. Conversely, there are 29 
treated sectors in the East and 27 control sectors in the West. 
 
 
3.3 Estimation 
 
Our main aim is to assess the causal impact of the new German national 
minimum wage on employment growth over 2014-2015 and 2014-2016 
among firms in treated sectors.37 Formally, let 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖  be a dummy 
variable, which is equal to 1 if firm 𝑖 is in a treated sector and 0 otherwise.   
                                                          
37 We use 2014 as base year for both 2015 and 2016 because ultimately we want to test 
whether there was an effect at all and are less interested in seeing whether this effect 
differed between 2015 and 2016. 
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Table 3.1: Treated, untreated and greyzone sectors 
Nace 
Code 
Treatment 
West- East 
# of Firms 
West- East 
Nace 
Test 
56 
55 
T-T 
T-T 
1018 - 124 
626 - 158 
Food and beverage service activities 
Accommodation 
47 GZ-T 9149 - 1255 Retail trade, excl. of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
70 GZ-T 6270 - 313 Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities 
45 GZ-T 4646 - 1017 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
68 GZ-T 4066 - 605 Real estate activities 
71 GZ-T 2702 - 454 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis 
52 GZ-T 2021 - 309 Warehousing and support activities for transportation 
82 GZ-T 1670 - 169 Admin, office support and other business support activities 
66 GZ-T 1509 - 160 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities 
10 GZ-T 1233 - 257 Manufacture of food products 
77 GZ-T 968 - 236 Rental and leasing activities 
23 GZ-T 881 - 202 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
73 GZ-T 987 - 68 Advertising and market research 
69 GZ-T 874 - 99 Legal and accounting activities 
79 GZ-T 763 - 81 Travel agency, tour operator and related activities 
74 GZ-T 746 - 51 Other professional, scientific and technical activities 
31 GZ-T 625 - 89 Manufacture of furniture 
93 GZ-T 506 - 65 Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities 
13 GZ-T 352 - 72 Manufacture of textiles 
78 GZ-T 317 - 31 Employment activities 
11 GZ-T 272 - 29 Manufacture of beverages 
95 GZ-T 215 - 44 Repair of computers and personal and household goods 
14 GZ-T 171 - 18 Manufacture of wearing apparel 
80 GZ-T 130 - 21 Security and investigation activities 
63 GZ-T 118 - 8 Information service activities 
15 GZ-T 68 - 10 Manufacture of leather and related products 
50 GZ-T 53 - 5 Water transport 
12 GZ-T 11 - 1 Manufacture of tobacco products 
64 C-C 956 - 51 Financial service activities, excl. insurance and pension funding 
38 C-C 608 - 219 Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery 
35 C-C 652 - 167 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
37 C-C 108 - 34 Sewerage 
84 C-C 106 - 18 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
39 C-C 37 - 4 Remediation activities and other waste management services 
43 C-GZ 15765 - 3844 Specialised construction activities 
25 C-GZ 4969 - 964 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, excl. machinery and equipment 
41 C-GZ 3159 - 772 Construction of buildings 
28 C-GZ 3102 - 392 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
62 C-GZ 2603 - 250 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 
26 C-GZ 1180 - 170 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 
42 C-GZ 796 - 297 Civil engineering 
27 C-GZ 898 - 144 Manufacture of electrical equipment 
32 C-GZ 834 - 110 Other manufacturing 
20 C-GZ 594 - 86 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
85 GZ-C 536 - 95 Education 
33 C-GZ 464 - 124 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
24 C-GZ 498 - 71 Manufacture of basic metals 
29 C-GZ 339 - 68 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
17 C-GZ 329 - 49 Manufacture of paper and paper products 
30 C-GZ 135 - 32 Manufacture of other transport equipment 
21 C-GZ 124 - 19 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and preparations 
65 C-GZ 105 - 4 (re-)Insurance and pension funding, excl. compulsory social security 
36 C-GZ 36 - 21 Water collection, treatment and supply 
51 C-GZ 18 - 0 Air transport 
9 C-GZ 6- 3 Mining support service activities 
6 C-GZ 3- 0 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 
T: treated, C: control, GZ: grey zone (excluded). Table sorted by  treatment status and number of firms in 
the sector. Unlisted sectors are a) in grey zone in both areas, b) excluded based on legislative reasons or 
c) excluded due to pre-existing higher sectoral minimum wage agreements. 
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Denote by ∆𝑌𝑖𝑡
1 the observed change in the outcome value for treated firm 
𝑖 at time 𝑡 and by ∆𝑌𝑖𝑡
0 the potential change in the outcome value that the 
same firm would have observed at time 𝑡 in the absence of the minimum 
wage introduction. The key parameter of interest is the average effect of 
treatment on the treated (ATT): 
𝛼 = 𝐸[∆𝑌𝑖𝑡
1  − ∆𝑌𝑖𝑡
0| 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 = 1 ], 𝑡 = 2015, 2016           (3.1) 
where 𝐸[⋅] represents the expectation operator.  
However, the term 𝐸[∆𝑌𝑖𝑡
0|𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 = 1] is not observable. While existing 
evaluation studies for Germany typically use a standard difference-in-
difference approach to estimate the counterfactual situation, we apply 
here a difference-in-difference matching strategy (Heckman et al. 1997, 
1998). The latter requires that, given a set of exogenous characteristics X, 
the change in the outcome value for control firms is (mean) independent 
of treatment status (unconfoundedness and overlap assumptions). 
Though being a “data-hungry” method, it provides a more convincing 
counterfactual comparison group (Ichino, 2014) by helping to balance 
covariates across treated and control firms. In addition, it allows to 
control, not only for unobserved time-invariant confounding factors, but 
also for unobserved covariates that are correlated with the observed ones 
(Smith and Todd, 2005a; Lechner, 2011). 
More specifically, we implement nearest neighbour matching. This 
involves finding for each treated firm the closest control firm(s)38 in 
terms of the Mahalanobis distance. To obtain the best possible match, a 
large pool of controls is required. Therefore, we employ matching with 
replacement and allow different treated firms to be matched to the same 
control firm. The risk that the closest neighbour is far away is avoided 
by excluding all treated firms whose smallest Mahalanobis distance is 
beyond the 95th percentile. 
A tabular summary of our matching design can be found in Table 3.2. 
We always match on the level of log employment in 2012 and 2013 and 
on credit ratings in 2012, 2013 and 2014. This ensures that treated and 
control firms have a similar history in terms of both employment trends 
                                                          
38 The set of control units matched to any treated unit is a singleton unless there are ties. 
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and projected survivability and profitability. Moreover, we also consider 
three additional covariates that optionally enter as matching variables, 
all measured in 2014: firm labour ‘productivity’ (turnover per 
employee)39, state unemployment rate and share of mini jobbers in state 
total employment. The first would avoid that we match a three-man nail 
polishing shop to a multi-million financial activity. The two state-level 
matching variables proxy for particularities of local labour markets.  
 
Table 3.2: Matching summary  
Dependent Variables 
Δ log(employment) (2014-15/16) 
Matching Variables 
log(employment) (2012, 2013) 
credit rating (2012, 2013, 2014) 
Matching Variables (optional) 
firm ‘productivity’ (turnover/employment) in 2014 
state unemployment rate in 2014 
share of mini-jobbers in total state employment in 2014 
Testing Variables 
Δ log(employment) (2013-14) 
log(employment) (2011) 
 
We estimate the counterfactual with all possible combinations of the 
matching variables (6 in total) and select the specification that produces 
the smallest standardised difference in means (SDM) for the change in 
log employment between 2013 and 2014.40 Hitherto, no study has found 
any anticipation effects of minimum wage changes, neither in Germany 
(e.g. Caliendo et al., 2018) nor in the US (e.g. Dube et al., 2010), implying 
that there should not be a treatment  effect in 2014. In case of a tie, we 
                                                          
39 If no productivity data for 2014 is available, we use the average of the last five years. If 
those aren’t available either, we use the firm average over the entire available sample. 
40 The standardised mean difference of two variables is the difference in the mean of the 
variables, divided by the average of the two standard deviations. The SDM is less 
dependent on sample sizes than t statistics, which makes it more suitable for balance checks 
in matching procedures (Imbens, 2015). 
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look at the divergence in the SDM for the level of log employment in 
2011. If these are still tied, we choose the most parsimonious option.41  
ATT can then be estimated by the difference in the mean employment 
growth rate over 2014-𝑡 between the matched samples: 
?̂? =
1
𝑁𝑇
∑∆𝑌𝑖𝑡
1
𝑖∈𝑇
−
1
𝑁𝑇
∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗∆𝑌𝑗𝑡
0
𝑗∈𝐶(𝑖)𝑖∈𝑇
                        (3.2) 
𝑤𝑖𝑗 = {
1/𝑁𝑖
𝐶
0
        
𝑖𝑓 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶(𝑖) 
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
where 𝑇 is the set of 𝑁𝑇 treated observations, 𝐶(𝑖) is the set of 𝑁𝑖
𝐶 control 
units matched to treated unit 𝑖 and 𝑤𝑗 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑖∈𝑇  is the weight assigned 
to each control observation 𝑗, with ∑ 𝑤𝑗 = 𝑁
𝑇
𝑗 . Standard errors are 
calculated as per Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie and 
Imbens (2006) in order to factor in matching uncertainty. 
Table 3.A2 in the Appendix provides some baseline statistics about our 
sample, which contains 53,489 control firms and 10,257 treated ones. 
Start-ups and micro firms are overrepresented in the treated group 
relative to the (raw) control group. Treated firms’ average employment 
grew faster since the introduction of the minimum wage (40 percent 
more employment growth than the controls), turnover grew more 
slowly in 2015, but by 2016 this trend had reversed. The credit ratings of 
treated firms improved (lower is better). Even though treated firms 
tended to be smaller, it is reassuring to see that their relative difference 
remained constant through 2012-2014 (-11 percent), which also applies 
to their turnover and credit ratings. Finally, treated firms tended to be in 
states with a higher unemployment rate and a higher share of mini-jobs. 
Thus, overall, the descriptive statistics show that the sample of treated 
firms is systematically different from the sample of control firms in both 
firm-specific and region-specific characteristics. This suggests that 
treatment assignment might not be statistically exogenous: after all, an 
inherent goal of the minimum wage introduction is to improve the 
income of workers in low-wage sectors and regions not covered by 
                                                          
41 In Section 3.7 we show how intuition from multi factor error models and synthetic control 
methods can be used to justify this approach. 
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national collective bargaining agreements (Weinkopf, 2015). Yet, our 
difference-in-difference matching strategy, by conditioning on pre-
treatment observable covariates and by allowing for time constant 
confounding unobservables, should mitigate the problem of 
endogeneity bias. Detailed pre-treatment checks will be provided on a 
regression-by-regression basis. 
Our main results are shown in Table 3.3. In East Germany, we find a 
small negative impact on employment growth of 0.5 percentage points 
in 2015 and 0.8 percentage points by 2016 (column 1). On the other hand, 
in West Germany, where the treated firms belong to either the restaurant 
or the accommodation sector, employment remained stable, with 
insignificant results in both years (column 2).  
 
Table 3.3: Employment effects 
 
East West 
(1) (2) 
∆ Growth 14-15 -.005 .002 
 (.002)** (.004) 
∆ Growth 14-16 -.008 .001 
 (.003)** (.006) 
# of treated 5654 1562 
# of controls 39012 39012 
# of controls used 8008 2699 
SDM 14-16 -.05 .01 
SDM 14-15 -.04 .02 
SDM 13-14 .02 .02 
SDM 2013 0 .01 
SDM 2012 0 .01 
SDM 2011 0 .04 
Trend Judgement ✓ ✓ 
Specification Base Base 
∆ Growth is the difference in growth between the treated and control 
group. SDM refers to the standardized difference in means. Specification 
shows which matching specification scored best at the evaluation 
criteria. Matching uncertainty robust AI standard errors in parentheses 
(Abadie and Imbens, 2006). Stars:  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01. 
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Figure 3.2: Employment effect in East Germany 
 
(a) Treatment effect 2014-15 
 
 
(b) Treatment effect 2014-16 
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Estimates in Table 3.3 are derived from the base matching procedure (log 
employment in 2012, 2013 and credit ratings in 2012, 2013, 2014). In both 
regions the observed differences in employment growth from 2013 to 
2014 are minute (0.02). Pre-treatment trends also match, as indicated by 
the checkmarks in the Trend 2011-2013 row. Figure 3.2 shows this 
graphically for employment in East Germany.42 
Micro and small firms might be particularly affected by the minimum 
wage introduction given that it is harder for them to leverage capital in 
order to compensate for higher labour costs (it be due to lack of scope or 
access to funds). They might also struggle more with the extra 
bureaucratic burdens that came with the minimum wage legislation 
(Egeln, 2016). On the other hand, small firms might be less encumbered 
by internal protocols and hierarchy, which would make it easier for them 
to adjust their internal processes to new circumstances.  
In Table 3.4 we zoom in on these micro and small firms (respectively, <10 
and 10-49 employees). Except for small firms in the East, estimates are 
now obtained by matching also on different combinations of the optional 
covariates. Some regressions no longer perform well in the pre-treatment 
tests, as evidenced by the SDM 13-14 row and divergence over the SDMs 
of 2011/2012/2013. In the East, even our best estimate for employment 
growth of small firms still entails a meaningful difference in 2013-2014 
growth (0.09, column 2) and the pre-treatment trends diverge. In the 
West, 2013-2014 growth differences remain minor (SDMs of -0.01 to 
0.02), but pre-treatment trends for micro firms (column 3) are noisy 
enough to cast a small question mark on the credibility of the 
corresponding estimates. 
Nevertheless, there is still evidence to suggest that the minimum wage 
effects are more extreme for smaller firms. Amongst micro firms in the 
East, employment growth was reduced by 1.8 percentage points (2 × the 
overall effect). Employment in small firms in the West even went up, 
indicating these sectors might be characterized by monopsonistic labour 
markets. 
                                                          
42 In the Appendix, we also show unmatched difference in difference results (Table 3.A3); 
however, for some sample splits the pre-treatment trends are not ideal. 
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Table 3.4: Employment effects - micro and small enterprises 
 East West 
 Micro Small Micro Small 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆ Growth 14-15 -.009 .002 -.002 .019 
 (.004)** (.003) (.008) (.006)*** 
∆ Growth 14-16 -.018 -.001 -.007 .034 
 (.006)*** (.005) (.011) (.009)*** 
# of treated 2875 2091 552 665 
# of controls 39009 39012 39009 38908 
# of controls used 3001 2534 512 610 
SDM 14-16 -.09 -.01 -.04 .21 
SDM 14-15 -.07 .01 -.01 .19 
SDM 13-14 -.02 .09 -.01 .02 
SDM 2013 -.27 .01 -2.4 .16 
SDM 2012 -.28 .01 -2.41 .16 
SDM 2011 -.28 .01 -2.15 .15 
Trend Judgement ✓ x ? ✓ 
Specification MJ Base MJ P, U 
See notes of Table 3.3. MJ: match also on the 2014 share of mini-jobbers in state total 
employment, P: … level of firm labour productivity, U: … state unemployment rate.  
Stars:  * p < 0.1,  ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
3.4 Discussion 
 
Our employment estimates are in line with other existing studies of the 
German minimum wage. Bossler and Gerner (2016) find a reduction in 
employment of 1.9 percent in firms with at least one employee earning 
less than €8.50 based on the 2011-2015 IAB Establishment Panel. 
Likewise, in a later paper they find an employment effect of -1.7 percent 
by 2016, driven mostly by firms in the East and firms facing strong 
competitive pressure (Bossler et al., 2018). The approach in Caliendo et 
al. (2018) is more similar to ours, but they get their identifying variation 
from regional rather than sectoral differences in the minimum wage bite. 
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They find a much smaller effect on regular employment (-0.3 percent), 
but a significantly larger effect for mini-jobbers (-3.0 percent). This 
differential impact on regular versus marginal employment is also 
present in Garloff (2016), who uses region-age-gender variation in the 
minimum wage bite to identify the employment effect. They find that 
the number of mini-jobs lost balance out the gains in regular 
employment, suggesting there might be a shift from one form to the 
other. The pattern repeats itself in Bonin et al. (2018), who use a 
confidential employee-employer dataset to find an overall employment 
loss of -0.7 percent, driven exclusively by a drop in marginal 
employment (-0.9 percent) whereas regular employment even increased 
in their estimation (+0.4 percent). 
In order to compare our results to the numerous ex-ante predictions, we 
first convert the relative employment loss to an absolute number of jobs 
foregone. In 2014, Germany counted 38 million employees43. Of those, 
4.9 million were employed in an affected sector. We only find significant 
disemployment effects in the East (-0.8 percentage points growth), 
therefore we limit ourselves to the 2.2 million affected employees in the 
East. Our back-of-the-envelope estimate then suggests that 22,000 jobs 
were lost due to the national minimum wage. This represents a mere 0.05 
percent of total employment and is in the same ballpark as the 
previously mentioned ex-post studies. It lies, however, far below most 
ex-ante predictions. The latter were generally clustered around a million 
jobs lost (Knabe and Schöb, 2008: 0.84 million; Ragnitz and Thum, 2007: 
1.1 million; Bachmann et al., 2008: 1.2 million; Bauer et al., 2009: 0.85 
million), with the notable exception of Müller and Steiner (2010), who 
predicted a more conservative 150,000 job loss. A potential explanation 
for this large discrepancy is that ex-ante studies were performed at a time 
when German unemployment was twice as high (10 versus 5 percent in 
2014) and estimated wages in the bottom decile were much lower 
(Müller, 2013). 
How can we explain this muted response to a significant policy shock?  
Burauel et al. (2017) have shown that compliance with minimum wage  
                                                          
43 Source: Destatis. Includes both regular and marginal employment, but excludes interns 
and the self-employed. 
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legislation was less than perfect: in 2014, an estimated 2.8 million people 
earned less than the NMW, by 2016 this number had only dropped to 1.8 
million. Closely related, Burauel et al. (2017) also find an increase in 
unpaid overtime, which would further dampen the cost shock 
experienced by firms. A reduction in working hours instead of 
headcounts is another possibility (Burauel et al., 2018). We discuss here 
three additional potential adjustment mechanisms, by looking at the 
impact of the German minimum wage on the change in credit ratings - 
an indicator of firm profitability (Kraft et al., 2012) - and in log turnover 
over 2014-2015 and 2014-2016 (see Table 3.5 for matching design).44,45 
  
Table 3.5: Matching design – credit rating and turnover regressions 
Credit rating regressions Turnover regressions 
Dependent Variables 
Δ credit rating (2014-15/16) Δ log(turnover) (2014-15/16) 
Matching Variables 
credit rating (2012, 2013) log(turnover) (2012, 2013) 
log(employment) (2012, 2013, 2014) credit rating (2012, 2013,2014) 
Matching Variables (optional) 
firm ‘productivity’ (turnover/employment) in 2014 
state unemployment rate in 2014 
share of mini-jobbers in total state employment in 2014 
Testing Variables 
Δ credit rating (2013-14) Δ log(turnover) (2013-14) 
credit rating (2011) log(turnover) (2011) 
 
Table 3.6 documents that credit ratings in West Germany went up 1.08 
points by 2016 (higher is worse). This finding suggests that owners 
absorbed some of the costs through lower profitability (column 4), which 
would hint to monopsonistic labour markets. There is some 
circumstantial evidence to support this claim. For instance, Bachmann 
                                                          
44 In Section 3.7, we also show that the NMW doesn’t lead to higher firm exit rates, although 
the matching provides credible estimates only in East Germany. 
45 Note that the various complementary adaptation strategies may work conditional on the 
level of the NMW chosen by the federal authorities.  
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and Frings (2017) find that the restaurant and accommodation sectors 
(the only treated ones in the West) show more traits of monopsonistic 
than of competitive labour markets. On the contrary, firms in the East 
appear to have come out of the minimum wage shock stronger, with 
credit ratings improving across the board (columns 1-3). Such enhanced 
profitability might be due to increased expected demand. Yet, the result 
is somewhat at odds with Bossler et al. (2018) who use accounting data 
to show that the NMW reduced profitability in affected firms by 8 
percent (driven by higher labour costs). Unfortunately, they do not 
provide a regional split. 
 
Table 3.6: Credit rating effects - all, micro and small enterprises 
 East West 
 All 
(1) 
Micro 
(2) 
Small 
(3) 
All 
(4) 
Micro 
(5) 
Small 
(6)  
∆ Growth 14-15 -.317 -.88 .519 .893 .572 .539 
 (.306) (.456)* (.489) (.457)* (.685) (.726) 
∆ Growth 14-16 -1.566 -1.602 -1.373 1.083 .899 .556 
 (.435)*** (.663)** (.662)** (.63)* (.883) (1.048) 
# of treated 5965 3077 2184 1750 766 673 
# of controls 42847 42847 42847 42847 42847 42847 
# of controls used 4393 2233 1620 1628 758 621 
SDM 14-16 -.1 -.1 -.08 .06 .05 .03 
SDM 14-15 -.03 -.08 .04 .07 .04 .04 
SDM 13-14 -.01 -.05 -.01 .03 0 .06 
SDM 2013 -.01 -.01 -.01 0 0 0 
SDM 2012 -.01 -.01 -.01 0 0 0 
SDM 2011 -.04 -.03 -.06 -.02 -.06 .05 
Trend Judgment ✓ ? ? ✓ ? ? 
Specification U U U P P P 
See notes of Table 3.4. Stars:  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table 3.7 reports estimates for the change in log turnover as dependent 
variable. While in East Germany turnover did not respond to the 
minimum wage hike, in West Germany it grew 1.1 percentage points 
 62 
more among treated firms in 2015 and 3.3 percentage points more by 
2016, with gains disproportionately going to micro and small firms. This 
pattern is consistent with positive price and demand effects. 
 
Figure 3.7: Turnover effects - all, micro and small enterprises 
 East West 
 
All 
(1) 
Micro 
(2) 
Small 
(3) 
All 
(4) 
Micro 
(5) 
Small 
(6) 
∆ Growth 14-15 -.001 -.006 -.005 .011 .026 .016 
 (.004) (.005) (.005) (.006)** (.01)*** (.009)* 
∆ Growth 14-16 -.003 .003 -.008 .033 .046 .043 
 (.006) (.008) (.008) (.009)*** (.018)** (.013)*** 
# of treated 3981 1821 1401 1115 342 457 
# of controls 27787 27785 27787 27788 27787 27788 
# of controls used 2876 1579 1283 1090 328 471 
SDM 14-16 -.01 .01 -.04 .16 .2 .21 
SDM 14-15 -.01 -.04 -.03 .09 .2 .12 
SDM 13-14 -.01 -.01 -.01 .02 -.01 .03 
SDM 2013 -.01 -.27 .02 0 -.08 .02 
SDM 2012 -.01 -.27 .01 0 -.08 .01 
SDM 2011 0 -.3 .03 .02 -.15 -.01 
Trend Judgement ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ x ✓ 
Specification U MJ Base P, U P, U Base 
See notes of Table 3.4.  Stars:  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
The price channel as an escape valve has a long line of supporting 
literature, both in the US (e.g. Aaronson, 2001; Allegretto and Reich, 
2018) and beyond (e.g. Cengiz et al., 2018, for Hungary; Link, 2018, for 
Germany). Restaurant prices in particular, are relatively volatile, 
increasing by 2-3 percent yearly even in low general inflation periods.46,47 
Moreover, still with reference to the restaurant sector, we can observe 
                                                          
46 Source: Destatis, Verbraucherpreisindex.   
47 In its 2018 Report, the Minimum Wage Commission highlights that there was exceptional 
price growth in both the Accommodation and Restaurant sectors (p. 138). 
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that: (i) 2015 saw a 12 percent decline in the number of people who never 
eat out as well as an increase in the number of people eating out often48; 
(ii) income effects in the lower deciles might have an outsized effect on 
restaurant demand given that expenditure on outside eating doubles 
when households go from earning less than €900 per month to earning 
between 1,300-1,500, which is what you would see if a full time worker 
went from an hourly wage of €5.5 to the new legislated minimum49. 
Our results put American studies into perspective: if the US restaurant 
sector50 can adjust to higher minimum wages through similar 
mechanisms, the lack of disemployment effects found in that sector (e.g. 
Dube et al., 2010, Allegretto et al., 2011) cannot automatically be 
extrapolated to the wider economy. 
 
 
3.5 Robustness checks 
 
In our main results, we split firms into three groups based on the share 
of employees earning less than €8.50 per hour in 2013-2014. The 
thresholds, at 10 and 30 percent, were quite strict to ensure a clear 
distinction into treated and control. However, our lack of significant 
employment effects may depend on these specific thresholds, as well as 
this specific measure of the minimum wage bite.  
As an alternative, we first shift these limits to 15 and 25 percent. This 
should reduce the variance of our estimate (as we have more data), but 
comes with the risk of introducing attenuation bias as (more) firms will 
now be assigned to the wrong treatment status.51  
                                                          
48 Source: Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/561124/eating-out-frequency-
germany/, accessed April 2018. 
49 Source: Destatis, ”Private Consumption Expenditure of Households, EVS” 
50 Due to the low level of the US minimum wage, no other meaningful sectors employ 
considerable numbers of potentially affected workers. 
51 Essentially, we introduce measurement error in the treatment variable, which would be 
our independent variable if we were in a standard regression framework. 
 64 
Table 3.8 shows the results with the laxer treatment assignment. As 
expected, the estimates have become more precise, with standard errors 
slightly decreasing across the board and the coefficient estimates moving 
closer to zero. Nevertheless, by 2016 we still find evidence, in the East, 
for a small negative employment effect (-0.7 percentage points, column 
1) and a moderate improvement of credit ratings (column 3) and, in the 
West, for a slight deterioration of the latter (column 6). Instead, we find 
no significant effect on turnover within the wider set of treated firms in 
the West (columns 2 and 5), which now belong also to retail trade (NACE 
revision 2 code 47), manufacture of food products and beverages (10, 11), 
and sports and recreation activities (93). Thus, the ability of firms to 
adapt to the NMW via turnover depends on sector-specific features. 
 
Table 3.8: Employment, turnover and credit rating effects – smaller 
grey zone 
 East West 
 Emp Turn CR Emp Turn CR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆ Growth 14-15 -.003 -.002 -.093 -.001 -.004 .253 
 (.002) (.003) (291) (.002) (.002) (.159) 
∆ Growth 14-16 -.007 -.006 -.716 0 -.005 .67 
 (.003)** (.005) (.406)* (.002) (.003) (.217)*** 
# of treated 6577 4706 7605 11552 8275 14294 
# of controls 63385 45457 72600 63385 45460 72600 
# of controls used 11881 4055 5766 17908 7111 12126 
SDM 14-16 -.04 -.03 -.04 0 -.02 .04 
SDM 14-15 -.02 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.03 .02 
SDM 13-14 .02 -.01 -.03 .01 -.02 .01 
SDM 2013 0 -.01 -.01 0 0 0 
SDM 2012 0 -.01 0 0 0 0 
SDM 2011 .01 -.02 -.02 0 0 -.02 
Trend Judgement ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Specification Base MJ U Base P P, U 
See notes of Table 3.4  Stars:  * p < 0.1,  ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01. 
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Second, our headcount based bite measure does not factor in distances 
to the NMW nor how important those sub-NMW employees are for the 
total wage bill of firms in that sector. As a check, we calculate two new 
measures. Gap, which measures how much average wages go up in 
euros under full compliance and no spillovers. And WBI, which 
indicates how much the total wage bill increases under the same scenario 
in relative terms. Table 3.9 provides an overview. For each measure, the 
sectors in the bottom quartile are taken as controls, the top quartile as 
treated52. The three measures lead to very similar treatment and control 
groups. 37 (32) sector-regions are considered treated (control) in all 
three. 5 (6) are treated in two and 5 (9) in one measure only. Figure 3.A1 
in the Appendix illustrates this correlation graphically. 
 
Table 3.9: Bite measure indicator overview 
Name Description Information Used 
Share Share of employees earning less than 
NMW in 2013-14 
Headcounts of wage 
above/below NMW 
Gap Average increase in hourly wage under 
full compliance and no spillovers 
Sub NMW wages 
WBI Average increase in the total wage bill 
under full compliance and no spillovers 
All wages 
 
The resulting estimates are also quite similar as evidenced by Table 3.10 
and Table 3.11. By 2016, the negative employment effect in East Germany 
is slightly larger under the gap-based measure (-1.1 percentage points, 
column 1 of Table 3.10) and of the same magnitude but insignificant 
under the WBI measure (-0.7 percentage points, column 1 of Table 3.11). 
Regardless of the treatment indicator used, turnover doesn't diverge, 
while credit ratings experience an improvement in 2016. 
In the West, the Gap measure leads to a small negative employment 
effect (-0.8 percentage points, column 4 of Table 3.10), however, the pre-
treatment trend for the estimation is shaky, though not necessarily 
                                                          
52 The 10-30 percent thresholds we use in our main regressions corresponds very closely to 
this interquartile range for the share-based measure. 
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disqualifying; by 2016, growth in turnover is also 2.2 percentage points 
lower in the treated sectors than in the control group (column 5 of Table 
3.10); credit ratings deteriorate in both years (column 6 of Table 3.10). 
The findings for West Germany based on average wage bill increases are 
more in line with the main results, seeing no employment effect (column 
4 of Table 3.11), higher turnover growth (3 percentage points, column 5 
of Table 3.11) and a deterioration of credit ratings in 2015 (column 6 of 
Table 3.11).53  
 
Table 3.10: Employment, turnover and credit rating effects – Gap 
 East West 
 Emp Turn CR Emp Turn CR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆ Growth 14-15 -.008 -.002 -.057 -.006 .005 1.905 
 (.004)** (.004) (.311) (.002)*** (.007) (.946)** 
∆ Growth 14-16 -.011 -.003 -.735 -.008 -.022 2.527 
 (.005)** (.006) (425)* (.003)*** (.012)* (1.277)** 
# of treated 4966 3496 5781 10545 7554 13153 
# of controls 36708 26501 41979 36708 26498 41977 
# of controls used 3577 2604 4018 8164 1751 1772 
SDM 14-16 -.06 -.01 -.05 -.05 -.11 .14 
SDM 14-15 -.06 -.01 -.01 -.05 .04 .15 
SDM 13-14 0 0 .01 .02 .01 .01 
SDM 2013 -.01 -.01 -.01 0 -.14 .06 
SDM 2012 -.01 -.01 -.01 0 -.14 .06 
SDM 2011 -.02 -.03 -.05 0 -.15 -.01 
Trend Judgement ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Specification U P, U U P, U P,U,MJ P, MJ 
See notes of Table 3.4 Stars:  * p < 0.1,  ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01. 
 
                                                          
53 This is essentially a result of how similar the alternative treatment indicators are to the 
share-based measure: under the WBI measure, the only new treated sector in the West is 
sports and recreation activities (93); under the Gap measure, the added treated sectors in 
the West include retail trade (47), sports and recreation activities (93), programming and 
broadcasting activities (60), and gambling and betting activities (92). 
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Table 3.11: Employment, turnover and credit rating effects – WBI 
 East West 
 Emp Turn CR Emp Turn CR 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆ Growth 14-15 -.005 .003 -.216 .001 .011 .689 
 (.003) (.003) (.322) (.004) (.005)** (.407)* 
∆ Growth 14-16 -.007 0 -1.239 .006 .03 .593 
 (.004) (.005) (.452)*** (.006) (.009)*** (.569) 
# of treated 6048 4316 6974 1701 1221 2192 
# of controls 56440 40204 64532 56440 40204 64532 
# of controls used 4920 4012 5742 2223 1200 2089 
SDM 14-16 -.04 0 -.08 .04 .14 .03 
SDM 14-15 -.04 .02 -.02 .01 .09 .05 
SDM 13-14 .02 -.01 0 .01 .03 .03 
SDM 2013 0 0 0 .01 0 .01 
SDM 2012 0 0 0 .01 -.01 .01 
SDM 2011 0 -.02 -.02 .03 .01 0 
Trend Judgement ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Specification U P U U U P 
See notes of Table 3.4. Stars:  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we present a novel approach to analyse the employment 
growth effects of the national German minimum wage introduced on 
January 1st 2015. We start from individual hourly wages to determine 
which sectors were vulnerable to the new wage floor and which should 
remain unaffected. Then we turn to firm level data and match firms in 
treated sectors to similar firms in unaffected sectors. The richness of the 
(proprietary) dataset used allows us to not only match on past 
employment and turnover, but also on the firm’s credit score evolution, 
which represents expectations about its future.  
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We find a very small employment effect in the East, suggesting 
employment in treated firms grew 0.8 percentage points slower than in 
their untreated counterparts, equivalent to 22,000 jobs lost. Micro firms 
(<10 employees) seem particularly affected, seeing 1.8 percentage points 
lower employment growth. In the West, employment remains stable. 
The overall conclusion remains the same if we use different thresholds 
or different bite measures. 
We propose several complementary mechanisms which may have 
muted the disemployment effect of the minimum wage. In the West, the 
treated sectors have previously been found to have monopsonistic 
labour markets (Bachmann and Frings, 2017). Our finding that credit 
ratings (an indicator of firm profitability) deteriorated supports this 
theory. Moreover, the affected sectors in the West (restaurant and 
accommodation) are characterized by flexible prices and sell products 
set to profit from richer poor workers. These product demand and price 
effects might also be at play in the East, in line with findings in the 
international literature (e.g. Allegretto and Reich, 2018; Cengiz et al., 
2018). 
It is non-trivial to directly extrapolate these results to the US situation. 
For example, the product demand effects are unlikely to materialise in 
that context as minimum wages are so low that only a tiny fraction of the 
population is affected (Wursten, 2017). Nevertheless, the increase in 
turnover in the accommodation and restaurant sectors still adds a few 
Newton of support to the prices-as-escape-valve theory gaining ground 
in that debate. Moreover, although our results might not inform whether 
the small minimum wage changes observed in the US have been 
detrimental to employment, they do suggest that fears for dramatic job 
losses after the introduction of a living wage ($15/hour) are exaggerated. 
The same fears existed in Germany (ex-ante studies clustered around 1M 
job losses) but have so far not been vindicated. Instead, the National 
Minimum Wage led to robust wage growth (Bossler and Gerner, 2016) 
and at most very limited employment losses, and that only in particular 
sectors and regions. 
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3.7 Supporting details 
 
Matching procedure justification. In line with synthetic control method 
studies (e.g. Abadie and Imbens, 2006; Dube and Zipperer, 2015), we 
assume that the outcome value for any firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 , can be 
modelled in a multi factor error structure (see e.g. Chudik and Pesaran, 
2015; Bai, 2009) as follows:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝐷𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                      (3.3) 
𝛼𝑖 is the firm-specific treatment effect. 𝐷𝑡  is a dummy variable, which is 
equal to one from 2015 onwards and zero prior to the reform. 𝑐𝑖 is a firm-
specific fixed effect and 𝛿𝑡 is a period specific common shock. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a 
mean zero (time-varying) idiosyncratic shock. 𝐹𝑡 is a time-varying 
economy wide shock that affects each firm differently, according to its 
specific factor loading 𝜆𝑖. There can be a potentially large number of 
these, but, for ease of exposition, we stick to one. 
Substituting our model for 𝑌𝑖𝑡  into equation 3.2 and expanding the 
difference operator yields:  
?̂? =∑[𝛼𝑖 + (𝑐𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖) + (𝛿15 − 𝛿14) + 𝜆𝑖(𝐹15 − 𝐹14) + (𝜀𝑖,15 − 𝜀𝑖,14)]
𝑖𝜖𝑇
 
−∑𝑤𝑗[(𝑐𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗) + (𝛿15 − 𝛿14) + 𝜆𝑗(𝐹15 − 𝐹14) + (𝜀𝑗,15 − 𝜀𝑗,14)]
𝑗𝜖𝐶
(3.4) 
The 𝑐𝑖’s drop out due to the time differing. Moreover, given that 
∑ 1𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑇 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑗𝜖𝐶 , the deltas in treated and control also cancel out each 
other. Finally, the 𝜀’s are assumed to be mean zero, so that, as T and C 
get large, these drop out as well, leaving us with:  
?̂? =∑[𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖(𝐹15 − 𝐹14)]
𝑖𝜖𝑇
−∑𝑤𝑗𝜆𝑗(𝐹15 − 𝐹14)
𝑗𝜖𝐶
= 
=∑𝛼𝑖
𝑖𝜖𝑇
+ (∑𝜆𝑖
𝑖𝜖𝑇
−∑𝑤𝑗𝜆𝑗
𝑗𝜖𝐶
) (𝐹15 − 𝐹14)                            (3.5) 
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The remaining bias terms are a function of the disparity in the treated 
and untreated factor loadings 𝜆. This is where the synthetic control 
method intuition comes in: if we match on pre-treatment outcome 
values, then as 𝑇,𝐶 and the number of pretreatment periods we match 
on get larger, the average difference between treated and untreated 
factor loadings 𝜆 goes to zero. The idea is that with just one pre-treatment 
period you might still be able to  find a set of weights 𝑤𝑗  such that treated 
and untreated firms with different factor loadings match due to 
compensating idiosyncratic 𝜀’s. As the pre-treatment period becomes 
longer, this becomes increasingly unlikely (given time constant weights). 
Instead, this only remains possible if your matching algorithm achieved 
matches by picking controls firms such that the weighted sum of their 
factor loadings ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝜆𝑗𝑗𝜖𝐶  equals the sum of the treated factor loadings 
∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑖𝜖𝑇 . Under that assumption, Equation 3.5 reduces to:  
?̂? = ∑𝛼𝑖
𝑖𝜖𝑇
                                                   (3.6) 
where all bias terms have been accounted for. 
 
Exit rate analysis. We make a few changes to our methodology to 
accommodate the peculiarities of exit rates. First, we do not drop outliers 
as these might be disproportionately important in terms of exit 
probabilities. Second, we only match on employment and credit rating 
in 2012 and 2013, omitting the 2014 credit rating. This allows us to test 
whether there were divergences in exit rates in 2014 already. Finally, 
given that we match on non-zero employment in past years, we cannot 
judge whether exit rates in those years were similar. The dependent 
variable is the change in the existence status of the firm. It can take on 
two values: 0 if the firm’s status did not change (still alive/still dead) or 
-1 if the firm left the market in the time period observed. For example, if 
the firm existed in 2013 and 2014, but not in 2015, then it would take on 
the value of 0 for ∆ Existence 13-14, but -1 for ∆ Existence 14-15 and ∆ 
Existence 14-16. 
Table 3.12 shows the results. In the East (column 1), we obtain credible 
pre-treatment results, with a SDM in 13-14 of only 0.01. The similarity 
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persists after the treatment, with no significant differences in existence 
rates (-0.001 by 2015, -0.002 by 2016). In the West, we find a significantly 
negative effect, suggesting that by 2016 an additional 3.9 percent of firms 
closed down. However, if we look at the SDMs, we see that similar 
differences were already observed between 2013 and 2014 (SDM of -0.11 
versus -0.1/-0.14), implying the results for West Germany are not 
credible. 
 
Table 3.12: Exit rate effects 
 East West 
 (1) (2) 
∆ Existence 14-15 -.001 -.022 
 (.003) (.002)*** 
∆ Existence 14-16 -.002 -.039 
 (.004) (.003)*** 
# of treated 27253 14846 
# of controls 134949 136070 
# of controls used 17245 56017 
SDM 14-16 -.01 -.14 
SDM 14-15 0 -.1 
SDM 13-14 .01 -.11 
Trend Judgement ✓ x 
Specification P, MJ Base 
See notes of Table 3.4. Stars: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01. 
 
Italian control firms. As an additional robustness check, we swap the 
donor pool to all Italian firms. Italy is the fourth largest economy in 
Europe (after Germany, the UK and France) and one of the few European 
countries that does not yet have a national minimum wage. Wage floors 
are set by collective agreements between trade unions and employer 
organizations at the sector level. Though the sectoral minimum wages 
are relatively high, they formally apply only to members of the signatory 
parties and non-compliance rates are not negligible (Garnero, 2018). 
Moreover, the agreed minima did not experience any significant 
movement in the time period studied. The Italian data was obtained 
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through AIDA, an oft-used database compiled by Bureau van Dijk. Due 
to the more demanding accounting requirements in Italy, the database is 
rather comprehensive, especially with regards to employment numbers 
and much more so than its German counterpart Dafne. Unfortunately, it 
does not contain credit ratings, so we are limited to matching on past 
employment (2011-2013). Table 3.13 shows the results. 
 
Table 3.13: Employment and turnover effects - Italian control firms 
 East West 
 Emp Turn Emp Turn 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
∆ Growth 14-15 -.011 .026 -.004 .028 
 (.002)*** (.008)*** (.004) (.009)*** 
∆ Growth 14-16 -.004 .071 .012 .08 
 (.004) (.013)*** (.006)* (.015)*** 
# of treated 3746 2971 1093 989 
# of controls 190754 278078 190754 278078 
# of controls used 133637 844 86590 350 
SDM 14-16 -.02 .3 .06 .38 
SDM 14-15 -.07 .16 -.03 .21 
SDM 13-14 0.2 .25 .11 .26 
SDM 2013 0 .04 0 .03 
SDM 2012 0 .03 0 .03 
SDM 2011 0 .03 0 .03 
Trend Judgement ✓ x x x 
Specification Base Base Base Base 
See notes of Table 3.3. Matching on one extra year to compensate for lack of credit 
ratings. Stars:  * p < 0.1,  ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01 
 
As in our main regressions, we see a negative employment effect in the 
East only (column 1). At -1.1 percentage points in 2015, it is similar in 
magnitude to the within-Germany comparisons, although the gap closes 
by 2016 (-0.4 percentage points). Unfortunately, it appears Italian firms 
are too different from German ones to learn more about the minimum 
wage effects. The SDM in 2013-14, which we use to check similarity, is 
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very high in the other regressions, at 0.11 for employment in the West 
(column 3) and 0.25/0.26 for turnover (East/West, columns 2 and 4). 
However, it is reassuring that our evaluation criteria are not always met, 
which would cast doubt on their usefulness. Moreover, we did not have 
credit ratings to match on. These are based on forward looking 
assessments, which might also explain why the estimations where we do 
match on them lead to more similar firms across the treated and control 
groups. 
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3.8 Appendix 
Table 3.A1: Overview of bite, gap and wage bill indicators by sector 
(East-West) 
Unlisted sectors are excluded based on legislative reasons or due to pre-existing higher sectoral minimum wage agreements. 
Share: share earning less than 8.50 in 2013-2014 (percentage). Gap: gap between hourly wage in 2013-2014 and MW for those 
earning less than the MW. Wage Bill : relative increase in total wage bill under full compliance and no spillovers (percentage). 
Nace 
Code 
Share 
West-East 
Gap 
West-East 
Wage Bill 
West-East 
Nace Text 
55 52 - 64 1.37 - 2.14 12 - 26 Accommodation 
56 52 - 64 1.36 - 2.13 12 - 26 Food and beverage service activities 
47 29 - 48 0.70 - 1.26 4 - 12 Retail trade, excl. of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
69 23 - 45 0.49 - 0.99 2  - 7 Legal and accounting activities 
12 23 - 45 0.49 - 0.99 2  - 7 Manufacture of tobacco products 
80 23 - 44 0.48 - 0.97 2  - 7 Security and investigation activities 
73 23 - 44 0.48 - 0.98 2  - 7 Advertising and market research 
78 23 - 44 0.48 - 0.98 2  - 7 Employment activities 
74 23 - 43 0.48 - 0.97 2  - 6 Other professional, scientific and technical activities 
71 22 - 43 0.47 - 0.96 2  - 6 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis 
11 28 - 42 0.52 - 0.94 3  - 9 Manufacture of beverages 
45 21 - 42 0.53 - 1.20 3 - 12 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
10 28 - 42 0.52 - 0.95 3  - 9 Manufacture of food products 
70 22 - 42 0.47 - 0.95 2  - 6 Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities  
82 22 - 42 0.47 - 0.94 2  - 6 Admin, office support and other business support activities 
79 16 - 41 0.30 - 0.94 2  - 8 Travel agency, tour operator and related activities 
52 16 - 40 0.30 - 0.93 2  - 8 Warehousing and support activities for transportation 
77 21 - 40 0.46 - 0.91 2  - 7 Rental and leasing activities 
50 16 - 39 0.31 - 0.87 2  - 7 Water transport 
15 20 - 39 0.51 - 0.85 3  - 9 Manufacture of leather and related products 
66 11 - 38 0.18 - 0.86 0  - 6 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities 
14 20 - 38 0.63 - 0.82 3  - 9 Manufacture of wearing apparel 
23 12 - 38 0.30 - 0.62 2  - 5 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
95 22 - 38 0.53 - 0.99 3  - 9 Repair of computers and personal and household goods 
13 16 - 38 0.27 - 0.77 2  - 8 Manufacture of textiles 
63 21 - 37 0.47 - 0.88 2  - 6 Information service activities 
51 3 - 37 0.06 - 0.89 0  - 8 Air transport 
31 14 - 34 0.33 - 0.35 2  - 4 Manufacture of furniture 
68 14 - 32 0.32 - 0.87 1  - 5 Real estate activities 
93 26 - 32 0.73 - 0.93 5  - 8 Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities 
19 12 - 29 0.29 - 0.43 2  - 4 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 
8 14 - 29 0.32 - 0.61 2  - 5 Other mining and quarrying 
61 23 - 29 0.60 - 0.92 2  - 6 Telecommunications 
49 21 - 28 0.47 - 0.66 2  - 5 Land transport and transport via pipelines 
91 23 - 28 0.67 - 0.84 4  - 6 Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities 
60 23 - 28 0.67 - 0.85 4  - 6 Programming and broadcasting activities 
92 23 - 28 0.67 - 0.85 4  - 6 Gambling and betting activities 
59 22 - 28 0.64 - 0.82 3  - 6 Audiovisual productions 
90 23 - 28 0.67 - 0.85 4  - 6 Creative, arts and entertainment activities 
53 23 - 28 0.61 - 0.93 2  - 6 Postal and courier activities 
94 11 - 26 0.20 - 0.58 1  - 3 Activities of membership organisations 
18 15 - 26 0.40 - 0.53 1  - 4 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
87 14 - 26 0.27 - 0.49 1  - 3 Residential care activities 
75 14 - 26 0.27 - 0.49 1  - 3 Veterinary activities 
58 15 - 26 0.40 - 0.54 1  - 4 Publishing activities 
88 14 - 26 0.27 - 0.50 1  - 3 Social work activities without accommodation 
17 10 - 26 0.27 - 0.48 1  - 4 Manufacture of paper and paper products 
86 14 - 26 0.27 - 0.49 1  - 3 Human health activities 
42 7 - 23 0.20 - 0.45 1  - 4 Civil engineering 
41 8 - 23 0.21 - 0.48 1  - 4 Construction of buildings 
16 13 - 23 0.38 - 0.19 2  - 2 Manufacture of wood related products, straw and plaiting, excl. furniture  
46 12 - 22 0.21 - 0.21 1  - 2 Wholesale trade, excl. of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
30 8 - 22 0.12 - 0.38 0  - 3 Manufacture of other transport equipment 
32 8 - 22 0.16 - 0.20 1  - 2 Other manufacturing 
22 12 - 22 0.27 - 0.45 1  - 4 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
43 7 - 22 0.20 - 0.44 1  - 4 Specialised construction activities 
29 5 - 22 0.09 - 0.44 0  - 3 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
6 5 - 21 0.12 - 0.30 1  - 2 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 
72 10 - 21 0.29 - 0.42 1  - 3 Scientific research and development 
24 3 - 20 0.05 - 0.31 0  - 2 Manufacture of basic metals 
25 6 - 20 0.12 - 0.30 1  - 2 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, excl. machinery and equipment 
33 7 - 18 0.14 - 0.28 1  - 2 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
26 6 - 17 0.12 - 0.20 0  - 1 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 
27 5 - 16 0.10 - 0.32 0  - 2 Manufacture of electrical equipment 
65 7 - 15 0.16 - 0.54 0  - 3 (re-)Insurance and pension funding, excl. compulsory social security 
5 4 - 13 0.11 - 0.23 1  - 2 Mining of coal and lignite 
62 6 - 13 0.17 - 0.47 1  - 2 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 
9 5 - 12 0.12 - 0.21 0  - 2 Mining support service activities 
21 3 - 12 0.06 - 0.21 0  - 1 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and preparations 
20 3 - 12 0.05 - 0.21 0  - 1 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
36 7 - 11 0.16 - 0.28 1  - 2 Water collection, treatment and supply 
28 3 - 10 0.08 - 0.14 0  - 1 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
85 11 - 9 0.26 - 0.24 1  - 1 Education 
39 7  - 9 0.15 - 0.17 1  - 1 Remediation activities and other waste management services 
35 5  - 8 0.12 - 0.21 0  - 1 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
37 6  - 7 0.14 - 0.14 1  - 1 Sewerage 
64 3  - 7 0.07 - 0.08 0  - 0 Financial service activities, excl. insurance and pension funding 
38 6  - 6 0.13 - 0.12 1  - 1 Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery 
84 4  - 5 0.08 - 0.16 0  - 1 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
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Table 3.A2: Summary statistics 
 Control Treated Rel. Diff. 
Size Shares  
Micro (1-9) 42 50 + 0.19 
Small (10-49) 42 37 - 0.12 
Medium (50-249) 13 11 - 0.15 
Large (250+) 3 2 - 0.33 
Age Shares  
Start-ups (1-5) 8 11 + 0.38 
Young (6-10) 13 16 + 0.23 
Mature (11+) 78 73 - 0.06 
Dependent Variable Means (SD)  
∆ log(employment) (1415) .019 (.29) .026 (.35) + 0.37 
∆ log(employment) (1416) .035 (.4) .049 (.46) + 0.40 
∆ log(turnover) (1415) .01 (.33) .008 (.35) - 0.20 
∆ log(turnover) (1416) .038 (.43) .042 (.47) + 0.11 
∆ credit rating (1415) .198 (22.54) -.652 (23.16) - 4.29 
∆ credit rating (1416) 1.266 (34.38) -1.245 (32.11) - 1.98 
Lagged Variable Means (SD)  
log(employment) (2012) 2.49 (1.46) 2.209 (1.4) - 0.11 
log(employment) (2013) 2.529 (1.46) 2.24 (1.4) - 0.11 
log(employment) (2014) 2.547 (1.46) 2.262 (1.4) - 0.11 
log(turnover) (2012) 14.299 (1.71) 13.996 (1.55) - 0.02 
log(turnover) (2013) 14.338 (1.7) 14.04 (1.54) - 0.02 
log(turnover) (2014) 14.44 (1.68) 14.148 (1.52) - 0.02 
credit rating (2012) 240.365 (43.76) 241.307 (43.5) 0 
credit rating (2013) 238.876 (43.88) 239.343 (43.47) 0 
credit rating (2014) 238.517 (44.51) 238.728 (43.62) 0 
Context Variables (SD)  
log(productivity) (2014) 11.779 (.70) 11.8 (.87) 0 
state unemployment rate 6.422 (2.45) 8.731 (1.99) + 0.36 
state share mini-jobs .13 (.06) .251 (.16) + 0.93 
N 53 489 10 257 - 0.80 
Rel. Diff.: the relative difference between treated and control group is defined as RD = 
(T - C)/C.  N, size and age shares are based on all observations used  in any of the 
regressions. The number of observations used to calculate the variable means (SDs) may 
differ based on missings in that particular variable. 
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Figure 3.A.1: Correlation share, gap and wage bill indicators 
See notes below Table 3.A1 for a description of the indicators. +: values for sectors in 
the East, o: the West. 
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Table 3.A3: Difference in difference, by region 
 East West 
 ∆Emp ∆Turn ∆CR ∆Emp ∆Turn ∆CR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post × Treated 0.00615 0.00652 0.160 -0.0115 ** 0.0116* 0.346 
  (0.79) (0.63) (0.41) (-2.53) (1.93) (0.80) 
N 270030 194146 321172 - - - 
# of treated 40176 28918 49672 - - - 
# of controls 229854 165228 271500 - - - 
Treated × 2010 -0.0250 0 -1.013 0 0 0 
  (-1.02) (.) (-0.73) (.) (.) (.) 
Treated × 2011 0 -0.0168 0 0.00902 -0.0447* -0.795 
  (.) (-0.37) (.) (0.35) (-1.80) (-0.63) 
Treated × 2012 -0.0134 -0.0180 1.763 -0.0146 -0.00496 -1.802** 
  (-0.67) (-0.58) (1.32) (-0.57) (-0.22) (-2.08) 
Treated × 2013 -0.00596 0.0208 0.691 -0.0562*** -0.00526 -1.520* 
  (-0.42) (0.95) (0.65) (-2.69) (-0.25) (-1.83) 
Treated × 2014 0.00118 0.0259 0.975 -0.0477** -0.0114 -0.352 
  (-2.24) (-0.52) (-0.40) (0.08) (1.08) (0.96) 
Regressions include firm fixed effects and (East Germany * Year) fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the labour market region. Estimates come from regressions with 
an interaction term for East Germany; this is stressed by only showing one set of N 
statistics per dependent variable. Dependent variable was in differences. Employment 
and turnover variables are in logs. Stars: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Is protection really good for the 
imposing country? A production 
network approach 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Since the global financial crisis, the call for policies aimed at protecting 
domestic production has been on the rise in many Western countries. 
This trend is particularly evident in the US where the Trump 
administration has embraced an “America First” approach to economic 
policy. After the initial decision to withdraw from the Trans Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and to renegotiate the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), the US government levied a series of substantial 
import tariffs: in January 2018 it ordered tariffs on imported washing 
machines and solar panels54, in march 2018 it turned to steel (25 percent) 
                                                          
54 The duty on washing machines contains a quota-like element where imports above a 
certain threshold have a higher tariff: in the first year, imported washing machines will be 
subject to a 20 percent tariff for the first 1.2 million imported machines, and a 50 percent 
tariff on subsequent machines; these rates will drop, respectively, to 16 percent and 40 
percent over a three-year period. The tariff on imported solar panels is an additional duty 
with an exclusion threshold only for imported cells: in the first year, imported solar panels 
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and aluminium (10 percent), and now it is thinking of cars. In light of 
these developments, our goal is to provide further understanding on the 
macroeconomic consequences of import tariffs applied to intermediate 
inputs in the context of a model of production networks à la Acemoglu 
et al. (2012, 2016) that allows us to account for the existence of inter-
industry input-output linkages. Such a framework also lends itself to the 
assessment of a highly controversial fiscal policy proposal put forward 
by the Republican Party (GOP), involving the move from the current 
origin-based corporate tax system to a destination-based one. 
We start with the analysis of import tariffs. Standard trade theory asserts 
that a country with monopoly power benefits from imposing unilaterally 
a modest import duty (see Humphrey, 1987). The underlying argument 
is that, by taxing imports, the large country shifts domestic demand 
away from foreign produced products and towards domestically 
produced products, improving so its terms-of-trade (the relative price of 
imports in terms of exports). Optimum tariff theory has been extended 
in various ways (e.g. Scitovsky, 1942; Johnson, 1953; Kennan and 
Riezman, 1988; Kemp, 1966; Jones, 1967; Gehrels, 1971; see Pomfret, 
1992), and, in addition to market power, the literature has put forward a 
number of other potential rationales for protectionism – such as the role 
of politics (e.g. Mayer, 1984; Magee et al., 1989; Grossman and Helpman, 
1994). Yet, echoing the theory of effective protection, a recent body of 
work, pioneered by Yi (2003), has recognized that, in order to assess the 
net impact of import tariffs in today’s increasingly vertically-
interconnected economies, it is crucial to account for trade in 
intermediate goods and to distinguish between output tariffs - applied 
in the final market - and input tariffs - applied in the intermediate 
markets. Indeed, trade in intermediate goods now amounts to as much 
as two-thirds of international trade (Johnson and Noguera, 2012) and the 
presence of interconnections among sectors in the form of input-output 
linkages suggests that tariffs have a more complex and articulated 
impact on the aggregate economy than postulated by standard theory. 
We develop here a simple input-output model to characterize how an 
idiosyncratic input tariff shock affects the imposing country. 
                                                          
will be subject to a 30 percent tariff; this rate will gradually fall to 15 percent over a four-
year period. 
 80 
Our theoretical framework features a large open economy55,56, populated 
by a representative household and by n perfectly competitive sectors 
each specializing in a distinct good. On the consumption side, the 
representative household gets disutility from providing labour to firms 
at a sector-homogenous wage rate and derives utility from an aggregate 
final good, which is a Cobb-Douglas combination of n domestic end 
products. On the production side, every sector produces its output with 
a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas technology that combines 
labour with an intermediate input bundle; the latter is a Cobb-Douglas 
combination of n intermediate goods, each of which is, in turn, a CES 
aggregate over a domestic and foreign variety57. Within any industry, 
prices of the two varieties may differ by a given proportionality constant. 
Moreover, imported inputs are subject to sector-specific ad-valorem 
tariffs, which are absorbed in a fixed part by foreign producers. For 
simplicity, we assume that tax revenues are wasted.  
Our characterization result establishes that a tariff increase on a given 
imported intermediate good entails an overall loss of GDP that reflects 
not only the direct effect on the immediate customers of the protected 
industry, but also the indirect effects on its customers’ customers and so 
on. Indeed, being forced to substitute away from the foreign to the 
corresponding domestic variety, national firms that source inputs from 
the affected industry experience a drop in productivity, which translates 
into lower output and higher prices (relative to the wage), and so triggers 
a downstream propagation of the shock over input-output linkages.58 
The extent to which GDP contracts depends on four specific 
characteristics of the tariff-exposed industry: the importance as (direct 
and indirect) input supplier, the elasticity of substitution between the 
domestic and foreign intermediate input variety, the pre-tax differential 
in their price, and the tariff pass-through into import price.   
                                                          
55 A country is said to be “large” if it can exert an influence on world prices. 
56 Nicita et al. (2018) show that the economies facing the lowest export supply elasticities 
and therefore having the strongest market power are the US and the European Union. 
57 The nested Cobb-Douglas-CES structure of the sector-specific production technology is 
in line with the trade literature relying on the Armington assumption (see, for example, 
Vandenbussche et al., 2017, 2018). 
58 As in Carvahlo and Tahbaz-Salehi (2018), by downstream propagation we mean that the 
shock transmits from one industry to another in the direction of the flow of goods. 
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After studying import tariffs, we turn to the corporate tax reform 
proposal currently under debate in the US. Based on the work by 
Auerbach and Devereux (2013) and Auerbach et al. (2017), its advocates 
call for the introduction of a so-called border-adjustment tax that, in the 
computation of a company’s taxable profit, would include the cost of 
imported inputs but exclude the revenue accrued from exports. Such a 
policy is argued to be neutral, that is to have no effect on real allocations. 
Yet, this neutrality result relies on assumptions – first and foremost the 
trade balance condition - that are unlikely to hold in practice (Barbiero 
et al., 2018) and are in contradiction with the rationale underpinning the 
US policy proposal. 
We re-assess the aggregate effects of a shift to border-adjusted business 
income taxation, by adding exports to our model - taken, for simplicity, 
to be a given share of each industry’s output - and by replacing sector-
specific import tariffs with a uniform profit tax imposed on all firms in 
the economy. Our theoretical predictions indicate that the GDP impact 
of the fiscal regime change results from two opposing effects: while the 
impossibility to deduct the costs associated with imported intermediate 
goods produces an outcome akin to import tariffs, the ability to deduct 
export sales drives aggregate output up by ensuing a cascade of positive 
downstream production adjustments. For low sectoral export shares, the 
former effect dominates over the latter. 
 
Related Literature. The present chapter is most closely related to 
Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Acemoglu et al. (2016), who stressed the role 
of the input-output structure in determining whether and how 
idiosyncratic sectoral shocks can propagate throughout the economy 
and shape aggregate outcomes. Their setup, which builds on the seminal 
paper by Long and Plosser (1983), has been extended in a number of 
ways59 – for example, by allowing for more general production 
technologies (e.g. Carvalho et al., 2016, Baqaee and Fahri, 2018a), by 
departing from the assumption of perfect competition (e.g. Grassi, 2017; 
Baqaee and Fahri, 2018b; Liu, 2018) and by accommodating endogenous 
                                                          
59 See Carvahlo and Tahbaz-Salehi (2018) for a review of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on production networks in macroeconomics. 
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changes in the production network (e.g. Carvalho and Voigtlander, 2015; 
Oberfield, 2018; Acemoglu et Azar, 2018). Yet, so far, research has 
focused mainly on a closed-economy setting60. We propose an open 
economy extension of the production network model presented in 
Acemoglu et al. (2012, 2016) by allowing for gross substitution between 
a domestic and an imported variety of each intermediate input and by 
postulating that a fixed share of each industry’s output is sold abroad.  
The analysis of input tariffs is also related to two distinct strands of the 
trade literature. A recent body of work has embedded a multi-sector 
environment featuring production linkages into quantitative trade 
models and evaluates the welfare implications of trade shocks (e.g. 
Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2014; Caliendo and Parro, 2015; Ossa, 
2015; Blaum, 2016; Caliendo et al., 2017). Except for a few studies 
concerned with the consequences of UK's withdrawal from the 
European Union (e.g. Dhingra et al., 2017; Felbermayr et al. 2018), these 
contributions have mainly looked at tariff reductions and have shown 
that the welfare gains from trade liberalization are larger in the presence 
of input trade and sectoral interrelations61. In light of current 
protectionist tendencies, we use, instead, our simple input-output 
setting to assess the value-added consequences of import tariff hikes 
targeted at intermediate products.  
Another line of research in the trade literature evaluates tariff shocks 
within trade network models that account for worldwide sector-level 
input-output linkages in production (e.g. Noguera, 2012; Blanchard et 
al., 2016; Vandenbussche et al., 2017, 2018).62 This approach allows to 
determine how trade barriers levied in one country affect its trading 
partners when indirect exports are taken into account. Yet, as we are 
interested in assessing the desirability of a higher input tariff for the 
imposing country even aside from the risk of retaliation, we focus on the 
domestic production network.   
                                                          
60 There are only few exceptions (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2016; Caliendo et al. 2018b). 
61 A variety of firm-based models of imports with input-output linkages draw similar 
conclusions with respect to firm performance (e.g. Goldberg et al., 2010; Gopinath and 
Neiman, 2014; Halpern et al., 2015). 
62 See Chaney (2016), Johnson (2018) and Bernard and Moxnes (2018) for a general overview 
of network models in trade. 
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Finally, the evaluation of the GOP’s fiscal policy proposal is related to 
the macroeconomic literature exploring the real allocative impact of 
border adjustment taxes, either in their explicit form - a combination of 
an import tariff and an export subsidy - or in their implicit form - as part 
of value added taxation or corporate profit taxation. This literature has 
proceeded along two principal avenues. On the one hand, it has outlined 
the conditions that must be satisfied in order for a border adjustment tax 
to be neutral in the short-run and/or in the long-run (Grossman, 1980; 
Feldstein and Krugman, 1990; Auerbach and Holtz-Eakin, 2016; Lindè 
and Pescatori, 2017; Barbiero et al., 2018). On the other hand, it has 
shown how such a policy can be used as a tool to stimulate the economy 
just in the same ways as exchange rate devaluations (Keynes, 1931; Farhi 
et al., 2014; Erceg et al., 2017). We contribute to this literature by 
providing a characterization of the propagation of the fiscal shock 
throughout the economy. To parallel the recent US reform proposal, we 
nest the border adjustments into business income taxation.  
 
Outline. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 
4.2, we lay out the theoretical framework that allows us to characterize 
how idiosyncratic input tariff shocks affect a highly vertically-integrated 
economy. Section 4.3 adapts this model to the analysis of border-
adjustments nested into corporate profit taxation. Conclusions are 
drawn in Section 4.4 and proofs are provided in Section 4.5.  
 
 
4.2 Tariffs on imported intermediates 
 
In this Section, we generalize the static multi-sector network model of 
Acemoglu et al. (2012, 2016), by allowing also for imports of intermediate 
goods from abroad. This framework provides us with theoretical 
predictions on the macroeconomic consequences of a sector-specific 
input tariff change when the role of input-output linkages is accounted 
for. 
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4.2.1 Model setup 
Consider a static large open economy with 𝑛 perfectly competitive 
sectors, denoted by {1, … , 𝑛}. Each sector specializes in the production of 
a distinct good whose output sales (net of national imports of the same 
good) meet final demand by households and intermediate input demand 
by other sectors. 
The final demand side is summarized by a single representative 
household who provides 𝑙 units of labour at a wage 𝑤 and has Cobb-
Douglas preferences over domestic final goods from all 𝑛 sectors: 
𝑈(𝑐1, … , 𝑐𝑛 , 𝑙) =  𝛾(𝑙)∏𝑐𝑖
𝛽𝑖  
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                (4.1) 
where 𝑐𝑖 is the consumption of the final good produced at home by sector 
𝑖, 0 < 𝛽𝑖 < 1 designates the weight of commodity 𝑖 in the utility of the 
representative household and 𝛾(∙) is a decreasing differentiable function 
capturing the disutility from work.63 Throughout, we assume that 
∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 1. Total labour supply is split between industries so as to 
satisfy 𝑙 = ∑ 𝑙𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 .64 
Output of every sector within the domestic economy is obtained 
according to a Cobb-Douglas technology that combines labour with a 
composite intermediate good:  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑙𝑖
𝛼𝑖∏𝑚
𝑖𝑗
𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
                                               (4.2) 
where 𝑦𝑖  is the total output of sector 𝑖, 𝑙𝑖 is the amount of labour hired by 
sector 𝑖 and 𝑚𝑖𝑗 is the amount of commodity 𝑗 used in the production of 
good 𝑖. The coefficients 𝛼𝑖 > 0  and 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0  designate, respectively, the 
                                                          
63 In Section 4.5.4, we show that our main results are qualitatively unaffected when we 
allow for gross substitution between a domestic and a foreign variety of each final good. 
64 Traditional trade models typically say that protectionism doesn’t cost (or add) jobs, 
rather changes the employment mix (Krugman, 2018). In reality, there might be labour 
adjustment costs to trade shocks (Artuç et al., 2010), as suggested also by the results in 
Chapter 2; although important, the latter are not crucial for assessing the basic mechanism 
by which input tariffs exert their aggregate impact. 
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elasticity of industry 𝑖’s output with respect to labour and intermediate 
good 𝑗. A larger 𝑎𝑖𝑗  means that the output of industry 𝑖 is more 
responsive to a change in the level used of intermediate input 𝑗, whereas 
𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 0 if intermediate good 𝑗 is not needed in the production of industry 
𝑖 (our 𝑎𝑖𝑗  is equivalent to 𝓌𝑖𝑗  in Acemoglu et al., 2012). Throughout, we 
assume that 𝛼𝑖 +∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 = 1 for all 𝑖. This normalization guarantees that 
the sectoral production functions exhibit constant returns to scale. 
The intermediate good demand 𝑚𝑖𝑗 is, in turn, a CES aggregate of a 
quantity 𝑥𝑖𝑗  purchased from domestic producers and a quantity ?̅?𝑖𝑗  
purchased from foreign producers: 
𝑚𝑖𝑗 = [𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝜎𝑗−1
𝜎𝑗 + ?̅?
𝑖𝑗
𝜎𝑗−1
𝜎𝑗 ]
𝜎𝑗
𝜎𝑗−1
                                     (4.3) 
where 𝜎𝑗 > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and 
foreign variety of the intermediate good produced within sector 𝑗. 
The government levies a sector-specific ad-valorem duty on 
intermediate products imported from abroad. The overall tax revenue 
raised by granting protection to inland industries amounts to: 
𝑇 =∑∑𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑖?̅?𝑖?̅?𝑗𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                           (4.4) 
where ?̅?𝑖  is the pre-tax price paid for foreign intermediate input 𝑖, 𝑡𝑖 ∈
[0,1] is the tariff rate imposed on the value of the same good and 0 < 𝜀𝑖 <
1 is the part of this tariff actually borne by domestic producers. For 
simplicity, we assume that 𝑇 is entirely wasted and that ?̅?𝑖 is 
proportional to the price 𝑝𝑖  paid for home-produced commodity 𝑖 – i.e. 
?̅?𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖𝑝𝑖  with 𝜇𝑖 being a non-negative constant.  
Then, the market clearing condition for each national industry 𝑖 can be 
written (in nominal terms) as:  
𝑝𝑖𝑦𝑖 −∑?̅?𝑖(1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑖)?̅?𝑗𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1
= 𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖 +∑𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1
.                   (4.5) 
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4.2.2 Competitive equilibrium 
In line with Acemoglu et al. (2012, 2016), we focus on the notion of 
competitive equilibrium for the static large open economy outlined 
above. A competitive equilibrium is here defined as a collection of prices 
({𝑝𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑛 , {?̅?𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑛 , 𝑤) and quantities {𝑐𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 , 𝑙𝑖 , {𝑥𝑖𝑗}𝑗=1
𝑛
, {?̅?𝑖𝑗}𝑗=1
𝑛
}
𝑖=1
𝑛
 such that: 
i. given prices, the representative household chooses consumption 
of each final good and total labour supply so as to maximize his 
utility (equation 4.1) subject to his budget constraint 
𝐶 =∑𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 𝑤𝑙;                                             (4.6) 
ii. given prices, the representative firm in any sector 𝑖 chooses the 
amount of labour and of the domestic and foreign variety of each  
intermediate good in order to maximize its net profits 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖𝑦𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑖 −∑𝑝𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
−∑?̅?𝑗(1 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡𝑗)?̅?𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
               (4.7) 
subject to its production possibility (equation 4.2) and the zero-
profit condition;  
iii. the labour market and all commodity markets clear. 
In Section 4.5.1 we fully characterize the unique competitive equilibrium 
solution to the basic model. Since income and substitution effects cancel 
out in the presence of Cobb-Douglas preferences, optimal labour supply 
is independent of the wage rate and the representative household spends 
a constant fraction of its total budget on the products of each industry:  
𝑙 = −
𝛾(𝑙)
𝛾′(𝑙)
                                                     (4.8) 
𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖
𝑤𝑙
= 𝛽𝑖                                                         (4.9) 
On the other hand, the fact that profits are zero in perfectly competitive 
markets with constant-returns-to-scale nested Cobb-Douglas-CES 
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technologies implies that the costs incurred by any industry for labour 
and for each intermediate good are constant fractions of its total costs 
(or, equivalently, its total sales). Specifically, the relative cost of each 
input in the total costs of a given industry is equal to the sector-specific 
output elasticity of the corresponding input: 
𝛼𝑖 =
𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑝𝑖𝑦𝑖
                                                      (4.10) 
𝑎𝑖𝑗 =
𝑝𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 + ?̅?𝑗(1 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡𝑗)?̅?𝑖𝑗
𝑝𝑖𝑦𝑖
                                    (4.11) 
This property allows us to interpret the output elasticities of inputs as 
the entries of input-output tables and to represent the structure of input-
output interconnections in the economy by a directed weighted network 
whose nodes correspond to the 𝑛 industries and whose edges denote an 
input-supplying relationship with weight 𝑎𝑖𝑗  between any two sectors. 
Summing up equation 4.10 for all industries and using the labour market 
clearing condition, the wage bill can  be obtained as the sum of the labour 
fractions of the total sales over all industries: 
𝑤𝑙 =∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑝𝑖𝑦𝑖 = 𝑉𝐴.                                   (4.12) 
Note that, in view of equation 4.11 and the property of constant returns 
to scale in sectoral production, the sum on the right-hand-side is nothing 
but the difference between aggregate sales and aggregate spending for 
intermediate goods. Thus, the wage bill is equivalent to the total value 
added in the economy. 
Moreover, if we combine the market clearing condition for each industry 
𝑖 with the optimal demand of domestic and imported intermediate good 
𝑖 by every sector 𝑗 and bear in mind the assumptions on the technical 
coefficients – 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0 for all 𝑖, 𝑗 and ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 < 1 for all 𝑗 –, the vector of 
sectoral sales can be computed as: 
(
𝑝1𝑦1
⋮
𝑝𝑛𝑦𝑛
) = [𝐼 − 𝐴′]−1 (
𝑝1𝑐1
⋮
𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑛
) = [𝐼 + 𝐴′ + (𝐴′)2 +⋯](
𝑝1𝑐1
⋮
𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑛
)  (4.13) 
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where 𝐴 is the 𝑛𝑥𝑛 matrix with entries 𝑎𝑖𝑗 . Thus, total sales of any 
industry 𝑖 are a weighted sum of the (nominal) final demand in each 
sector, where the weights are given by the non-negative elements in the 
𝑖th row of the inverse matrix [𝐼 − 𝐴′]−1 and reflect the importance of 
inland industry 𝑖 as a direct and indirect input supplier to all other 
industries in the national economy.    
 
4.2.3 Shock propagation 
Our goal is to assess how changes in sectoral tariffs targeted at imported 
intermediates affect the aggregate value added (or GDP) of the imposing 
country. Recall that, since profits are zero in the competitive equilibrium 
and the wage rate is homogenous across industries, all the surplus in the 
economy goes to the consumer and, specifically, total value added in the 
economy is equal to the wage bill 𝑤𝑙. In Section 4.5.2 we establish that, 
under average price normalization, the logarithm of 𝑤𝑙 is given by: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙 = 𝑣′ ⋅ 𝐴
(
 
 
(𝜎1 − 1)
−1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [1 + (𝜇1(1 + 𝜀1𝑡1))
1−𝜎1
]
⋮
(𝜎𝑛 − 1)−1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [1 + (𝜇𝑛(1 + 𝜀𝑛𝑡𝑛))
1−𝜎𝑛
]
)
 
 
  (4.14) 
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ     
1
𝑛
𝟏′𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝 = −𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙 − 𝑣′𝐻 
where 𝐻 is a 𝑛𝑥1 vector with elements 𝐻𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑗  and 
𝑣′ is the transpose of the so-called influence vector defined as: 
𝑣 =
1
𝑛
[𝐼 − 𝐴′]−1𝟏 =
1
𝑛
[𝐼 + (𝐴′) + (𝐴′)2 +⋯]𝟏.             (4.15) 
Thus, positive sector-specific input tariff shocks result in an overall loss 
of GDP that is the outcome of both direct effects and indirect effects 
transmitted through the production network. 
To better grasp the underlying mechanism, imagine that an input tariff 
increase hits only one sector in the economy, say sector 𝑖. Such a trade 
shock makes imported intermediate good 𝑖 more expensive for its 
customers and forces them to substitute away from it to the 
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corresponding domestic variety. Against a drop in productivity, 
industry 𝑖’s customers will scale back their production. This output 
contraction, in turn, increases the price (relative to 𝑤) faced by the 
customers of industry 𝑖’s customers and induces a second round of 
adjustments as the latter will also react by reducing production. Thus, a 
cascade effect is underway: the original shock to industry 𝑖 percolates 
through the production network by lowering the output not only of 
industry 𝑖’s customers, but also of its customers’ customers, and so on.  
The size of the resulting GDP loss depends on the interaction of four 
factors relating to the affected industry: 65 
a. network centrality: if industry 𝑖 has only few linkages with other 
peripheral sectors, then even a large shock may not affect much 
aggregate GDP; vice versa, if the same industry is an input-
supplier to many other central sectors in the economy, then just 
a small shock may induce significant GDP losses;  
b. elasticity of substitution between the domestic and imported 
intermediate good variety: for 𝜇𝑖(1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑖) < 1, the higher is the 
elasticity of substitution between the domestic and foreign 
variety of intermediate good 𝑖, the larger will be the decline in 
the economy’s total value added; 
c. ratio of the pre-tax foreign over home price: the stronger is the 
initial absolute price disadvantage of the domestic economy for 
intermediate good 𝑖, the greater will be the fall in aggregate 
national output;  
d. pass-through from the tariff rate into the import price: for 
(𝜇𝑖(1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑖))
𝜎𝑖−1[(𝜎𝑖 − 1)𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑖 − 1] < 1 (always satisfied when 𝑡𝑖 
is not too large), the larger is the part of the tariff that falls on 
national customers of imported intermediate good 𝑖, the more 
pronounced the contraction of GDP will be. 
In Section 4.5.2, we also investigate the effect of sector-specific input 
tariff shocks on other endogenous variables. Specifically, we show that 
                                                          
65 Note that the comparative statics results for the parameters 𝜇𝑖, 𝜀𝑖, 𝜎𝑖 must be viewed in 
combination one with each other. 
 90 
the effect on final consumption levels is exactly opposite to the effect on 
the corresponding domestic relative price:  
𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐 = −𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝 − 𝟏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤)                             (4.16) 
Moreover, we also show that, if preferences are symmetric as in 
Acemoglu et al. (2012), the effect on the output of any good mirrors the 
effect on the quantities consumed of this good as a final commodity: 
𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 = 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐,                                            (4.17) 
Thus, under Cobb-Douglas preferences and technologies, there is no 
impact on the protected industry itself and its (direct and indirect) 
suppliers as upstream propagation results from two distinct effects – a 
price effect and a quantity effect - that exactly offset each other. 
Our theoretical predictions hinge strongly on two crucial features of the 
underlying model. First, we consider only the short-term effects of an 
idiosyncratic tariff hike imposed unilaterally on imported intermediates. 
This perspective ignores beggar-thy-neighbour policies, but can be 
justified on the ground that we aim to re-assess the optimality of import 
tariffs for the imposing country even before the risk of retaliation (see 
also Krugman, 2018). Our results suggest that, when all direct and 
indirect effects of a higher duty on goods used as input by other sectors 
are accounted for, the adoption of such a policy may prove 
counterproductive. 
Second, for computational convenience, we posit that production in 
every industry is described by a nested Cobb-Douglas-CES technology 
and we conceive import taxation as purely distortionary. These 
approximations do not allow to capture potential network effects due to 
changes in the composition of production factors used by firms and to 
the redistribution of the tax proceeds raised by the government. In any 
case, while tariff revenues may result in unproductive public spending 
(as exemplified by the massive boost to defence spending envisioned in 
Trump’s 2019 budget plan), Carvalho et al. (2017) show that the “labour 
substitution effect” is always weaker than the “output effect” 66. 
                                                          
66 Baqaee and Fahri (2018a) extend this result to a general class of economies with 
heterogeneous agents, arbitrary nested CES technologies and multiple production factors.  
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4.3 Border-adjustments in corporate profit taxation 
 
The simplified theoretical setting outlined in the previous section can 
also be used to examine the macroeconomic consequences of an 
alternative policy measure, which is currently under debate in the US 
and features a more comprehensive state action. Concerned with the fact 
that the US corporate tax system is biased against domestic production67, 
the Republican Party released in 2016 a radical corporate tax reform 
proposal. A key feature of their plan is the so-called border adjustment 
tax (BAT) that would make export sales deductible from the corporate 
tax base, while expenditure on imported inputs would not be deductible 
- in contrast with other costs such as wage bill and purchases of domestic 
intermediates.  
If we set 𝑡𝑖 = 0 for every 𝑖 and denote by 𝜏 the corporate profit tax rate 
uniform across all sectors, the analysis of the implications associated 
with the adoption of BAT requires only to introduce trade outflows into 
our model. For simplicity, we model exports from any industry 𝑖 as a 
given share 1 − 𝜗𝑖 of its total output, with 𝜗𝑖 close to 1. Then, net profits 
of representative firm 𝑖 can be written as:  
             𝜋𝑖 = (1 − 𝜏) (𝑝𝑖𝜗𝑖𝑦𝑖 −  𝑤𝑙𝑖 −∑𝑝𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
) +    
           + (1 − 𝜑𝜏)((1 − 𝜗𝑖)𝑝𝑖𝑦𝑖 −∑?̅?𝑗?̅?𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
)            (4.18) 
where 𝜑 = 1 under the current origin-based regime and 𝜑 = 0 under the 
newly proposed destination-based regime.  
                                                          
67 The US system subjects resident companies to corporate taxation based on their 
worldwide income, though allowing to defer the tax payment on profits earned abroad 
until they are remitted to the US. Such a system generates two potential distortions: it 
encourages US corporations either to strand profits abroad (lock-out effect) or to merge with 
a small corporation in a low-tax country (corporate inversion). 
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In Section 4.5.3 we show that, using the same price normalization as 
above, the change in the logarithm of the wage bill induced by a shift to 
border-adjusted corporate profit taxation is: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤𝑙(𝜑 = 0) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤𝑙(𝜑 = 1) =                                                                               
= 𝑣′ ⋅
(
 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
1 − 𝜏𝜗1
1 − 𝜏
⋮
𝑙𝑜𝑔
1 − 𝜏𝜗𝑛
1 − 𝜏 )
 
 
⏟            
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦
+ 𝑣′ ⋅ 𝐴
(
 
 
 
(𝜎1 − 1)
−1𝑙𝑜𝑔
(1 − 𝜏)𝜎1−1 + 𝜇1
𝜎1−1
1 + 𝜇1
𝜎1−1
⋮
(𝜎𝑛 − 1)
−1𝑙𝑜𝑔
(1 − 𝜏)𝜎𝑛−1 + 𝜇𝑛
𝜎𝑛−1
1 + 𝜇𝑛
𝜎𝑛−1 )
 
 
 
⏟                            
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑥
(4.19) 
In other words, the GDP response to the fiscal reform proposal results 
from the combined effect of BAT’s two key components: 
 an implicit import tax. By not allowing to deduct costs for 
imported intermediate goods, BAT forces importing industries 
to substitute away from these goods to the corresponding 
domestic ones. Against a drop in productivity, importing 
industries will then scale down their production. This output 
contraction, in turn, increases the (relative) price faced by the 
customers of the importing industries and induces a second 
round of adjustments as the latter will also react by lowering 
output, and so on. 
 an implicit export subsidy. By allowing to deduct export sales, 
BAT makes national goods more attractive on the world market. 
Exporting industries will then have an incentive to scale up their 
production. This output expansion, in turn, lowers the (relative) 
price faced by the customers of the exporting industries and 
induces a second round of adjustments as the latter will also 
react by rising output, and so on. 
Note that, when firms in all industries sell their output entirely on the 
internal market - i.e. 𝜗𝑖 = 1 for every 𝑖 -, the first term in equation 4.19 is 
zero and the difference in the logarithm of value added under the two 
corporate tax regimes takes on a negative sign. Thus, by continuity, that 
difference remains negative also for low sectoral export shares – i.e. 𝜗𝑖 
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close to 1 for every 𝑖68: the network propagation triggered by the implicit 
export subsidy is weaker than the network propagation triggered by the 
implicit import tax.  
This conclusion clearly depends on the simplified open-economy setting 
considered here. Yet, equation 4.19 still seems to suggest that the 
adoption of border adjustments as part of business income taxation may 
be costly in terms of GDP for countries with large trade deficits in sectors 
that take a central position within the production network. Hence, our 
analysis provides new food for thought in the debate about the 
desirability of the fiscal policy in question – beyond the role of currency 
adjustments (Fahri et al., 2017). 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
In recent years, support for free trade has weakened within developed 
countries and parties calling for state regulation of international trade 
have gained ground across Western democracies. The most striking 
example is that of the US, where the Trump administration has already 
imposed several rounds of tariffs in 2018 based on the claim of unfair 
competition from its trading partners. But do protective import duties 
really boost domestic production? To address this issue, the present 
paper develops a production network model in the spirit of Acemoglu 
et al. (2012, 2016) that features also imports of intermediate products 
from abroad. Such a theoretical framework allows to explicitly account 
for indirect effects due to interconnections among sectors in the form of 
input-output linkages. 
Our model suggests that a sector-specific input tariff increase leads to a 
contraction in aggregate value added. Indeed, immediate customers of 
the protected industry, faced with a higher price for the imported 
intermediate input variety, experience a fall in productivity and scale 
                                                          
68 Any logarithmic function is continuous over ℝ+ and the difference of two continuous 
functions is, in turn, a continuous function. 
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back their production; the consequent rise in the price (relative to the 
wage) of these sectors’ output creates an indirect negative effect on their 
own customers, and so on. There is, instead, no upstream propagation 
to the protected industry and its direct and indirect input suppliers as, 
with Cobb-Douglas technologies and preferences, price and quantity 
effects exactly cancel out. Thus, contrary to optimum tariff theory 
concerned only with final goods, we find that a (higher) protective duty 
imposed on goods used as inputs by other sectors does not necessarily 
work to the advantage of the imposing country, even before a trade war 
kicks off. As most of Trump’s tariffs are levied on intermediates, this 
result has important policy implications. 
Another policy currently under discussion in the US with the stated goal 
to foster domestic economic activity involves the introduction of border-
adjustments as part of corporate profit taxation. According to this 
proposal, the cost of imported inputs would no longer be deductible 
from the corporate tax base, while export sales could be excluded. In 
other words, tax jurisdiction would follow the location of consumption 
rather than the residence of the business or the source of its profits. By 
modelling exports from each industry simply as a constant share of its 
total output, we show that the change in GDP from a shift to border-
adjusted corporate profit taxation is determined by the combined effect 
of the implicit import tax and the implicit export subsidy: as a result of a 
powerful downstream propagation (of opposite sign), the former causes 
aggregate output to shrink, while the latter leads to its growth. For low 
sectoral export shares, the contractionary effect of the implicit import tax 
outweighs the expansionary effect of the implicit export subsidy. 
As already pointed out throughout, several important issues remain 
open to future research. First, we consider the formally simpler case 
where tax payments are a pure outflow of resources. An interesting 
exercise would be to reassess the macro-consequences of a sectoral input 
tariff hike (or a corporate-tax-based border adjustment) in the presence 
of productive public expenditure. Indeed, the latter may reshape 
propagation patterns over input-output linkages and so alter their 
aggregate implications. 
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Second, the production process at each node is here approximated by a 
nested Cobb-Douglas-CES production technology with constant returns 
to scale. One of the consequences of this assumption is that an industry’s 
expenditure on different inputs as a fraction of its sales is invariant to the 
realization of the shocks. If we were to impose more general production 
technologies, allowing for changes in the composition of production 
factors employed by firms, a higher tariff applied to a given imported 
intermediate good (or a shift to border-adjusted business income 
taxation) would impact aggregate output also via a labour substitution 
channel.  
Third, for tractability, our theoretical framework treats exports from any 
industry as a constant fraction of its output, considers the pass-through 
from a sector-specific input tariff onto the corresponding import price to 
be exogenous and postulates that the pre-tax price paid for each 
imported good is proportional to the price paid for the corresponding 
domestic good. These conditions do clearly not hold in practice. A more 
realistic large open economy representation would require to model also 
foreign consumer preferences as well as overseas production processes. 
Fourth, the present analysis ignores the response by other countries to 
the unilateral imposition of sectoral import tariffs. Yet, most recently the 
reaction to Trump’s tariffs suggests that trading partners are likely to 
implement retaliatory measures. As industries of highly industrialized 
economies are now embedded in a web of international transactions, a 
trade war would probably amplify the GDP loss we detect and, hence, 
our prediction may be interpreted as a lower bound on the true 
aggregate effect of sector-specific input tariffs. 
Finally, our open economy model features a world of only two countries 
- Home and Foreign. The extension to a multi-country setting would 
allow to assess also the impact of a country-specific sectoral input tariff 
shock (inter alia, the Trump administration set a 25 percent import duty 
on nearly 6,000 products imported from China). Differential tariff 
treatment across countries may give rise to trade diversion practices. 
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4.5 Proofs 
 
4.5.1 Proofs of results in Section 4.2.2 
 
Households. Taking prices and the wage rate as given, the 
representative household chooses how much to buy of each final good 
and how much labour to supply so as to maximize its utility subject to 
the budget constraint: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑐𝑖,𝑙
𝑈(𝑐, 𝑙) =  𝛾(𝑙)∏(𝑐𝑖)
𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
     𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜      𝐶 = ∑𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑐𝑖 = 𝑤𝑙 
The Lagrangian function for this problem can be written as: 
ℒ =  𝛾(𝑙)∏(𝑐𝑖)
𝛽𝑖  
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜆(𝑤𝑙 −∑𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑐𝑖).  
Differentiating this function with respect to 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑙, yields the following 
set of first-order conditions: 
𝛾′(𝑙)𝑈(𝑐, 𝑙)
𝛾(𝑙)
+ 𝜆𝑤 = 0 
 𝛽𝑖  (𝑐𝑖)
−1𝑈(𝑐, 𝑙) − 𝜆𝑝𝑖 = 0. 
From these conditions, it follows that:  
𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖 = −
𝛾(𝑙)
𝛾′(𝑙)
𝛽𝑖𝑤. 
Substituting the expression for 𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖 into the budget constraint of the 
representative household, we obtain: 
𝑙 = −
𝛾(𝑙)
𝛾′(𝑙)
. 
The optimal labour supply does not depend on the wage rate 𝑤 and is  
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completely determined by the household’s disutility from work. As a 
consequence, consumption spending on each final good is (positively) 
proportional to the household’s total budget: 𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑙. 
 
Industries. Taking prices and the wage rate as given, any sector 𝑖 chooses 
the amount of labour and of domestic and foreign intermediate inputs 
so as to maximize its net profits subject to the production technology and 
to the zero-profit condition: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑙𝑖,{𝑥𝑖𝑗}𝑗∈𝔗𝑛
,{?̅?𝑖𝑗}∈𝔗𝑛
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖𝑦𝑖 −  𝑤𝑙𝑖 −∑𝑝𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
−∑?̅?𝑗(1 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡𝑗)?̅?𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
  
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜       𝑦𝑖 = 𝑙𝑖
𝛼𝑖 ∏(𝑥
𝑖𝑗
𝜎𝑗−1
𝜎𝑗 + ?̅?
𝑖𝑗
𝜎𝑗−1
𝜎𝑗 )
𝜎𝑗
𝜎𝑗−1
𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑗𝜖𝒩𝑖
  𝑎𝑛𝑑    𝜋𝑖 = 0 
where 𝒩𝑖 ⊆ 𝔗𝑛 is the set of industries that supply industry 𝑖 with 
intermediate goods. The Lagrangian function for this problem is: 
            ℒ𝑖 =  𝑝𝑖𝑦𝑖 −  𝑤𝑙𝑖 −∑𝑝𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
−∑?̅?𝑗(1 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡𝑗)?̅?𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
+ 
                              + 𝜆𝑖
{𝑙𝑖
𝛼𝑖 ∏(𝑥
𝑖𝑗
𝜎𝑗−1
𝜎𝑗 + ?̅?
𝑖𝑗
𝜎𝑗−1
𝜎𝑗 )
𝜎𝑗
𝜎𝑗−1
𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑗𝜖𝒩𝑖
− 𝑦𝑖  
} 
with 𝜆𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖. Differentiating ℒ𝑖 with respect to 𝑙𝑖, 𝑥𝑖𝑗  and ?̅?𝑖𝑗 , yields the  
following set of first-order conditions: 
𝑙𝑖 =
𝑝𝑖𝛼𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑤
                                                (4.20) 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 =
𝑝𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑖
𝑝𝑗
[1 + (
𝑝𝑗
?̅?𝑗(1 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡𝑗)
)
𝜎𝑗−1
]
−1
                    (4.21) 
?̅?𝑖𝑗 =
𝑝𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑖
?̅?𝑗(1 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡𝑗)
[(
?̅?𝑗(1 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡𝑗)
𝑝𝑗
)
𝜎𝑗−1
+ 1]
−1
.            (4.22) 
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From the first condition, it follows that the labour cost in any industry is 
a constant fraction of its total sales: 
𝛼𝑖 =
𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑝𝑖𝑦𝑖
. 
Similarly, if we combine the other two conditions, we have that also the 
cost borne by any industry for each intermediate good is some constant 
fraction of its total sales: 
𝑎𝑖𝑗 =
𝑝𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 + ?̅?𝑗(1 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡𝑗)?̅?𝑖𝑗
𝑝𝑖𝑦𝑖
. 
 
Labour market-clearing condition. Recall that the wage rate 𝑤 is 
homogenous across industries. Summing up optimal labour costs for all 
industries, yields: 
𝑤∑𝑙𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
=∑𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
and, from the labour market-clearing condition, it follows: 
𝑤𝑙 = 𝛼 ⋅ 𝑠 
that is, the wage bill 𝑤𝑙 is equal to the scalar product of the vector of 
labour’s output elasticities and the vector of total sales. As equation 4.11 
and the property of constant returns to scale imply in turn: 
𝑉𝐴 =∑𝑝𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
−∑∑(𝑝𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 + ?̅?𝑗(1 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡𝑗)?̅?𝑖𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 𝛼 ⋅ 𝑠, 
it becomes therefore evident that the wage bill is equivalent to the 
aggregate value added (or GDP). 
 
Goods market-clearing condition. If, in the market-clearing condition 
for industry 𝑖 (equation 4.5), we substitute for the optimal demand of 𝑥𝑗𝑖   
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and ?̅?𝑗𝑖  by every industry 𝑗 (equations 4.21 and 4.22), we have: 
𝑝𝑖𝑦𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖 +∑𝑝𝑗𝑎𝑗𝑖𝑦𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
.                                   (4.23) 
In matrix form, the previous equality can be re-written as: 
[
1 − 𝑎11 ⋯ −𝑎𝑛1
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
−𝑎1𝑛 ⋯ 1 − 𝑎𝑛𝑛
] (
𝑝1𝑦1
⋮
𝑝𝑛𝑦𝑛
) = (
𝑝1𝑐1
⋮
𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑛
),  
Since the matrix on the left hand-side, [𝐼 − 𝐴′], is column diagonally 
dominant, it is non-singular and its inverse exists. Moreover, since the 
norm of 𝐴′ ≥ 0 is less than one, all the eigenvalues of 𝐴′ lie inside the unit 
circle and the following representation of [𝐼 − 𝐴′]−1 is possible: 
[𝐼 − 𝐴′]−1 = [𝐼 + 𝐴′ + (𝐴′)2 +⋯ ]. 
Therefore, the vector of total sectoral sales can be derived as: 
(
𝑝1𝑦1
⋮
𝑝𝑛𝑦𝑛
) = [𝐼 − 𝐴′]−1 (
𝑝1𝑐1
⋮
𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑛
) = [𝐼 + 𝐴′ + (𝐴′)2 +⋯](
𝑝1𝑐1
⋮
𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑛
). 
Total sales in any sector 𝑖 depend on the (nominal) demand for each 
domestic final good via the non-negative elements in the 𝑖th row of the 
matrix [𝐼 − 𝐴′]−1. That is, how much industry 𝑖 sells on the market is 
determined by the final demand, not only from the same industry, but 
also from all other industries, according to the importance of inland 
industry 𝑖 as a direct and indirect input supplier. 
 
4.5.2 Proofs of results in Section 4.2.3  
 
Effect of input tariff shock on GDP. In Section 4.5.1 we have shown 
that, as profits are zero in the presence of perfect competition and Cobb-
Douglas technologies with constant returns to scale and the wage rate is 
homogenous across industries, the total value added in the economy is 
simply equal to the wage bill 𝑤𝑙. In particular, if we recall that the 
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optimal labour supply 𝑙 is determined only by the disutility from work, 
all the effect will be captured by the wage rate 𝑤. 
Plugging the optimal factor demands of industry 𝑖 (equations 4.20-4.22) 
into its production technology (equation 4.2), applying the condition 
𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 = 1 and taking logs, yields: 
𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝𝑖 + 𝐻𝑖 +∑
𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝜎𝑗 − 1
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑙𝑜𝑔 [𝑝𝑗
1−𝜎𝑗 + (?̅?𝑗(1 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡𝑗))
1−𝜎𝑗] 
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ      𝐻𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑗 . 
For simplicity, we assume here that ?̅?𝑗 = 𝜇𝑗𝑝𝑗 for every 𝑗, with 𝜇𝑗 being 
a non-negative proportionality constant. Then, the previous equation 
becomes:  
  𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝𝑖 + 𝐻𝑖 +                                                                                   
 −∑𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝𝑗 +∑
𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝜎𝑗 − 1
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑙𝑜𝑔 [1 + (𝜇𝑗(1 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡𝑗))
1−𝜎𝑗
]     (4.24) 
or, in vector form:  
𝛼𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤 = [𝐼 − 𝐴]𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝 + 𝐻 + 𝐴
(
 
 
(𝜎1 − 1)
−1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [1 + (𝜇1(1 + 𝜀1𝑡1))
1−𝜎1
]
⋮
(𝜎𝑛 − 1)−1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [1 + (𝜇𝑛(1 + 𝜀𝑛𝑡𝑛))
1−𝜎𝑛
]
)
 
 
 
Since 𝐴 is a non-negative matrix and has all column sums less than one, 
the inverse of [𝐼 − 𝐴] exists and can be approximated by the convergent 
power series [𝐼 + 𝐴 + 𝐴2 +⋯ ]. Thus, if we pre-multiply both sides of the 
last equality by the so-called influence vector 𝑣′ = (1/𝑛)𝟏′[𝐼 − 𝐴]−1, we 
get: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤 =
1
𝑛
𝟏′𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝 + 𝑣′𝐻 + 𝑣′𝐴
(
 
 
(𝜎1 − 1)
−1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [1 + (𝜇1(1 + 𝜀1𝑡1))
1−𝜎1
]
⋮
(𝜎𝑛 − 1)−1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [1 + (𝜇𝑛(1 + 𝜀𝑛𝑡𝑛))
1−𝜎𝑛
]
)
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Finally, by choosing the average price normalization so that: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙 + 𝑣′𝐻 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔∏ 𝑝𝑖
1/𝑛𝑛
𝑖=1 = 0, 
we obtain: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙 = 𝑣′ ⋅ 𝐴
(
 
 
(𝜎1 − 1)
−1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [1 + (𝜇1(1 + 𝜀1𝑡1))
1−𝜎1
]
⋮
(𝜎𝑛 − 1)−1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [1 + (𝜇𝑛(1 + 𝜀𝑛𝑡𝑛))
1−𝜎𝑛
]
)
 
 
 
This characterization result highlights that a positive input tariff shock 
to any industry 𝑖 entails an overall loss in the logarithm of the economy’s 
total value added which stems from a cascade of downstream 
adjustments: indeed, faced with a higher relative price for the imported 
intermediate input variety, the immediate customers of industry 𝑖 are 
forced to replace it with the corresponding domestic variety; as a result, 
they experience a drop in productivity and will find it optimal to lower 
output by some amount, creating negative indirect effects also on their 
own customers and so on.  
 
Effect of input tariff shock on (relative) prices and consumption levels. 
For this part of the proof, let ?̂?𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖/𝑤 for every 𝑖. As 𝛼𝑖 = 1 − ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  
with 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0 and ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 < 1, equation 4.24 implies: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔?̂?𝑖 = −𝐻𝑖 +∑𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑙𝑜𝑔?̂?𝑖 −∑
𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝜎𝑗 − 1
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑙𝑜𝑔 [1 + (𝜇𝑗(1 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡𝑗))
1−𝜎𝑗
]   
or, in vector form: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔?̂? = −(𝐼 − 𝐴)−1 {𝐻 + 𝐴(
[𝜎1 − 1]
−1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [1 + (𝜇1(1 + 𝜀1𝑡1))
1−𝜎1
]
⋅⋅⋅
[𝜎𝑛 − 1]−1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [1 + (𝜇𝑛(1 + 𝜀𝑛𝑡𝑛))
1−𝜎𝑛
]
)} 
Thus, as a consequence of a tariff increase in industry 𝑖, all national 
industries that directly or indirectly rely on it witness a rise in their 
relative price.  
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Taking, instead, logs of the household’s optimal consumption spending 
on any commodity 𝑖 (equation 4.9), we have: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐𝑖 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛽𝑖 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔?̂?𝑖 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙 
or, in vector form: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐 = 𝟏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛽 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔?̂? 
From the expression for the equilibrium vector of relative prices, it 
follows then:   
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐(0) + (𝐼 − 𝐴)−1𝐴
(
 
 
[𝜎1 − 1]
−1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [1 + (𝜇1(1 + 𝜀1𝑡1))
1−𝜎1
]
⋮
[𝜎𝑛 − 1]−1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [1 + (𝜇𝑛(1 + 𝜀𝑛𝑡𝑛))
1−𝜎𝑛
]
)
 
 
,  
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ     𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐(0) = 𝟏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛽 
As total labour supply depends only on the disutility from work, it is 
evident that the effect of a sectoral input tariff shock on the final 
consumption of a given good is exactly opposite to the effect on the 
corresponding domestic relative price. This finding follows from the 
Cobb-Douglas nature of the household’s utility over final goods. 
 
Effect of input tariff shock on output levels. To evaluate the impact on 
sectoral output quantities, divide both sides of equation 4.23 by 𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖 and 
use the optimality condition for household consumption (equation 4.9): 
𝑦𝑖
𝑐𝑖
= 1 +∑
𝛽𝑗𝑎𝑗𝑖
𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑦𝑗
𝑐𝑗
 
In matrix form, the resulting system can be written as: 
[
 
 
 
 1 − 𝑎11 ⋯ −
𝛽𝑛
𝛽1
𝑎𝑛1
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
−
𝛽1
𝛽𝑛
𝑎1𝑛 ⋯ 1− 𝑎𝑛𝑛 ]
 
 
 
 
(
 
 
𝑦1
𝑐1
⋮
𝑦𝑛
𝑐𝑛)
 
 
= (
1
⋮
1
) 
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Under symmetric preferences - i.e. 𝛽𝑖 = 1/𝑛 for every 𝑖  (Acemoglu et al., 
2012) -, the matrix on the left-hand side simplifies to [𝐼 − 𝐴′]. As 𝐴′ is 
element-wise non-negative and has norm less than one, we can then 
express the equilibrium vector of output-to-consumption ratios as: 
(
 
 
𝑦1
𝑐1
⋮
𝑦𝑛
𝑐𝑛)
 
 
= [𝐼 − 𝐴′]−1 (
1
⋮
1
)  
Thus, in response to a sector-specific tariff increase, the quantity 
produced of any good varies in exactly the same way as the quantity 
consumed of the same good. This is a consequence of the Cobb-Douglas 
constant-returns-to-scale assumption for sectoral production functions. 
 
4.5.3 Proof of result in Section 4.3 
Under corporate profit taxation, the representative firm in any sector 𝑖 
solves the following maximization problem taking prices as given: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑙𝑖,{𝑥𝑖𝑗}𝑗∈𝔗𝑛
,{?̅?𝑖𝑗}𝑘∈𝔗𝑛
  𝜋𝑖 = (1 − 𝜏) (𝑝𝑖𝜗𝑖𝑦𝑖 −  𝑤𝑙𝑖 −∑𝑝𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
) +              
                                             +(1 − 𝜑𝜏) ((1 − 𝜗𝑖)𝑝𝑖𝑦𝑖 −∑?̅?𝑗?̅?𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
) 
     𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜        𝑦𝑖 = 𝑙𝑖
𝛼𝑖 ∏(𝑥
𝑖𝑗
𝜎𝑗−1
𝜎𝑗 + ?̅?
𝑖𝑗
𝜎𝑗−1
𝜎𝑗 )
𝜎𝑗
𝜎𝑗−1
𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑗𝜖𝒩𝑖
  𝑎𝑛𝑑    𝜋𝑖 = 0 
where 𝜑 = 1 in the presence of border-adjustments and 𝜑 = 0 otherwise.  
Taking the derivative of the corresponding Lagrangian function with 
respect to 𝑙𝑖, 𝑥𝑖𝑗  and ?̅?𝑖𝑗 , and applying the zero-profit condition, yields:  
𝑙𝑖 =
𝑝𝑖[1 − 𝜏(𝜗𝑖 + 𝜑(1 − 𝜗𝑖))]𝛼𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑤(1 − 𝜏)
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𝑥𝑖𝑠 =
𝑝𝑖[1 − 𝜏(𝜗𝑖 + 𝜑(1 − 𝜗𝑖))]𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑦𝑖
𝑝𝑠(1 − 𝜏)
[1 + (
𝑝𝑠(1 − 𝜏)
?̅?𝑠(1 − 𝜑𝜏)
)
𝜎𝑠−1
]
−1
 
?̅?𝑖𝑠 =
𝑝𝑖[1 − 𝜏(𝜗𝑖 + 𝜑(1 − 𝜗𝑖))]𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑦𝑖
?̅?𝑠(1 − 𝜑𝜏)
[(
?̅?𝑠(1 − 𝜑𝜏)
𝑝𝑠(1 − 𝜏)
)
𝜎𝑠−1
+ 1]
−1
 
Note that, in the absence of border-adjustments, the optimal demand for  
inputs is independent of 𝜏; uniform corporate profit taxation affects 
optimal input choice only when it discriminates between domestic and 
imported production factors.  
Next, if we substitute the first-order conditions of representative firm 𝑖 
into its production function, take logs of both sides and use the fact that 
𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 = 1, we get: 
𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝𝑖 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔[1 − 𝜏(𝜗𝑖 + 𝜑(1 − 𝜗𝑖))] − 𝛼𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 − 𝜏) + 𝐻𝑖 +     
     +∑
𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝜎𝑗 − 1
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑙𝑜𝑔 [(𝑝𝑗(1 − 𝜑𝜏))
1−𝜎𝑗
+ (?̅?𝑗(1 − 𝜑𝜏))
1−𝜎𝑗
] 
where again 𝐻𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑗 . Under the assumption of a 
(positive) proportional relationship between domestic and foreign 
sectoral input prices, the resulting system of equations can be written in 
vector notation as: 
𝛼 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤 = (𝐼 − 𝐴)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
1 − 𝜏(𝜗1 + 𝜑(1 − 𝜗1))
⋮
1 − 𝜏(𝜗𝑛 + 𝜑(1 − 𝜗𝑛))
) − 𝛼 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 − 𝜏) + 
            +𝐻 + 𝐴(
(𝜎1 − 1)
−1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [(1 − 𝜏)1−𝜎1 + (𝜇1(1 − 𝜑𝜏))
1−𝜎1
]
⋮
(𝜎𝑛 − 1)
−1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [(1 − 𝜏)1−𝜎𝑛 + (𝜇𝑛(1 − 𝜑𝜏))
1−𝜎𝑛
]
) 
Finally, pre-multiplying both sides of the last equality by the influence 
vector 𝑣′ = (1/𝑛)𝟏′[𝐼 − 𝐴]−1, and normalizing the average price so that: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙 + 𝑣′𝐻 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔∏𝑝𝑖
1/𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 0 
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we obtain: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙 = 𝑣′𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
1 − 𝜏(𝜗1 + 𝜑(1 − 𝜗1))
⋮
1 − 𝜏(𝜗𝑛 + 𝜑(1 − 𝜗𝑛))
) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 − 𝜏) +                 
                   +𝑣′ ⋅ 𝐴 (
(𝜎1 − 1)
−1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [(1 − 𝜏)1−𝜎1 + (𝜇1(1 − 𝜑𝜏))
1−𝜎1
]
⋮
(𝜎𝑛 − 1)
−1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [(1 − 𝜏)1−𝜎𝑛 + (𝜇𝑛(1 − 𝜑𝜏))
1−𝜎𝑛
]
) 
Thus, the change in the logarithm of value added arising from the 
inclusion of border-adjustments into corporate profit taxation amounts 
to: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤𝑙(𝜑 = 0) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤𝑙(𝜑 = 1) =                                                                            
        = 𝑣′ ⋅
(
 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
1 − 𝜏𝜗1
1 − 𝜏
⋮
𝑙𝑜𝑔
1 − 𝜏𝜗𝑛
1 − 𝜏 )
 
 
+ 𝑣′ ⋅ 𝐴
(
 
 
 
(𝜎1 − 1)
−1𝑙𝑜𝑔
(1 − 𝜏)𝜎1−1 + 𝜇1
𝜎1−1
1 + 𝜇1
𝜎1−1
⋮
(𝜎𝑛 − 1)
−1𝑙𝑜𝑔
(1 − 𝜏)𝜎𝑛−1 + 𝜇𝑛
𝜎𝑛−1
1 + 𝜇𝑛
𝜎𝑛−1 )
 
 
 
 
where the first term on the right-hand side reflects the positive (direct 
and indirect) effect of the implicit export subsidy and the second term 
captures the negative (direct and indirect) effect of the implicit import 
tax. 
 
4.5.4 Cobb-Douglas-CES utility function 
In Section 4.2, we study the implications of a tariff hike targeted at 
imported intermediate goods in the presence of input-output linkages 
among industries. To this end, we postulate, for simplicity, that the 
representative household derives utility only from final goods produced 
by domestic industries.   
Let us now suppose, instead, that the sector-specific final good 
consumption 𝑐𝑖 is, in turn, a CES combination of a quantity 𝑓𝑖 purchased 
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from domestic producers at price 𝑝𝑖  and a quantity 𝑓?̅?  purchased from 
foreign producers at price ?̅?𝑖(1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑖): 
𝑐𝑖 = [𝑓𝑖
𝜌𝑖−1
𝜌𝑖 + 𝑓̅
𝑖
𝜌𝑖−1
𝜌𝑖 ]
𝜌𝑖
𝜌𝑖−1
 
where 𝜌𝑖 > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and 
foreign variety of the final good produced within sector 𝑖. The 
maximization problem for the representative household then implies:  
𝑓𝑖 =
𝑤𝑙𝛽𝑖
𝑝𝑖
[1 + (𝜇𝑖(1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑖))
1−𝜌𝑖]
−1
 
𝑓?̅? =
𝑤𝑙𝛽𝑖
?̅?𝑖(1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑖)
[1 + (𝜇𝑖(1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑖))
1−𝜌𝑖]
−1
 
Yet, as all sectoral production technologies exhibit constant returns to 
scale, prices are independent of the demand side and the log of aggregate 
value added is still given by equation 4.14.  
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